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#PRÉSIDENTIELLE2017 
A CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF THE 2017 FRENCH 
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ON TWITTER 
 
Fanny Macé, Ph.D. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2019 
 
Supervisor: Carl S. Blyth 
 
In the context of the 2017 French presidential election, this dissertation 
examines political discourse on Twitter from a socio-semiotic perspective. 
Specifically, it focuses on campaign tweets as a unique genre of discourse that 
plays a pivotal role in the dissemination and amplification of political 
discourse. This study uses an innovative framework which combines two 
approaches to discourse analysis: Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and 
Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL). CDA and SFL are socially-oriented 
approaches to discourse which share a dialectical view of text-in-context 
whereby discourse shapes and is shaped by the social and cultural context in 
which it occurs (Fairclough, 2003; Hasan, 2014). I draw on Norman 
Fairclough’s concept of ‘order of discourse’, which refers to a unique 
configuration of genres, discourses and styles constitutive of a social practice 
or structure (Fairclough, 1993). I suggest that digital campaigning constitutes 
a growing social practice with its own order of discourse, and I examine how 
the 2017 presidential candidates mobilized particular discursive mechanisms 
to realize a variety of discourses (ideologies) and styles (identities). In addition, 
 vii 
I analyze how they exploited the generic affordances and constraints of tweets 
to their advantage. To this end, I collected a total of 208 tweets from six main 
actors of the 2017 election: outgoing president François Hollande and 
candidates Emmanuel Macron, Marine Le Pen, François Fillon, Jean-Luc 
Mélenchon and Benoît Hamon. All tweets were posted in reaction to three 
events of significance for the election. This dissertation provides an in-depth, 
multifunctional analysis that focuses on ideational, interpersonal and textual 
ways of meaning-making: (1) transitivity and social actor representation, (2) 
modality and engagement and (3) texture and generic structure. I argue that 
the 2017 election was above all characterized by an effort of the candidates to 
distance themselves from the political class. I suggest that this anti-
establishment sentiment was realized by two ‘styles of politics’: the populist 
style and the centrist style. Finally, I argue that the structural constraints of 
tweets amplify these populist appeals through the combination of 
decontextualization and semantic condensation.  
 
Key words: French, Critical Discourse Analysis, Systemic Functional 
Linguistics, social semiotics, political discourse, social media, Twitter. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
Rhetoric is the art of ruling the minds of men. 
Plato. 
 
 
Paris. May 7, 2017. Thousands of women and men of all ages are 
gathered next to the majestic glass pyramid on the Louvre’s plaza. Cheers 
erupt as a triumphant Emmanuel Macron enters the esplanade to the sound 
of Beethoven’s Ode to Joy, the anthem of the European Union. In his victory 
speech against far-right leader Marine Le Pen, the 39 year-old president-elect 
thanks the French nation: “You have chosen audacity.”1 Fast forward to 
December 9, 2018. A crowd of protesters in fluorescent yellow vests stand in 
front of the Louvre’s heavy metal gates. Sirens can be heard in the background 
and the air is filled with thick plumes of tear gas. For the fourth consecutive 
weekend, the Gilets Jaunes are chanting what has become their rallying cry: 
Macron, démission! (‘Macron, resignation!’). The next day, a somber, haggard-
looking Macron issues a televised apology in a bid to appease the tensions that 
led to the worst street unrest since 1968: “I might have given you the 
impression that I did not share your concerns, that my priorities were 
                                                 
1 “Vous avez choisi l’audace.” 
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elsewhere. I know that I have hurt some of you with my words.”2 Yet, this 
humbling admission did little to quell the anger of the protesters, who 
dismissed it as “crumbs” from le président des riches - a label Macron has 
acquired since he took office. Now several months into 2019, the Gilets Jaunes 
remain bound and determined, and Macron’s approval ratings continue to 
nosedive. While there are multiple and complex factors behind the spectacular 
rise of candidate-Macron and his equally remarkable fall as president, the 
concept of ‘discursive identity’ can shed light on this apparent mystery. Modern 
elections are very much centered around the notion of performance (Goffman, 
1959), and on the necessity to craft an identity that will appeal to a wide array 
of voters. Accordingly, a successful presidential bid relies primarily on the 
strategic use of discourse for self-promoting purposes. As we will see 
throughout this dissertation, numerous discursive strategies contribute to this 
crafting process.   
A former investment banker, Macron ran on the catchphrase ni de 
droite, ni de gauche (‘neither right nor left’) and vowed to usher a new political 
era that would transcend the traditional left-right divide. On the campaign 
trail, he took the part of a televangelist preaching the gospel of a united and 
rejuvenated nation. We may argue that Macron’s 2017 campaign epitomizes 
                                                 
2 “J'ai pu donner le sentiment que ce n'était pas mon souci, que j'avais d'autres priorités. Je 
sais qu'il m'est arrivé de blesser certains d'entre vous par mes propos.”  
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the triumph of form over substance; He was en marche (‘going forward’) but his 
path remained unclear, he claimed that he had a projet for France but he never 
quite revealed its nature (Gaboulaud & Lechevallier, 2018).Yet, his undying 
optimism led many to entertain the hope that he was l’homme providentiel at 
a time when an overwhelming majority of voters were dissatisfied with 
mainstream politics. In the spring of 2017, the French political climate was 
indeed defined by political fragmentation, public apathy and lack of 
engagement in politics. A nationwide survey released in January 20173 
revealed that 89% of participants (n = 2044) did not trust their political leaders. 
In such a deeply demoralized and divided country. Macron’s positive vision 
appealed particularly to young voters.  In a jab at outgoing president François 
Hollande, Macron promised that he would not “pretend to be a normal 
president”. Instead, he aspired for exceptionalism and strong leadership. As he 
sat on the throne of the Elysée in the summer of 2017, Macron traded his 
‘catch-all’ campaign persona for that of a Republican monarch. His most recent 
predecessors – Chirac, Sarkozy and Hollande – attempted to increase their 
proximity to the French people by addressing them in a simple, accessible 
manner. In contrast, Macron reckoned that what he perceives as linguistic 
superiority, such as his frequent use of archaic and erudite words, would assert 
his superiority as a political leader (Gaboulaud & Lechevallier, 2018). Yet 
                                                 
3 Cevipof (Sciences Po), January 2017: Political Trust Barometer.  
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instead of gaining the respect and the legitimacy he craved, Macron has built 
a reputation for arrogance and imperiousness. Importantly, the public’s 
frustration and feeling of alienation towards a political class they perceive as 
deceitful and out-of-touch has contributed to the rise of populism across 
western democracies (Wodak, 2015). With his boastful yet simplistic rhetoric, 
Donald Trump is the archetype of the ‘antipolitician’. Simple phrasing and 
basic lexicon make his short, to-the-point statements portray assertiveness in 
addition to being easy to grasp by the audience (Kreis, 2017). Above all, Trump 
embodies an utter rejection of the political establishment. In recent years, 
populist movements – including Trump’s MAGA movement – have been 
exploiting social media to their advantage. Twitter stands out due to its 
character limit, which requires users to compress their messages into short 
‘microposts’. Because of this concision constraint, tweets are convenient 
vehicles for sound bites, buzzwords and empty catchphrases (Longhi, 2013). 
Moreover, the instantaneity and ubiquity of social media means that any 
message can be widely distributed with infinitesimal delay (Zappavigna, 2012).  
This dissertation examines the impact of Twitter on political discourse in 
the context of the 2017 French presidential election. Specifically, it focuses on 
campaign tweets as a unique genre of discourse that plays a pivotal role in the 
dissemination and amplification of political discourse. In the remainder of this 
chapter, I establish the context and rationale for the development of this study. 
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After providing a short description of the 2017 election and of the concept of 
‘Twitter politics’, I introduce my conceptual framework as well as the main 
goals of the analysis. I then present the research questions that have guided 
my analysis and conclude with a brief outline of each chapter. 
 
Context of the study 
The 2017 French presidential election  
Under the current voting system established in the 1960’s, presidential 
elections are conducted in two rounds, or tours. The first round (premier tour) 
is open to any candidate with 500 signatures of support from elected 
officials. Some of these candidates are nominated by political parties, while 
others run as independents. A run-off (second tour) between the two leading 
candidates is then held two weeks after the first ballot. In the last election, the 
first round took place on April 23, 2017 and included eleven candidates. On 
May 7, a run-off opposed centrist independent Emmanuel Macron and 
National Front leader Marine Le Pen, which Macron won by a comfortable 
margin (66%). 
The 2017 election was unique in many respects, and a cascade of events 
led to a highly unpredictable campaign that ultimately redefined the French 
political landscape. First, the tense political climate provided a fertile ground 
for populist movements and political outsiders, and resulted in the dislocation 
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of France’s traditional left-right axis, which opposed the center-left Parti 
Socialiste and the center-right Républicains. Widespread distrust and 
dissatisfaction with mainstream parties led the 2017 electorate to privilege 
outsiders rather than the traditional party heavyweights. On November 27, 
2016, François Fillon defied every poll with a landslide victory in the 
Republican primary election. Former president Nicolas Sarkozy, who had been 
yearning for a comeback, retired from political life shortly after his defeat. A 
few days later, President François Hollande announced that he would not seek 
reelection amidst dismal approval ratings. Benoît Hamon won the subsequent 
Socialist primary, but he failed to gain any momentum during the general 
election. As a result, a portion of Republican and Socialist voters defected to 
so-called ‘anti-establishment’ candidates, namely far-right National Front 
leader Marine Le Pen and far-left independent Jean-Luc Mélenchon. The two 
populist contestants found an unforeseen rival in Emmanuel Macron, who 
launched his independent platform En Marche! (‘Forward!’) only a year prior 
to the election. Macron and Le Pen took the lead after the first round, which 
resulted into an unprecedented runoff from which both traditional blocks had 
been excluded.  
Moreover, the campaign was laden with scandals and allegations of 
corruption, which contributed to its unpredictability. After winning the 
primary, Republican nominee François Fillon quickly established himself as 
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one of the election’s frontrunners. Little did he predict that a financial scandal 
would soon rattle his political career. On January 25, 2017, the French tabloid 
Le Canard Enchaîné published shocking allegations that Fillon’s wife, 
Penelope Fillon, received nearly €500,000 as parliamentary assistant to her 
husband – a position she never actually occupied. The scandal, which became 
known as ‘Fillongate’ or ‘Penelopegate’, led to Fillon being put under criminal 
investigation just a few months before the first round of the election. Despite 
damning evidence and a sharp drop in opinion polls, Fillon adamantly refused 
to step down and continued to paint himself as the innocent victim of a political 
assassination. Fillongate was not the only scandal to rock the election, 
however. Like Fillon, Marine Le Pen faced several allegations of misused 
European funds, even though the affair did not appear to deter her supporters. 
On the opposite side of the political aisle, internal divisions added turmoil to 
an already fragile Socialist Party. Indeed, several prominent Socialists broke 
their vow to support the party’s nominee, and former prime minister Manuel 
Valls was dubbed a traitor after his public endorsement of Emmanuel Macron.  
Finally, the threat of terrorism loomed over the 2017 campaign, which 
took place during a state of emergency (état d’urgence) following an attack on 
the Champs Elysées just three days before the first round of the election. Once 
a pariah, the National Front experienced a surge in popularity after the 2015 
Paris attack and the 2016 Nice attack, amidst heightened anxiety and ethnic 
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tensions. Since Marine Le Pen won its leadership in 2011, the far-right party 
has progressively established itself as a substantial political and electoral 
player within France’s partisan landscape.  
 
The age of Twitter Politics  
There is perhaps no better illustration of the impact of social media on 
contemporary politics than Donald Trump. The U.S. President uses his Twitter 
handle @realdonaldtrump as an official channel of communication, and his 
relentless ‘tweeting’ has become a running feature of American news cycles 
(Kreis, 2017; Oates & Moe, 2017). Because they provide increased visibility and 
proximity to the electorate, social networks have become an essential part of 
modern political campaigns (Parmelee & Bichard, 2012). Fundamentally, the 
advent of the participatory web has rendered the online/offline separation 
obsolete, as most of what transpires in the cyberspace now bleeds onto the “real 
world” (Bouvier, 2015). A case in point is former French president François 
Hollande, who took offense when a journalist suggested that his lack of 
participation on social media had contributed to his poor approval ratings 
(Larrouturou, 2013).  
Created in 2006, Twitter has grown from a minimalist microblogging 
service to a popular social network offering wide interactive functionality 
(Dayter, 2014). In its early days, Twitter was heralded as an egalitarian 
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platform with the potential to bridge the gap between the public and their 
political leaders and to broaden political dialogue (Marwick, 2013; 
KhosraviNik, 2018). A decade later, most of these utopian hopes have vanished 
as the public feels increasingly alienated and disengaged from political life 
(Cevipof, 2017). Research suggests that most politicians view Twitter as a 
unidirectional form of communication rather than as an opportunity to interact 
with the public (Cunningham, 2013).  As such, they use their Twitter accounts 
mainly for self-promotion and for broadcasting their opinions (Page, 2012; Enli 
& Skogerbø, 2013). Moreover, Twitter allows electoral candidates to post real-
time campaign updates and thus to increase their visibility rather than relying 
solely on traditional media outlets. During elections, campaign interventions 
are often shared synchronously on social media, relaying interviews, rallies 
and debates (De Cock & Roginsky, 2014). Finally, because it provides visibility 
independently from traditional mass media, Twitter can assist political 
outsiders in building a following outside of mainstream parties (KhosraviNik, 
2018).  
Research focus and methodology 
This dissertation examines the 2017 French presidential election with a 
focus on discourse, and on how discourse relates to other social elements, such 
as ideologies, institutions, and identities. Specifically, it provides an in-depth, 
10 
 
multi-layered analysis of 208 campaign tweets and of the linguistic 
mechanisms invested in their production. The tweets were posted in reaction 
to three real-world events symptomatic of the trends discussed in the previous 
section: (a) President Hollande’s announcement that he would not seek 
reelection, (b) the Fillongate scandal and (c) the Champs Elysées terror attack 
which occurred days before the election. The analysis centers on the main five 
2017 presidential candidates (Emmanuel Macron, Marine Le Pen, François 
Fillon, Jean-Luc Mélenchon and Benoît Hamon) and on their reactions to these 
particular events. Moreover, the tweets of outgoing president François 
Hollande are also included in the study due to his status as the official 
‘presidential voice’ during the 2017 election. The purpose of this analysis is to 
investigate how each candidate frames (i.e., reports, evaluates and 
contextualizes) events according to the context of situation and to their own 
ideological motivations. I examine the discursive strategies involved in this 
framing process and how they relate to particular ideological discourses. In 
this context, I approach ideology not as a set of personal beliefs, but as a 
dynamic dimension of social practices, including discursive practices.  
My framework is anchored in the field of social semiotics, i.e., in a 
conceptualization of language as social practice and of text as “life mediated 
through the symbolic system of language.” (Eggins, 2004, p. 352). I draw from 
two socially-oriented approaches to discourse analysis: Norman Fairclough’s 
11 
 
dialectical-relational approach to Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and 
Michael Halliday’s Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL)4. CDA is concerned 
with the relationship between discourse, power and ideology. One of the 
founders of the discipline, Norman Fairclough, describes the aims of CDA as 
follows:  
to systematically explore often opaque relationships of causality and 
determination between (a) discursive practices and (b) wider social and 
cultural structures, relations and processes; to investigate how such 
practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by 
relations of power and struggles over power. (Fairclough, 1995, p.132). 
As such, a critical approach to discourse analysis focuses on the means by 
which power is exerted in discourse. CDA researchers share an understanding 
of ideology as “ideas, discourse, or signifying practices in the service of the 
struggle to acquire or maintain power” (Woolard, 1998, p.7). They suggest that 
most ideological beliefs are not consciously held and are manifested as 
“common-sense assumptions” (Fairclough, 1989, p.2). Accordingly, CDA seeks 
to provide a framework for uncovering latent or hidden ideological content 
through close textual analysis (Wodak & Meyer, 2001, p. 8). Fairclough has a 
‘dialectical-relational’ approach to discourse, meaning that he believes that 
“any discursive practice is defined by its relations with others, and draws upon 
others in complex ways” (Fairclough, 1992, p.55). Key to this approach is the 
                                                 
4 I discuss this framework in more detail in chapter 4.  
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concept of ‘orders of discourse’, which posits that discourse permeates social 
structures through unique configurations of (a) genres, (b) discourses and (c) 
styles. First, discourse can be structured into recognizable genres (such as 
church sermons or job interviews). Second, it represents reality as shaped by 
particular ideologies and value systems. For instance, the reality of abortion is 
represented differently in ‘pro-life’ and in ‘pro-choice’ discourses. Finally, 
discourse contributes to speaker identification and group affiliation in the form 
of styles (Fairclough, 1992, 2003). 
This dissertation looks at orders of discourse through the methodological 
lens of Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL). SFL conceptualizes language as 
“a grammatical system that interrelates with its surrounding discourse” 
(Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999, p.27). Halliday’s systemic-functional 
grammar is based on the premise that texts ‘realize’ meanings through the 
medium of ‘lexicogrammar’ (Halliday, 1994). These elements (social meanings, 
texts and lexicogrammar) form a semiotic system interacting with the 
demands of social functions (Halliday, 1992). Indeed, Halliday (1978) argues 
that the clause is a realization of three major strands of meanings, or 
‘metafunctions’: ideational, interpersonal and textual. The ideational 
metafunction is involved in the representation of the speaker’s experience, 
while the interpersonal metafunction contributes to creating and maintaining 
social relationships. Finally, the textual metafunction relates to the 
13 
 
organization of the text in a cohesive and coherent way. Most importantly, 
these three meanings are fused together in all linguistic units (Eggins, 2004). 
In this respect, they relate closely to Fairclough’s orders of discourse:  
Particular semantic relations or grammatical categories and relations 
will be seen as primarily associated with either genres, or discourses, or 
styles. ‘Primarily’, because there is not a simple one-to-one relation – so 
for instance modality will be seen as primarily associated with styles, 
but also germane to genres and discourses. (Fairclough, 2003, p.67) 
In other words, the elements of orders of discourse are dialectically related as 
they work together to realize meaning. As such, considering all three ways of 
meaning-making can help uncover a more comprehensive picture of the 
discursive practices that permeate social structures (Fairclough, 2003). In the 
context of this study, I posit that campaign tweets are part of a unique order 
of discourse within the growing social practice that is digital campaigning. I 
make use of systemic-functional methodology in light of Fairclough’s 
dialectical-relational approach rather than as a separate method. Accordingly, 
my analysis centers on lexicogrammatical categories that link the text 
(campaign tweets) to its socio-cultural context (the 2017 French election): (a) 
transitivity and representation, (b) modality and engagement and (c) texture 
and generic structure. SFL seeks to explain how grammar realizes meanings 
while CDA asks how these meanings can be used to exert influence over others, 
and how they reflect unbalanced relationships between powerful and weaker 
groups (Fairclough, 1992; van Dijk, 1993). A combination of both approaches 
14 
 
can thus highlight how speakers construe ideology through the foregrounding 
of particular patterns of linguistic choices. My decision to focus on three specific 
events rather than on the election as a whole is contingent on the argument 
that all discourse is designed for a particular time, place, and audience 
(Halliday, 1976; Bell, 1984). Indeed, CDA views social processes as historically 
situated and therefore as relative to the socio-cultural context within which 
they unfold (Wodak & Meyer, 2001). As such, each event analyzed in this study 
constitutes a unique ‘context of situation’ (Martin, 2000) that contributes to 
the 2017 election’s broader narrative. 
Relevance and contribution to the field 
Political discourse is in constant evolution with the emergence of new 
modes and forms of communication. As more of human existence is being 
catalogued online, there is a growing need to adapt existing methodological 
tools to digital environments (Herring, 2013). In this context, the role of social 
media in political elections has become a popular research topic over recent 
years (Chadwick & Howard, 2009). This is especially true of sentiment 
analysis, which has been applied to a vast array of studies for political 
forecasting or assessing candidate popularity (Tumasjan, Sprenger, Sandner, 
& Welpe, 2010). While it can offer valuable insights, automated analysis is not 
designed to handle idiosyncrasies of political opinion or linguistic 
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incongruence. Because they rely on tweet volume and on all-purpose sentiment 
lexicons, probabilistic models are indeed geared towards capturing overall 
mood or sentiment rather than ideological content: 
[T]he extreme affective conceptualization shies away from notions such 
as critique, ideology and shades of social constructivism to the 
advantage of a de-politicalized, super-localized analysis. This is not to 
cast away the potential of affective analysis in attempting to understand 
how people are moved, and what attracts them. (KhosraviNik, 2018, 
p.432).   
To improve our understanding of Twitter as a strategic tool for political 
communication, it is necessary to extend the analytical depth of social media 
research (Unger et al., 2016). Critical approaches to discourse locate the 
impetus for discursive change in socio-cultural conditions, and are concerned 
with the broader social ramifications that lie within particular instances of 
discursive practice (Wodak & Meyer, 2001). CDA is a fitting approach to 
political discourse at it aims to show how ideologies and relations of power 
shape discourse through particular discursive strategies (Fairclough, 1992). To 
this end, it merges both discourse analysis and critical social theory:  
[D]iscourse analysis specifically aims to show how the cognitive, social, 
historical, cultural, or political contexts of language use and 
communication impinge on the contents, meanings, structures, or 
strategies of text or dialogue, and vice versa, how discourse itself is an 
integral part of and contributes to the structures of these contexts. (van 
Dijk, 1991, p.45) 
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CDA and SFL are both concerned with exploring the mediating links between 
social forms and forms of talk, and can be combined into a systematic study of 
linguistic structures within their socio-cultural context of production. While 
both approaches have been used in multiple contexts, very few studies have 
attempted to apply them to social media. Indeed, the majority of studies 
employing CDA still focus on texts in traditional settings, such as official 
speeches or newspaper articles. Moreover, there has been little application of 
either approach to French data, and existing research on French political 
discourse typically favors lexicometric and logometric approaches (Mayaffre, 
2004; Longhi, 2013).  
This dissertation makes use of an innovative methodology for the 
qualitative analysis of French online data. To the best of my knowledge, this is 
the first extensive study to undertake a multi-functional analysis of French 
political discourse on social media. Hence, I hope to provide a reusable 
framework that can be operationalized and extended to future research. This 
study acknowledges the limitations of qualitative analysis but seeks to show 
that CDA can provide valuable social and political insights when combined 
with systemic-functional analysis. My goal is not to infer broad generalizations 
on digital campaigning, but rather to unmask some of the most salient 
discursive strategies used by French politicians to exploit Twitter for political 
and electoral gain. I argue that a critical approach to online discourse can 
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provide useful insights not obtainable with big data. Finally, it has been 
suggested that integrating SFL methods into CDA research can reduce 
researcher bias by allowing greater sensitivity to texts and thus resulting in 
more precise, transparent analysis (Young & Fitzgerald, 2006, p.53). 
 
Research Questions  
My analysis was guided by the following Research Questions:  
(a) How do the 2017 candidates mobilize discursive strategies to represent 
social actors and events in particular ways? How do these 
representations reflect and realize particular discourses and ideologies?   
 
(b) Which lexicogrammatical resources do the candidates draw from to 
express their personal attitudes and stances? How are these discursive 
strategies mobilized in the construction of distinctive ‘styles of politics’?  
 
(c) What discursive and techno-discursive features characterize campaign 
tweets as a unique genre of discourse?  How do these features benefit or 
hinder political communication?  
Based on previous research, I set forth a series of hypotheses. Because of 
Twitter’s imposed character limit5, I hypothesized that campaign tweets would 
                                                 
5 The original 140 character-limit was expanded to 280 characters on November 7, 2017.  
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contain few evidentials or mitigators for the sake of concision. Next, it has been 
posited that Twitter is a ‘hybrid medium’ which shares both spoken and 
written characteristics (Zappavigna, 2012; Paveau, 2013). However, because of 
the official nature of presidential elections, I expected campaign tweets to favor 
standard French and to avoid playful features such as neologisms or non-
standard orthography and punctuation. Additionally, I hypothesized that the 
candidates would use hashtags in order to add context and to increase the 
reach of their tweets, rather than for creative purposes. However, I predicted 
that candidates who brand themselves as ‘anti-establishment’ would be more 
likely to transgress linguistic norms in an attempt to distance themselves from 
mainstream politicians. Finally, I also expected some variation from one event 
to the next, as each event constitutes its own context of situation. The Champs 
Elysées attack, for instance, calls for more formality than the Fillon affair, 
which turned Fillon into an object of ridicule.  
 
Organization of the dissertation 
Chapter 2 provides a review of the scholarship on the relationship between 
discourse, power and ideology. Moreover, it discusses modern trends in 
political discourse, such as personalization, conversationalization and 
marketization.  
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Chapter 3 discusses past and current research on Twitter and its role in 
present-day politics. Furthermore, it explores the techno-discursive dimension 
of Twitter and its application to political discourse.   
Chapter 4 describes the theoretical framework underlying this study, and 
outlines the methods used to collect the data and to conduct the analysis.  
Chapter 5 introduces and describes the findings for each phase of analysis 
(i.e., transitivity, modality and generic structure).  
Chapter 6 provides a general discussion of these findings and reframes them 
within the concept of ‘orders of discourse’. It concludes the study with a 
summary of the main findings and lays out avenues for further research.  
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Chapter 2  
Background: A Socio-semiotic Approach to Political 
Discourse 
 
Le politique fait moins le discours que le discours ne fait le politique. 
Christian Le Bart.  
 
Introduction 
The King’s Speech, a 2009 film based on historical events, portrays the 
trials and tribulations of George VI of England as he struggles to assert his 
legitimate authority due to his speech impediment. The critically acclaimed 
film reminds us that successful politicians are primarily skilled public 
speakers and, crucially, that language is a vehicle for power. This first review 
chapter explores the relationship between discourse, power and ideology. The 
first section centers on the notion of discourse as a social practice and 
introduces Norman Fairclough’s concept of ‘orders of discourse’, which refer to 
unique combinations of genres, discourses and styles that circulate within a 
given social field (Fairclough, 1992, 2001, 2003). I then discuss the 
conceptualization(s) of discourses as ‘frames’ through which speakers construe 
the social world, as well as the distinction between ideological frames and 
rhetorical frames (Chilton, 1996; Lakoff, 1996).  Finally, the last section 
explores the concept of ‘presidential ethos’ through two interrelated 
phenomena in modern political discourse: personalization (Karnoven, 2009) 
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and narrativization. Due to elections becoming more personalized (i.e. focused 
on individual political actors rather than collective parties), candidates must 
indeed convince their electorate of their legitimacy with compelling narratives 
(Gupta-Carlson, 2016).  
 
Discourse as social practice 
Genres, discourses, and styles   
The core premise of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is that discourse 
is a social endeavor. As such, CDA is a “social-semiotic approach to discourse 
analysis” (Slade & Eggins, 1997, p.24) which approaches texts as social 
instances of meaning-making (Fairclough, 2003, p.11).  CDA is partially rooted 
in social constructionism, which posits that all aspects of reality are social 
constructs. This constructionist approach to social reality is at the core of 
Michel Foucault’s discourse theory. Foucault (1969) argues that discourse 
cannot be reduced to language and signs, and that language always coincides 
with a set of ideologies.  As such, discourse is a manifestation of power relations 
and creates social realities that form the basis for a culture's epistemology.  
This epistemology is disseminated (or ‘naturalized’) through institutions and 
organized into networks of social practices. CDA draws heavily from Foucault’s 
approach to the role of discourse in social construction and regulation.  
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Nonetheless, Norman Fairclough criticizes the deterministic ‘idealism’ of most 
constructionist approaches and argues that they fail to acknowledge the factors 
which may affect or limit the construction process (Fairclough, 2003).  
Fairclough suggests instead that discourses are ‘social construals’ (i.e., 
representations of the social world) rather than social constructs:   
We may textually construe (represent, imagine, etc.) the social world in 
particular ways, but whether our representations or construals have the 
effect of changing its construction depends upon various contextual 
factors – including the way social reality already is, who is construing 
it, and so forth. (Fairclough, 2003, p.8) 
 
Seeking to operationalize the socially-constitutive properties of discourse, 
Fairclough (1992) created a multidimensional analytical framework 
contingent on his argument that semiosis (i.e., the production of meaning) 
occurs at three hierarchical levels: social structures, social practices, and social 
events. Social practices, which Fairclough (2001) defines as “relatively 
stabilized form[s] of social activity” (p.6), articulate a variety of social elements 
(e.g. activities, subjects, objects, values) in relation to discourse. Social 
practices integrate discourse in three interrelated ways; First, discourse is part 
of the social activity within the practice, as we adapt our language use to fit 
specific activities (e.g. everyday conversations, job interviews, organizational 
meetings). Second, discourse figures in the representation (or construal) of 
social practices, which includes both representations of other practices and the 
‘reflexive’ self-representation of our own practice. Third, discourse figures in 
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the constitution of identities within social practices, as patterns of language 
use index particular ‘ways of being’ within the practice. Together, these ways 
of incorporating discourse into social practices form a semiotic order 
Fairclough calls an ‘order of discourse’. An order of discourse is a combination 
of three semiotic elements (Fairclough, 2001, p.7): 
- Genres are ‘ways of acting’ within social practices. 
- Discourses are ‘ways of representing’ social practices. 
- Styles are ‘ways of being’ within social practices.  
Orders of discourse are “intermediate organizational entities” (Fairclough, 
2003, p.24) which connect the micro-level of concrete social events (e.g. specific 
texts) to the macro-level of social structures (e.g. fields, institutions and 
organizations). Indeed, social structures are constituted by networks of social 
practices, and the semiotic dimension of each network is an order of discourse 
(Fairclough 2000). Interdiscursive analysis consists in “seeing texts in terms of 
the different discourses, genres and styles they draw upon and articulate 
together” (Fairclough, 2003, p.3), which signals a characterization of discourse 
as “an element of social life which is closely interrelated with other elements” 
(Fairclough, 2003, p.3).  
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Power relations and dominant discourses 
Politics itself is a social field constituted by a network of social practices 
associated with activities within the government, political parties, elections, 
and public spheres (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, p.83). This network of 
practices includes various genres (e.g. debates, official speeches, interviews), 
styles and discourses which index different positions within the political 
system. Here, it is useful to distinguish two distinct but often confused 
understandings of the term ‘discourse’. In its most abstract sense, discourse 
can simply refer to semiosis, i.e. the social process of meaning-making. As 
elements of orders of discourse, however, discourses are ways of construing 
aspects of the world that are associated with particular beliefs, perspectives or 
orientations (Fairclough, 1992, p.128). Thus, we may speak about ‘anti-
immigration discourse’, ‘nationalist discourse’, or ‘pro-life discourse’. James 
Paul Gee (2004) uses the terms ‘big-D-Discourse’ and ‘small-d-discourse’ to 
distinguish between the abstract conceptualization of discourse as semiosis 
and the more concrete definition of discourse as a specific instance of language 
use. As such, Gee defines Discourse (with a big ‘D’) as a system of meaning-
making practices that generate discourses (with a small ‘d’), which are specific 
ways of talking about social realities (Gee, 2004, p.17).  
These discourses are ‘frames’ in the sense that they can offer multiple 
representations of the same social event. For instance, the terms crise des 
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migrants and accueil des réfugiés both refer to the same reality, but the first 
term indexes an anti-immigration stance by framing the issue as a crisis 
whereas the second puts forth a representation of France as a welcoming 
refuge. Discourses are also associated with particular ways of representing 
social actors (van Dijk, 1993); For example, the French neologisms 
“gauchiasse” and “FHaine” are referential choices which index two opposite 
political inclinations. 
Fairclough and Wodak (1997) argue that discourses do not all have the 
same ‘productivity’ i.e., the same impact within social structures. As a result, 
they contribute to producing unequal power relations between social groups 
(e.g., social classes, genders, ethnic minorities). For Foucault (1969), discourse 
is intrinsically linked to both power and knowledge. Indeed, the production of 
discourse is at once controlled, organized and redistributed by those who have 
the power and means of communication. Discourses thus determine not only 
what can be said but also who can speak, when, and with what authority 
(Foucault, 1969). As such, dominant discourses have the power to displace 
former social arrangements and to talk new areas of knowledge into existence. 
The productivity of discourses relates to Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of linguistic 
market. Bourdieu (1977) compares linguistic exchanges to economic 
transactions by arguing that some discourses have a higher ‘currency’ than 
others. Moreover, Bourdieu posits that individuals with a high social, cultural 
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and/or symbolic capital (such as political leaders) are more likely to have access 
to dominant discourses/markets. Their voices are “louder” and therefore they 
have a greater influence on social structures: 
Discourse always owes its most important characteristics to the 
linguistic production relations within which it is produced. […] All 
particular linguistic transactions depend on the structure of the 
linguistic field, which is itself a particular expression of the structure of 
the power relations between the groups possessing the corresponding 
competences. (Bourdieu, 1977, p.647) 
 
In other words, discourses always operate in relation to power, and determine 
how power circulates within society (Hall, 1992, p.295). This power-as-
domination paradigm, which conceptualizes power as the oppression of the 
masses via the exercise of ‘cultural hegemony’ (Gramsci, 1971), underlies most 
CDA approaches. Fairclough (2003) argues that the ideological effects of texts, 
i.e., the effects of texts in establishing, maintaining, or changing power 
relations, can be uncovered through interdiscursive analysis:  
Ideologies can have a durability and stability which transcends 
individual texts or bodies of texts – they can be associated with 
discourses (as representations), with genres (as enactments), and with 
styles (as inculcations). (Fairclough, 2003, p.9) 
 
In other words, ideologies can be found in all three elements of orders of 
discourse; they may be enacted in genres, represented in discourses, and 
inculcated in styles (Fairclough, 2003). 
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Framing the presidential election 
Ideologies as sociocognitive frames 
The conceptualization of ideologies as ‘representations’ (Hall, 1992; 
Fairclough, 2003), ‘constructs’ (Foucault, 1969; van Dijk, 1995) or ‘frames’ 
(Lakoff, 1996) suggests that they are actively involved in the process of 
construing social reality, which primarily takes place through the production 
and the interpretation of discourse(s).  Teun A. van Dijk (1995) argues that 
ideologies are sociocognitive frameworks shared by members of social groups, 
and that they “reflect speakers’ internalized beliefs about the society’s 
organization and function” (van Dijk, 1995, p.243).  Our linguistic choices can 
therefore mirror the fundamental values and principles (e.g. individualism vs. 
collectivism) of the society we live in.  Moreover, van Dijk suggests that 
abstract grammatical features (such as voice and transitivity) are most 
representative of ideological effects.  Unlike lexical choices, such grammatical 
features are not as accessible to introspection; they are therefore more likely 
to be “a spontaneous reflection of social reality mediated by ideologies of 
language users” (van Dijk, 1995, p.226) rather than deliberate linguistic 
choices.  Lexical features, however, can not only reflect a speaker’s attitude 
towards particular social actors (such as referring to François Fillon as “Fifi” 
or to Nicolas Sarkozy as “Sarko”) but can also reveal socially-conditioned biases 
towards certain groups (Fowler, 1991).  For instance, referential choices that 
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reduce women to animals (e.g. une vache, un thon, une poulette), inanimate 
objects (e.g. un cageot, une planche à repasser) or even to their sexual function 
(e.g. un bon coup, une mal-baisée) are all indicative of a misogynistic attitude.  
In other words, both grammatical and lexical features contribute to 
constituting ‘frames’ through which speakers can impose their beliefs on social 
reality.  
 
Metaphors and political affiliation 
In his book Moral Politics, George Lakoff (1996) explores the function of 
metaphors as cognitive frames which directly (but not consciously) influence 
our political views.  Specifically, Lakoff argues that the metaphorical 
understanding that NATION IS FAMILY underlies the moral division between 
conservatives and progressives in American political life (Lakoff, 1996, 2006).  
In French politics, evidence of a similar conceptualization can be found in the 
national hymn - which refers to the French people as enfants de la patrie 
(‘children of the fatherland’) - and in the national tripartite motto - which 
includes fraternité (‘fraternity’) as a core value of the French Republic.  In 
Lakoff’s model, NATION IS FAMILY is an overarching ‘conceptual metaphor’ with 
a shared understanding of the country as the home, citizens as siblings, and 
the government as the parent.  Where conservatives and progressives diverge, 
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Lakoff argues, is in their expectations as to the ‘parental role’ of the 
government (Lakoff, 1996).  On the one hand, progressives believe the 
government should act like a Nurturant Parent who protects citizens and 
assists them in achieving their potential.  On the other hand, conservatives 
liken the role of the government to that of a Strict Father.  As the moral 
authority of the family, the Strict Father teaches his children to be self-reliant 
and self-disciplined through ‘tough love’ (i.e. rewards and punishment).  From 
each ‘family model’ derives a set of core values and principles which form the 
basis of policies and programs (Lakoff, 2006, p.54).  Lakoff argues that 
progressive morality is based on empathy and responsibility (both for oneself 
and for others).  Empathy leads to an ethic of diversity and to the recognition 
of basic human dignity.  Paying taxes is a moral responsibility as it contributes 
to the common good (i.e. public services), which in turn protects citizens 
against discrimination and promotes the expansion of freedom.  In contrast, 
conservative morality centers on issues of authority and control.  
Conservatives believe that morality comes from obeying legitimate ‘moral 
authorities’ (God, the law, parents, etc.) but that we are all individually 
responsible for our own destiny: with enough self-discipline, everyone can pull 
themselves by the ‘bootstraps’.  Individual discipline is rewarded by the free 
market, which promotes wealth and efficiency through the profit motive.  
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Lakoff (2006) claims that these core principles explain how and why 
conservatives and progressives can have radically different understandings of 
the same fundamental concepts, such as fairness or freedom.  For example, 
while progressives believe that welfare programs can increase freedom by 
providing a social safety net for the less fortunate, conservatives see the same 
programs as interfering with the freedom of both welfare recipients (by 
trapping them into dependency) and taxpayers (by taking their hard-earned 
money) (Lakoff, 2006, pp.89-90).  In other words, semiosis is a dynamic social 
process as speakers attach meanings to words based on their worldviews, in 
agreement with Freeden’s conceptualization of ideology as the effort to “impose 
specific meanings onto the indeterminate range of meanings” (Freeden, 2006, 
p.19).  As Lakoff puts it:  
Words don't have meanings in isolation. Words are defined relative to a 
conceptual system. If liberals are to understand how conservatives use 
their words, they will have to understand the conservative conceptual 
system. (Lakoff, 1996, p.29) 
 
The ability to understand (and exploit) conceptual systems plays a decisive role 
during presidential elections, as candidates need to convince voters that fall 
beyond their party lines.  Lakoff stresses the Strict Father and Nurturant 
Parent models are “idealized models of family” (Lakoff, 2006, p.50; emphasis 
added).  In reality, few people are ‘pure conservatives’ or ‘pure progressives’ – 
most are ‘biconceptuals’ of various sorts, meaning they apply both family 
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models to different areas of their social and political lives (for instance, 
someone may be economically progressive but socially conservative).  In order 
for presidential candidates to win the “majority”, their discourse must thus 
resonate with a wide range of voters who do not fall neatly into ideological 
categories.  
Metaphors are not mere poetic devices: They can be powerful tools of 
persuasion, especially in the mouths of politicians.  Political discourse itself is 
framed according to the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor: arguments can be “won” 
or “lost”, and candidates can “shoot down” or even “crush” their “opponents” 
during heated debates.  Metaphorical arguments are analogical, meaning they 
can help us understand new concepts in terms of situations or ideas we are 
familiar with.  Indeed, Chilton and Ilyin note that metaphors “develop in 
discourse [...] in the lexicalization of abstract or innovatory concepts on the 
basis of mapping from the more concrete or better understood domains of 
experience” (Chilton & Ilyin, 1993, p.9).  Lakoff (1996) argues that conservative 
politicians rely more on metaphorical appeals than their progressive 
counterparts do.  In the United States, Republicans pride themselves on being 
the party of ‘family values’ - an emotional appeal which gained prominence 
with Ronald Reagan and remains at the core of American conservative 
discourse.  Besides NATION IS FAMILY, another prominent conservative 
metaphor is that COUNTRIES ARE CONTAINERS (Chilton, 1996), which is often 
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found in anti-immigration discourse and underlies Donald Trump’s ‘build the 
wall’ discourse, wherein the “wall” would prevent undesirables from “pouring 
into” the United States: 
(1) The Wall is a very important tool in stopping drugs from pouring into 
our country and poisoning our youth (and many others)!    
(@realDonaldTrump) 
Because metaphors play a systemic structural role in shaping how we think – 
as we saw with the NATION IS FAMILY metaphor - they enable candidates to 
‘frame’ their appeals based on deep-seated yet active values (Lakoff & Johnson, 
1980).   
 
Globalization and the technicalization of political discourse 
To which extent, then, do conservative and progressive discourses 
differ? French discourse analyst Damon Mayaffre analyzed the left-right divide 
in French politics across two time frames: the interwar period (1928-1939) and 
the Fifth Republic from 1958 to 2002.  In both studies, he adopted a logometric 
approach– a quantitative, computer-assisted method of discourse analysis 
which can detect both lexical and grammatical patterns across large amounts 
of text.  Mayaffre (2003) first compared the speeches of four 1930s politicians 
and found that their political orientations could be determined from the 
linguistic features they used.  For example, the two left-wing politicians - 
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Maurice Thorez and Léon Blum – appealed to the collectivity with the subject 
pronoun nous, while their right-wing opponents - Pierre-Etienne Flandin and 
André Tardieu - favored the use of the singular je and the impersonal on 
(Mayaffre, 2003, p.254).  Moreover, Flandin and Tardieu’s heavy use of passé 
composé (referring to completed past actions) and deictic markers suggested 
strong ties to history and tradition.  In contrast, Thorez and Blum’s reliance 
on present and future tenses seemed to reflect the Left’s ideal of social progress 
(Mayaffre, 2003, p.251).  In a separate study, Mayaffre (2004) analyzed 565 
presidential speeches spanning from the establishment of the Fifth Republic 
in 1958 to 2002.  Over time, he observed a shift from nominal to verbal 
discourse, with increases in both verbal processes (verbs of ‘saying’ such dire, 
répéter or affirmer) and modal verbs (e.g. pouvoir, falloir and devoir).  
For Mayaffre, these patterns denote a glorification of productivity at the 
expense of ideology, with managers and practitioners replacing theorists and 
thinkers (Mayaffre, 2004, p.246).  
Echoing Jürgen Habermas (1988)’s concerns about the degradation of 
the public sphere, numerous scholars have attributed this ‘marketization’ of 
political life to globalization and to the rise of neoliberal capitalism (Giddens, 
1990; Bourdieu, 1991; Freeden, 2000; Le Bart, 2010).  For Bourdieu, these 
trends have resulted in a restructuring of discourse based on a market model 
where commodities are bought and sold (Bourdieu, 1991).  This metaphorical 
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conceptualization of STATES ARE BUSINESSES reframes politicians as 
businessmen, policies and campaigns as products, and voters as consumers: 
Political life can be described in terms of the logic of supply and demand: 
the political field is the site in which, through the competition between 
the agents involved in it, political products, issues, programs, analyses, 
commentaries, concepts and events are created – products between 
which ordinary citizens, reduced to the status of “consumers”, have to 
choose, thereby running a risk of misunderstanding that is all the 
greater the further they are from the place of production. (Bourdieu, 
1991, pp.171-172) 
 
Through new media channels, ideological narratives “are taken over by wider 
social circles not as mere consumers but as opinion formers, programmatic 
entrepreneurs and originators of new political messages” (Freeden, 2000, p.11).  
As a result, ideological markers are fading, and political discourse is 
increasingly technocratic (Lemke, 1995).  Young and Fitzgerald (2006) define 
this ‘technicalization’ as “the introduction of technical language and the 
language of experts into the social policy domain” (p.263).  Politicians seek 
legitimacy and credibility through ‘appeals to authority’; they accumulate 
statistics, quote field experts, and even pose as inspectors in factories (Lemke, 
1995; Le Bart, 2010).  Lemke (1995) suggests that technical language gives the 
policies an “air of legitimacy” (p.58) but also prevents the non-expert audience 
from fully comprehending the discourse. He indeed argues that 
technicalization is a ‘monologic’ trend which favors first-person references and 
abstract processes (such as agentless passives and nominalizations). This non-
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interactive discourse prevents the public from entering the dialogue and, by 
extension, from questioning the policy (Lemke, 1995). For Le Bart (2010), 
however, the inclusion of expert knowledge into the discourse of politicians 
does not herald a ‘scientific turn’ in modern politics. As in advertising, 
information is presented for strategic rather communicative purposes, and Le 
Bart suggests that appeals to authority are the political equivalent of the 
realist literary device Roland Barthes calls l’effet de réel, wherein an 
overabundance of small descriptive details is key to creating a ‘reality effect’ in 
texts (Barthes, 1968).  
 
Personalization and the marketization of the self 
Moreover, the omnipresent je (‘I’) in modern French politics (Mayaffre, 
2004) signals a ‘personalization’ of political power, which refers to the notion 
that “individual political actors have become more prominent at the expense of 
parties and collective identities” (Karvonen, 2009, p.4). In the era of 
marketization, campaigning is an act of self-promotion; In order to sell their 
‘brand of presidency’, candidates must first and foremost be skilled advertisers.  
For Mayaffre (2004), the credibility of the speaker (ethos) and the emotional 
engagement of the audience (pathos) have supplanted the arguments (logos) 
themselves (p.246).  
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Max Weber (1978) coined the term ‘charismatic authority’ to refer to 
leaders of totalitarian or authoritarian regimes around whom devout followers 
develop a ‘cult of personality’. In a cult of personality, the charismatic leader 
is “considered extraordinary and treated as endowed with supernatural, 
superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities.” (Weber, 
1978, p.242). Most recently, numerous media scholars have turned their 
attention to U.S. President Donald J. Trump (Oates & Moe, 2017; Kreis, 2017). 
Trump has become known for his ad hominem attacks on various political and 
media actors (and associated nicknames such as “Crooked Hillary” Clinton, 
“Lyin’ Ted” Cruz or “Sloppy Steve” Bannon)6. By repeatedly attacking the 
character of his opponents, Trump framed his campaign (and subsequent 
presidency) in terms of a battle of personalities rather than a battle of ideas.  
As private lives grow increasingly public, the character of political actors 
– their ethos – has come to play a central role in modern elections (Amossy, 
1999), to the extent that it can determine a candidate’s fate regardless of their 
party affiliation (Alduy, 2017). In 1968, Canadian voters were so enthused with 
the youthful charm of Pierre Elliott Trudeau that their excitement became 
known as ‘Trudeaumania’ (McAllister, 2007). Nearly fifty years later, his son 
Justin Trudeau became an international heartthrob, and his good looks have 
                                                 
6 A Wikipedia page references all the nicknames used by Donald Trump: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_nicknames_used_by_Donald_Trump  
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garnered media attention from news headlines (Ryan, 2018) to internet memes 
(Cruz, 2016). In fact, a distinctive ethos may eventually be conceptualized into 
a ‘style of politics’ (e.g. Thatcherism) that transcends the politician and his or 
her individual mandate:  
(2) Du villepinisme au sarkozysme, du copéisme au sarkozysme, du 
sarkozysme au macronisme.       
(@AdrienDLPBR) 
Party affiliation is no longer enough: presidential candidates must promote 
their présidentiabilité (‘presidential ability’) with a ‘presidential ethos’ that 
will not only increase their credibility but also distinguish them from other 
candidates (Amossy, 1999). 
 
Rhetorical framing: the populist example 
Although some researchers use the terms interchangeably, styles of 
politics and ideologies refer to two types of discursive frames.   Indeed, the 
conceptual systems described by Lakoff (1996) are ideological frames i.e., 
representations of ideologies that speakers usually project unconsciously.  In 
contrast, styles of politics are rhetorical frames that are used strategically to 
support an underlying ideology (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014).  
One rhetorical frame which has garnered considerable media attention 
in recent years in populism.  Despite its frequent association with far-right 
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nationalism, the populist label has been applied to candidates belonging to 
both extremes of the political spectrum (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985).  For example, 
Donald Trump and Marine Le Pen are classic examples of ‘right populism’, 
while Bernie Sanders and Jean-Luc Mélenchon align with a different branch 
of ‘left populism’.  Bart Bonikowski defines populism as “a discursive strategy 
selectively employed by political outsiders on both the left and right extremes 
of the political spectrum to challenge the political status quo” (Bonikowski, 
2017, p.10). Bonikowski argues that unlike conservatism or liberalism, 
populism cannot be associated with a fully-fledged set of values and has few 
direct policy implications. Instead, populist candidates recite a simple, 
unidimensional message: the virtuous and sovereign people are at the mercy 
of corrupt elites and must reclaim their rights.  This capitalization on public 
fear of the ‘other’ and widespread resentment towards the ‘establishment’ can 
serve a wide range of political agendas. Indeed, while populism always involves 
a binary moral classification, the identities of both ‘the people’ and the vilified 
vary according to the candidate’s underlying ideology (such as nationalism or 
socialism).  For instance, Trump and Le Pen routinely claim that immigrants 
are precipitating the country’s downfall, while Sanders and Mélenchon center 
their discourse on the greedy elite who enrich themselves at the expense of the 
people.  In both cases, the candidates are projecting an ethos of outsider by 
adopting the point of view of the people and distancing themselves from the 
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establishment they are berating.  For Ernesto Laclau (2005), this involves 
forming a common ‘we’ which presupposes not only an equivalence between the 
candidates and his voters but also an imagined other (‘them’).  
Approaching populism as a style rather than ideology allows researchers 
to analyze how politicians can slip in and out of the populist style (based on a 
variety of factors including audience, medium, sociopolitical context, and 
outsider status).  This last point introduces the notion of performance, with 
candidates adapting and modulating their public image to fit voter 
expectations: 
Le discours ne semble plus destiné à véhiculer un message (…) mais 
seulement à organiser une médiation entre le président et les Français, 
et à mettre en scène un président disant ce qu’il dit. (Mayaffre, 2004, 
p.243; emphasis added).  
 
Here, Damon Mayaffre (2004) refers to the mise-en-scène (‘staging’) of the 
presidency by denouncing not only the personalization of political life but also 
its dramatization. 
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Elections as theatrical performances 
Performance and performativity 
 As Shakespeare might have said if he had lived in the 21st century, “All 
the political world’s a stage, and all its men and women merely players.”7.  In 
the era of political personalization and mediatization (Hjarvard, 2008), 
electoral campaigns have come to resemble carefully orchestrated spectacles.  
Presidential candidates are judged as much by their individual identities as by 
the policies they propose, and leading a successful campaign requires staging 
a compelling performance (Nimmo, 1985; Chou et al., 2016).  In 2017, this 
bataille de l’image manifested into several memorable stunts, from 
Mélenchon’s hologram holding rallies all over the country (Nikolaeva & 
Lagrange, 2017) to Marine Le Pen’s controversial selfie session at a Whirlpool 
factory (Vinocur, 2017).  
The theatrical dimension of modern politics resonates with Erving 
Goffman’s argument that self-presentation is analogous to a stage performance 
(Goffman, 1959).  In Goffman’s metaphorical theater, the public ‘front stage’ is 
where we present (or ‘perform’) a controlled, often idealized version of 
ourselves to an audience, through both verbal and nonverbal cues (e.g. 
clothing, gestures, facial expressions).  In contrast, the private ‘back stage’ is 
                                                 
The original lines, “All the world's a stage, and all the men and women merely players”, are 
delivered by the character Jaques in Act II, Scene VII, of Shakespeare’s As You Like It.
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where our masks come off, and where we can reveal our more authentic selves.  
However, self-presentation is not necessarily a conscious process, and Goffman 
suggests instead that all performances are on a continuum which stretches 
from ‘sincere’ to ‘cynical’, with cynical performers exhibiting the highest degree 
of awareness (Goffman, 1959, p.19).  Indeed, some performers sincerely believe 
that they are projecting a ‘true’, unfabricated version of themselves on the front 
stage.  On the opposite end of the spectrum, we find performers who are fully 
aware of their ‘routines’ and who might even find some enjoyment in the 
realization that they can toy with a trusting audience (Goffman, 1959, p.18).  
Yet, not all cynical performers are ill-intentioned, and there are numerous 
motives for impression management such as gaining employment, following 
workplace etiquette or, evidently, winning an election.  Finally, Goffman 
makes the important point that regardless of the intentions we project into our 
performances, we can never fully control or even predict how they will be 
perceived by our audience:  
By virtue of the same sign-accepting tendency, the audience may 
misunderstand the meaning that a cue was designed to convey, or may 
read an embarrassing meaning into gestures or events that were 
accidental, inadvertent, or incidental and not meant by the performer to 
carry any meaning whatsoever. (Goffman, 1959, p.51) 
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Regarding political discourse, Cécile Alduy (2017) underlines the dual 
meaning of performativity.8  Indeed, discourse can be ‘performative’ in the 
Austinian sense of words performing actions, such as a judge saying, “the court 
is now in session” or “I sentence you to life imprisonment” (Austin, 1962).  In 
his analysis of presidential speeches, Mayaffre (2004) has observed a gradual 
increase in the use of performative verbs between 1958 and 2002.9  Since 1980, 
he notes an omnipresence of self-referencing performatives used to describe 
the act of speaking itself (e.g., je dis, je répète, j’affirme).  Mayaffre suggests 
that this ‘metadiscursive narcissism’ (Mayaffre, 2004, p.245) is a symptom of 
the personalization of contemporary politics discussed in the previous section.  
Additionally, performative expressions can be used as a discursive strategy by 
presidential candidates; By adopting a ‘presidential style’, they can 
demonstrate their ability to ‘talk like a president’ (Alduy 2017).  In this sense, 
performative speech acts are part of the performance of presidential identity.  
Moreover, Cécile Alduy’s comparison of the presidential styles of François 
Hollande and Nicolas Sarkozy supports Goffman’s argument that speakers 
exhibit different degrees of control over their performances.  In fact, Alduy 
                                                 
8 “La communication politique est performative non seulement au sens strictement 
linguistique des actes de langage qui sont accomplis (‘je m’engage’, ‘je promets’, ‘je jure’) mais 
au sens où la performance est censée prouver par l’exemple les qualités du candidat, révéler 
son être profond, alors qu’il ne donne à voir, toujours, qu’un personnage” (Alduy, 2017, p.42). 
9 “Entre 1958 et 2002, les ‘je dis que…’, les ‘je vous répète que…’ prennent sur le contenu 
objectif du discours: matériellement, dans une allocation, le temps consacré à la mise en 
scène du dire est directement retranché au temps accordé à l’épaisseur du dit.” (Mayaffre, 
2004, p.246). 
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suggests that François Hollande unwillingly performed the role of a diffident 
‘backstage president’ (Alduy, 2017).  Through his use of agentless structures 
(e.g., passive verbs and impersonal expressions) and his favoring of the 
collective nous over the presidential je, Hollande removed himself from his own 
presidency.  His subdued style stood in stark contrast to his predecessor’s 
hyperpresidency (Alduy, 2017, p.59).  Indeed, Nicolas Sarkozy performed the 
role of the Strict Father described by Lakoff (1996) by adopting a discursive 
style that reflected his authority: he positioned himself as the agent (je) of his 
actions (i.e., material processes) which he situated in the concrete, immediate 
present (as opposed to Hollande’s hypothetical future; Alduy, 2017, p.60).  
 
Narrativization and storytelling  
In any election, it is every candidate’s nightmare to remain stuck in the role 
of a supporting character, or worse, of an invisible cameo.  Yet, even a skilled 
performance can be overlooked unless it is included in an engaging storyline.  
To remain on the electoral stage, the candidates must write their own ‘electoral 
narratives’ and cast themselves in the protagonist role (Nimmo, 1985).  As 
Chou, Bleiker and Premaratna (2016) put it: 
Like any compelling theatrical production, good campaigns hinge on a 
compelling plotline. Without it, actors will just become another face in 
the crowd and any proposed policies, whatever their merits, will simply 
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remain empty symbols without the power to capture the public’s 
imagination and support. (Chou et al., 2016, p.44) 
 
Several authors have approached the concept of narrative by proposing sets 
of criteria that make up coherent, bounded stories (Bruner, 1990; Gergen, 
1994; Edwards, 1997).  Jerome Bruner (1990) argues that well-formed stories 
include five elements: Action, Scene, Actor, Instrument, and Goal (Bruner, 
1990; Cited in Edwards, 1997, p.214).  These five elements describe the 
‘narrativization’ process i.e., the imposition of a narrative frame upon an event. 
In other words, narrativization rationalizes and frames an event by offering an 
account of what happened (Action), when and where it happened (Scene), who 
was involved (Actor), how it happened (Instrument) and why it happened 
(Goal). Bruner further argues that narratives require several “crucial 
grammatical components” in order to be carried out: the expression of human 
agentivity, the linearization of events and states in a consistent way, and 
finally the inclusion of the narrator’s perspective or voice (Bruner, 1990, p.77) 
An electoral narrative consists in a candidate ‘narrativizing’ an election 
from a perspective that will benefit his or her campaign (Alduy, 2017; Polletta, 
2008).  For instance, the 2017 French candidates established themselves as 
protagonists (or ‘heroes’) in their narratives by adopting a ‘core style’: 
Emmanuel Macron presented himself as the only candidate able to breach the 
left-right divide, Marine Le Pen as the only candidate able to vanquish Islamic 
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terrorism, and Jean-Luc Mélenchon as the only candidate able to bring down 
the corrupt 1%: 
(3) Il est temps de cesser le tic tac incessant de la droite et de la gauche 
depuis plus de 20 ans et de construire une véritable alternance.  
[It is time to stop the tick-tock of the Left and of the Right that has 
been relentless for more than 20 years and to build a genuine 
alternative.] 
(@EmmanuelMacron) 
(4) Je serai le Chef des Armées qui mènera la guerre au terrorisme 
islamiste, avec la détermination d’éradiquer cette idéologie.        
[I will be the Commander-in-Chief who will declare war on Islamic 
terrorism, with the determination to eradicate this ideology.] 
(@MLP_Officiel) 
(5) Je veux rendre la France au peuple français en la reprenant des mains 
de l'oligarchie.      
[I want to return France to the French people by taking her back from 
the hands of the oligarchy.] 
(@JLMelenchon) 
 
Dan Nimmo argues that presidential candidates tend to draw from five basic 
styles: the ‘army rally’, the ‘advertiser’, the ‘missionary’, the ‘crusade’, or the 
‘counter-crusade’ (Nimmo, 1985, p.33).  However, Goffman (1959) warns 
against blatantly misrepresenting oneself; the higher the discrepancy, the 
higher the risk of being exposed as an impostor:  
When we think of those who present a fake front or “only” a front, of 
those who dissemble, deceive and defraud, we think of a discrepancy 
between fostered appearances and reality. We also think of the 
precarious position in which these performers place themselves, for at 
any moment in their performance an event might occur to catch them 
out and baldly contradict what they have openly avowed, bringing them 
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immediate humiliation and sometimes permanent loss of reputation. 
(Goffman, 1959, p.59) 
 
The downfall of François Fillon throughout the 2017 election is a prime 
example.  An early favorite, Fillon built his campaign around the image of a 
devout family man who adhered to Christian morality and lived by his slogan, 
Le courage de la vérité.  When the news broke that he had been lying and 
stealing large sums from the government for decades, his campaign quickly 
plummeted, as many of his supporters could not condone the discrepancy 
between the ‘impostor’ they had seen on stage and the ‘real’ Fillon who was 
unmasked during the Fillongate scandal (Chrisafis, 2017).  
Yet, campaigns are not one-man shows.  The quest to the higher office 
is a fierce competition, and its narrativization also involves representing other 
‘players’ strategically.  Dan Nimmo (1985) argues that in elections as in 
theater, there are “heroes, villains, fools, victims, and assorted supporting 
parts be they good guys or bad, winners or losers” (Nimmo, 1985, p.32).  These 
‘roles’ or ‘parts’ are representational strategies (van Dijk, 1995) designed to 
arouse the audience in different ways; While some will unite, others will divide 
(Chou et al., 2016).  For instance, Trump’s use of derogatory nicknames 
contributes to his casting his detractors in the roles of fools and villains (Kreis, 
2017, p.614).  As such, a crucial ingredient in successful electoral tales is 
dramatization, in both senses of the word (Alduy, 2017).  Whether they 
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exaggerate the vices of an opponent or the severity of an event, the candidates 
seek to earn the public’s approval by tapping into their emotions.  This last 
point requires that the candidates set a scene that will resonate with their 
target electorate.  In his analysis of populism, Bonikowski suggests that 
“populist actors are able to capitalize on public dissatisfaction, fear, and 
resentment in order to serve their own wide-ranging political agendas” 
(Bonikowski, 2017, p.13).  He argues that left-wing populism focuses on 
growing economic injustice, whereas right-wing populism appeals primarily to 
white, native-born voters by “tapping into their grievances with demographic 
and cultural change” (p.10).  In other words, right-wing and left-wing populists 
rely on the same strategy (fear-mongering) to support different narratives and 
seduce different audiences (Bonikowski, 2017; Moffitt & Tormey, 2014). 
Furthermore, several scholars have investigated the use of storytelling 
in political discourse (Couldry, 2008; Polletta, 2008; Gupta-Carlson, 2016).  
Like populism, ‘storytelling’ is a discursive strategy which relies on emotional 
appeals; But while populism seeks to vilify the ‘other’, storytelling “humanizes” 
the politician by making him or her more relatable to the audience.  Indeed, 
political storytelling consists in using personal stories and anecdotes to 
increase ‘voter identification’ (i.e., the ability of voters to identify with a 
candidate and his ideas).  Polletta (2008) explains that voters are only likely to 
change their opinions if they have a personal stake in the issue.  Because 
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narratives have the ability to ‘immerse’ or ‘transport’ the audience, they can 
potentially lead to lasting changes of opinion (Polletta, 2008, p.27).  
Narrativization is therefore a form of rhetorical framing, which Bonikowski 
defines as “the practice of presenting an issue from a particular perspective in 
order to maximize its resonance with a given audience” (Bonikowski, 2017, 
p.14).  Indeed, Polletta argues that “what matters is not so much the stories 
you tell as the extent to which [they] resonate with the stories your audience 
already knows” (Polletta, 2008, p.29).  A politician seeking to persuade an 
audience can do so by ‘narrativizing’ events i.e., by recounting the events from 
a perspective that will resonate with the voters and with the politician’s 
agenda (Couldry, 2008; Alduy, 2017).  
 
Narratology and intertextuality  
Above all, narrativization is a semiotic strategy which articulates events 
and roles into meaningful configurations.  This semiotic function is the subject 
of narratology, a structuralist approach to narrative influenced by several 
French Structuralists (including Lévi-Strauss, Greimas, Benveniste, and 
Barthes) and Russian Formalists (namely Todorov and Bakhtin).  Narratology 
distinguishes histoire (i.e., events) and discours (i.e., the representation of 
events in a narrative), and posits that events only acquire meaning as they are 
articulated, or ‘narrativized’, into discourse (Fludernick, 2007).  This theory 
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relates to Foucault’s argument that an event is always understood within its 
larger historical context: 
History does not consider an event without defining the series to which 
it belongs, (…) a series of rather converging, and sometimes divergent, 
but never autonomous events that enable us to circumscribe the locus of 
a particular event and the conditions of its emergence. (Foucault, 1982, 
p. 230)  
 
In other words, narrativization is inherently ‘intertextual’, as it implies “the 
insertion of a text into history (society) and of this text into history” (Kristeva, 
1986; Cited in Fairclough, 1992, p.279).  Intertextuality (also referred to as 
dialogism (Bakhtin, 1981) and heteroglossia) refers to the bond which unites 
texts and social contexts through a dialogue with past, present, and future 
texts.  Therefore, any text is at once a response to what has been said before, 
and an anticipation of what will be said in the future (Kristeva, 1986; 
Fairclough, 1992, 2003) 
When combined with a theory of power relations, intertextuality 
supports the idea that ideology emerges as a product of language: “the 
ideological becoming of a human being (…) is the process of selectively 
assimilating the words of others” (Bakhtin, 1981, p.341).  Our discursive 
identities, or ‘styles’, are the products of intertextual (and interdiscursive) 
bricolage; a concept first theorized by Lévi-Strauss (1962) and extended to 
discourse by Jacques Derrida (1967).  Essentially, styles emerge and evolve as 
a result of being ‘in dialogue’ with other styles and with other elements of 
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orders of discourse. For Fairclough (1992), it is indeed the dynamicity of 
interdiscursivity which enables texts to lead social and cultural change as they 
“transform prior texts and restructure existing conventions (genres, 
discourses) to generate new ones” (p. 270). In discourse, there are no 
‘engineers’; We are all ‘bricoleurs’ who combine old parts to create new 
meaning.  Novelty is always rooted in history, and as Derrida (1967) famously 
said, “Il n’y a pas de hors texte.” (p.158). 
To conclude, the staging of a presidential campaign is akin to an 
elaborate, large-scale theatrical performance. On the electoral stage, 
politicians are simultaneously the writers, directors, and actors of their 
campaigns. For Jeffrey C. Alexander (2010), the best political performers are 
those who are able to “create meaning by looking back to the past from the 
present and by projecting the plot’s next act into the future, all at the same 
time” (p.64).  
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Chapter 3  
Background: Anatomy of a Twitter Campaign 
 
Today we are all witnesses, all members of 
a crowd that is watching and listening in real 
time. 
Mark Thompson.  
 
Introduction 
Since its launch in 2006, Twitter has established itself as a legitimate 
platform for political communication and has come to play a pivotal role in 
electoral campaigning. This review chapter discusses the impact of Twitter on 
contemporary political discourse and the popular appeal of ‘social media 
campaigns’. The first section begins with an introduction to social 
microblogging and a description of its defining features. It then addresses 
interactional dynamics and power relations on Twitter through two rhetorical 
strategies: ‘marketization’ (Fairclough, 1993) and ‘conversationalisation’ 
(Fairclough, 2003). The second section focuses on several approaches to genre 
and modality on Twitter. First, it discusses the relationship between discourse 
and technology in Web 2.0 genres and describes the concept of techno-
discursivity wherein technology is constitutive of online discourse (Paveau, 
2013). Next, it reviews Julien Longhi’s characterization of political tweets as a 
discourse genre and discusses epiphenomena such as decontextualization and 
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semantic condensation (Longhi, 2013). Finally, the conclusion provides a brief 
summary of the chapter and addresses some of the main challenges in current 
Twitter research.   
 
The era of Twitter politics 
Over the last decade, Twitter has quickly become an indispensable PR 
tool during electoral campaigns, and governments have gradually embraced 
the social microblogging platform as a legitimate channel for political leaders.  
Indeed, according to a 2017 report by the Digital Policy Council (DPC), 83 
percent of world leaders had active Twitter accounts in 2016. In the same 
report, it is argued that political elites can use Twitter not only for self-
promotion but also as a means of direct communication with the people:    
Today, Twitter is not just a bulletin board where a campaign staffer can 
relay political manifesto with the sole aim of garnering votes. It is a 
platform for political leaders to showcase their individuality, 
commitment to their country, to advocate the causes they believe in and 
to connect with real people, as real person would, spelling mistakes et 
al. (Digital Policy Council, 2016, p.17) 
Alice Marwick argues that Twitter campaigns are part of the “democratization” 
of politics whereby long-awaited speeches have been replaced by frequent and 
often less formal interventions (Marwick, 2013, p.24). In the United States, 
Donald Trump’s Twitter habit has received considerable media and scholarly 
attention (Kreis, 2017; Oates & Moe, 2017; Cillizza, 2017; Collins, 2018). The 
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hyper-visibility afforded by Twitter is indeed a defining characteristic of the 
Trump presidency; During his first year in the Oval Office, the American 
President sent out a staggering 2,568 tweets10. As a candidate in the 2016 U.S. 
election, Trump used his handle @realDonaldTrump to strengthen his populist 
appeal, vilify his opponents, and criticize traditional media outlets (Kreis, 
2017):  
(1) How do you fight millions of dollars of fraudulent commercials pushing 
for crooked politicians? I will be using Facebook & Twitter. Watch!  
(@realDonaldTrump) 
Yet, this ‘weaponization’ of social media to serve political ambitions (Lakoff, 
2017) is not unique to Donald Trump. Marine Le Pen’s director of digital 
campaigning, Gaëtan Bertrand, argued that Le Pen uses Twitter to protect her 
image from dishonest press coverage and to maintain a “direct relationship” 
with her supporters (quoted in Cieslinki, 2017)11.  For Ramona McNeal and 
Lisa Bryan (2018), Twitter has revolutionized the impact and prevalence of 
personal appeals in presidential campaigns. The ‘ground war’, which used to 
rely on painstaking phone calls and house-to-house canvassing, can now be 
                                                 
10 This number was compiled via the search engine Trump Twitter Archive 
(http://www.trumptwitterarchive.com/). It includes all original tweets posted by 
@realDonaldTrump from January 20, 2017 to January 20, 2018.  
 
11 Original quote: "Twitter, comme d'autres réseaux sociaux, permet à Marine Le Pen 
d'entretenir un lien direct, sans filtre et de rétablir la vérité sur des possibles déformations 
de son discours ou de ses expressions." (quoted in Cieslinki, 2017, para. 9) 
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fought with the quick swipe of a thumb on a smartphone screen. Conversely, 
the ‘air war’ (i.e. mass media such as radio or television) might soon become 
obsolete as candidates rely increasingly on new technologies to win over the 
electorate (McNeal & Bryan, 2018, p. 3612).   
 
Participation and affiliation on Twitter 
Twitter is a product of Web 2.0, which has shifted the internet’s focus 
from the static consumption of information to the dynamic involvement of 
individual users (Herring, 2013). In this new ‘participatory culture’ (Jenkins 
et al., 2009), user-generated content rivals traditional media sources. Indeed, 
Twitter is advertised as a network where users can find, share, and comment 
on global news: 
Twitter is what’s happening in the world and what people are talking 
about right now. (Twitter, 2018a) 
This ability to share and access information with great immediacy is the result 
of Twitter’s unique design and network structure. Every day, an average of 500 
million tweets get sorted and aggregated in dynamic feeds (Twitter, 2018a). 
Tweets can include references to other users (‘@mentions’ and ‘@replies’), 
copies of other tweets (‘retweets’), searchable hashtags, and multimodal 
content (mainly links to other websites, pictures and videos).  Amidst these 
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affordances, an imposed character limit12 encourages brevity and keeps the 
stream of conversations flowing.  
Another distinctive feature of the Twitter network is that it is public by 
default. However, Rossi and Magnani (2012) suggest that there are two levels 
of networking on Twitter: (1) personalized communication addressed to a 
known list of followers, and (2) global conversations that bring together 
multiple yet undefined audiences:  
Twitter-based communication exists on two almost autonomous levels: 
The Twitter network made of followers and friends that shows a certain 
level of stability and the topical network, characterized by a high level 
of contingency, that appears and disappears following the rhythm of a 
worldwide conversation. (Rossi & Magnani, 2012, p.563) 
The stability of this ‘follower network’ is questionable, as Twitter does not have 
a reciprocal following system and public profiles are accessible to invisible 
lurkers. Due to potential diversity of readership, users tailor their tweets to an 
‘imagined audience’ i.e. a mental representation of their potential readers 
(Marwick & boyd, 2011). Nonetheless, Rossi and Magnani (2012) highlight 
Twitter’s far-reaching influence by pointing out that single tweets can spark 
“worldwide conversation[s]” (p.563). Indeed, Twitter’s interactive format 
allows news to spread rapidly and to potentially become global topics of 
discussion, both within and beyond the Twitter network. A noteworthy 
                                                 
12 On November 7, 2017, Twitter doubled its character limit from 140 to 280 characters.  
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example is the #MeToo movement13, wherein a hashtag sparked a global 
reaction and went on to become a rallying cry against sexual assault (Thorpe, 
2017).  These topical conversations create a ‘context collapse’ (Marwick & boyd, 
2011) wherein multiple audiences co-exist in a single social context and form 
ephemeral ‘affinity spaces’ (Gee, 2005). Gee (2005) uses the term ‘affinity space’ 
as an alternative to the notion of ‘community of practice’ (Wenger, 1998). 
Communities frame participants in terms of membership and carry potentially 
problematic connotations of belongingness and personal ties. In contrast, 
affinity spaces are temporally-bound semiotic spaces where users interact and 
bond around evolving topics of interest (Gee, 2005). Hence, Gee’s approach 
focuses on the social construal of meaning within a shared space (which may 
be physical or virtual) rather than on membership in a community (Gee, 2005, 
p.214).  
On Twitter, affinity spaces are populated by ‘familiar strangers’ 
(Agarwal et al., 2009) who share interests and values yet have never met.  
Furthermore, even if they do not engage in direct exchanges, users are 
connected through communal performances such as retweeting and 
hashtagging (Zappavigna, 2011, 2012). Michele Zappavigna’s model of 
                                                 
13 In October 2017, American actress Alyssa Milano encouraged victims of sexual assault 
and harassment to help spread awareness with the hashtag #MeToo. On October 15, Milano 
(@Alyssa_Milano) tweeted “If you’ve been sexually harassed or assaulted write ‘me too’ as a 
reply to this tweet.” By the end of November 2017, the hashtag had been shared 1.7 million 
times (Thorpe, 2017).  
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affiliation on Twitter relies on an approach to discourse analysis informed by 
Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL), social semantics and corpus linguistics 
(Zappavigna, 2012). Zappavigna argues that tweets do not simply share 
information or express opinions; They also create affiliation between like-
minded users. In other words, they perform an interpersonal function as well 
as an ideational function (Zappavigna, 2012, p.11).  Evaluative language i.e., 
“language [that] is used to express attitudes and to adopt stances about other 
texts” (p.51) can indeed construe interpersonal meaning by indexing particular 
values around which users can affiliate. Furthermore, Zappavigna suggests 
that affiliation on Twitter is primarily achieved through ‘searchable talk’ (p.95) 
i.e., discourse that is tagged in order to be easily accessed by users who share 
the same values. As a collaborative practice, hashtagging encourages ‘ambient 
affiliation’ by inviting users to bond over a topic through a stream of 
interrelated tweets (Zappavigna, 2012, p.192). For instance, campaign 
hashtags such as #MAGA, #ImWithHer and #FeelTheBern were used during 
the 2016 U.S. election not only for campaign promotion but also for 
identification and affiliation between users rooting for the same candidate 
(Kuznekoff, Spencer & Burt, 2017).  
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Power relations and the fallacy of digital exceptionalism  
The predominant discourse in early Twitter research was that the 
technological affordances of the participatory web (Jenkins et al., 2009) 
provided an impetus for citizen involvement in the political process 
(Zappavigna, 2012). Twitter was heralded as a revolutionary platform for 
digital democracy, with promises of empowerment of ordinary citizens, 
grassroot mobilization, and reconnection with politics (Gillmor, 2006). Majid 
KhosraviNik comments that:  
The post-ideological, post-politics ethos is a dominant trend in Social 
Media research and theorization. Notions like participation, 
democratization, and individualism are appropriated, perhaps not even 
deliberately, to discuss a utopian context of communication brought 
about by digital affordances. (KhosraviNik, 2018, p. 7)  
This romanticized approach portrays Twitter as the new frontier for 
democratic participation, where the voiceless are given a voice and where 
grassroot journalists have the power to challenge the mass media monopoly on 
news production and dissemination (Gillmor, 2006; Houndshell, 2011). The 
‘techno-optimism’ of early Web 2.0 research contrasts with the ‘techno-
pessimism’ central to a growing number of popular books (Marwick, 2013).  
Numerous bestselling authors have indeed issued warnings about the dangers 
of social networks, such as decreased attention span (Carr, 2010), lynch mob 
mentality (Ronson, 2015) and loss of privacy under panoptical surveillance 
(Tucker, 2014). For Marwick, neither bleak technophobia nor blind optimism 
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are constructive approaches to new technologies: “Rather than drawing from 
empirical data, both techno-optimists and techno-pessimists extrapolate 
grand, singular theories about technology” (Marwick, 2013, p.27).  
Digital exceptionalism is based on the fallacious belief that cyberspace 
exists independently from everyday life (Marwick, 2013). This disembodiment 
hypothesis suggests that, unlike other forms of communication, the internet is 
not bound by the same social and market forces, and can transcend power 
relations:   
Web 2.0 suggests that technology can be used to bring about positive 
political changes and new relationships between citizens and 
governments, individuals and movements, and customers and 
businesses. (Marwick, 2013, p.7) 
In reality, technology use depends on a variety of political, economic and social 
factors (social and economic background, age, gender, race, education, 
availability of technological infrastructure, etc.). Ilana Gershon coined the 
term ‘media ideology’ to describe a particular way of perceiving and using social 
media (Gershon, 2010). Media ideologies can be shared by groups and 
associated with ‘idioms of practice’, wherein group members learn to use a 
medium together and agree on specific codes or rules (Gershon, 2010). The 
myth of egalitarianism on Twitter is partially rooted in the idea that regardless 
of status, all users must obey the rules set by the network (Marwick & boyd, 
2011). In other words, they share an idiom of practice. French writer Bernard 
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Pivot for instance points out that even though Donald Trump is omnipresent 
on Twitter, he cannot bypass the platform’s constraints (namely its character 
limit): 
(2) La seule limite que Donald Trump ne peut ni mépriser, ni enjamber, ni 
effacer, c'est celle de Twitter. 140 signes, même pour lui! 
[The only constraint that Donald Trump cannot snub nor bypass nor 
delete is the one set by Twitter. 140 characters, even for him!]  
(@bernardpivot) 
In truth, political figures do receive preferential treatment on Twitter – such 
as the blue ‘verified badge’14 – which can contribute to reproducing and 
sustaining uneven power relations between users (Marwick & boyd, 2011).  
Moreover, while regular accounts can be banned or suspended for misconduct 
(e.g. abusive behavior, hate speech or harassment), political leaders benefit 
from what could be described as moderation immunity. In a blog post published 
in January 2018, Twitter stated that: 
Twitter is here to serve and help advance the global, public conversation. 
Elected world leaders play a critical role in that conversation because of 
their outsized impact on our society. Blocking a world leader from 
Twitter or removing their controversial Tweets would hide important 
information people should be able to see and debate. It would also not 
silence that leader, but it would certainly hamper necessary discussion 
around their words and actions. (Twitter, 2018b) 
                                                 
14 Twitter states that “[a]n account may be verified if it is determined to be an account of 
public interest. Typically, this includes accounts maintained by users in music, acting, 
fashion, government, politics, religion, journalism, media, sports, business, and other key 
interest areas.” (Twitter, 2018b) 
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Above all, Twitter communication often lacks a key element of public sphere 
dialogue: reciprocity. Fairclough (2003) indeed argues that for public sphere 
dialogue to be effective – and yield palpable results such as policy changes - all 
participants must have equal opportunities to contribute. In other words, 
participation requires mutual recognition (Wenger, 1998). Yet, political figures 
rarely interact directly with their followers (Enli & Skogerbø, 2013), and 
contribute to a wide ‘status gap’ between verified celebrity accounts and 
regular accounts on Twitter (Marwick, 2013). While their tweets generate a 
high number of replies, celebrity users tend to ignore comments posted by non-
verified accounts (Marwick & boyd, 2011). Moreover, Twitter’s nonreciprocal 
following system allows political actors to boast thousands or even millions of 
followers with no obligation to follow them in return (Zappavigna, 2012). This 
affordance leads to largely disproportionate ‘follower to following’ ratios; For 
instance, Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump) boasted 54 million followers in 
August 2018 but was only following 47 accounts.  
In sum, participatory politics remains a seductive but distant ideal.  
Because they share a social platform with world leaders, ordinary users can be 
led to believe that they are more than mere spectators within the political 
sphere (Parmelee & Bichard, 2012). But while Twitter does provide 
opportunities for political activism and organized action, its impact on power 
relations remains questionable (Marwick, 2013; Mercier, 2016). Research 
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indeed suggests that political figures use Twitter mainly for self-promotion and 
increased visibility (Page, 2012), and that they seldom engage in dialogue with 
the electorate (Enli & Skogerbø, 2013). In other words, they seek to broadcast 
rather than to interact.  
 
New practices, new genres   
The marketization of identity 
Media ideologies directly affect self-representation, which Carolyn 
Cunningham defines as “the strategic negotiation of how one presents one’s 
self to audiences” (Cunningham, 2013, p.3). On Twitter, displays of identity 
often takes the form of self-promotion, or even self-branding as users attempt 
to ‘sell’ their particular ‘brand’ of identity (Marwick & boyd, 2011; Page, 2012).  
Fairclough defines strategic discourse as designed to obtain something from 
the audience (such as votes and campaign donations) whereas communicative 
discourse simply conveys information (Fairclough, 1992). While politicians 
often claim to use social media for connecting with voters, studies suggest that 
their primary motive is self-promotion (Page, 2012; Enli & Skogerbø, 2013).  
The current flare-up of ‘social media campaigns’ reflects Marwick’s concern 
that Web 2.0 has become “a neoliberal technology of subjectivity” (p.14) which 
promotes “an individualistic, competitive notion of identity that prioritizes 
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individual status-seeking over collective action or openness” (Marwick, 2013, 
pp.17-18).   
Fairclough argues that the infiltration of neoliberal ideology in public 
discourse is exemplified by two rhetorical strategies: marketization 
(Fairclough, 1993) and conversationalisation (Fairclough, 1992).  Both are 
instances of ‘recontextualization’ (i.e., the incorporation of elements of one 
social practice within another) and reflect a shift “from a distant, impersonal, 
formal public discourse toward conversation and personalized discourse” 
(Fairclough & Mauranen, 1997, p.117). Marketization refers to the 
incorporation of discursive elements of the commodities market - where items 
are bought and sold - into other domains such as politics and education 
(Fairclough, 1993; Young & Fitzgerald, 2006).  In other words, it is the 
ideological representation of institutions as entrepreneurial entities and of the 
audience as “members of consumption communities” (Fairclough, 1992, p. 203).  
Conversationalisation is a concomitant strategy which consists in emulating 
conversational language in a public context.  This trend is widespread in 
advertising and consumerist discourse, where advertisers use elements of 
casual conversation to feign intimacy with the consumer – a phenomenon 
Fairclough calls ‘synthetic personalization’ (Fairclough, 1992, p.52).  The mass 
media often relies on second-person pronouns to create the illusion of treating 
each member of a mass audience as an individual (e.g., “See you after the 
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break!”). Other features of conversationalisation include anecdotes and 
personal observations, the frequent use of singular and plural first-person 
pronouns, colloquialisms and short sentences, and rhetorical questions meant 
to involve the audience (Fairclough & Mauranen, 1997).  
There is a wide gap between the sophistication of official speeches – 
either prompted or rehearsed - and the apparent spontaneity of social 
networks, which are perceived as wilder linguistic territories (even world 
leaders are not immune to typos and spelling mistakes).  Twitter is a hybrid 
medium: users often try to emulate informal spoken language even though 
they have the ability to reflect and to carefully craft their messages – a 
deliberate stylization which Caroline Tagg describes as ‘speech-like 
performativity’ (Tagg, 2012, p.176).  The 140-character format lends itself to 
conversational language and catchy slogans, and by extension to advertising 
discourse.  It is thus an effective format for self-promoting and personalized 
campaigning (Longhi, 2013; Enli & Skogerbø, 2013).  Fundamentally, Twitter 
makes political discourse more visible, more accessible (especially through the 
‘livetweeting’ of interviews or speeches), and above all constant.  Indeed, digital 
campaigning is not as regulated as institutionalized political communication, 
such as TV debates where candidates may only speak during allotted times 
(KhosraviNik, 2018).  For Gautier Guignard, lead manager of François Fillon’s 
digital campaign during the 2017 election, Twitter is more than an echo 
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chamber; it is an amplifier where candidates can reach millions of potential 
voters in a matter of seconds (Cieslinki, 2017)15.  Therefore, politicians 
conveying their ideas through informal tweets should not be interpreted as a 
leveling of power relations in favor of ordinary citizens.  Instead, it is more 
indicative of a restructuring of political discourse according to global market 
principles and to new capitalist ideology (Fairclough, 1992; Marwick, 2013).  
On Twitter, politicians use language strategically to create a synthetic relation 
of intimacy with their electorate; The primary purpose of their tweets is, 
however, to persuade.  In other words, Twitter politics prioritizes affective 
appeals over rational argumentation, and seeks legitimacy through popularity 
and visibility (KhosraviNik, 2018).  
 
Genre 2.0: emergence and techno-discursivity  
The conceptualization of ‘genre of discourse’ is still highly debated 
among scholars.  Maingueneau (2004) argues that approaches to genre tend to 
be too narrow or too broad – most focus on either linguistic phenomena (e.g. 
structuralism) or on social context (e.g. interactionism) but few manage to 
reconcile both dimensions (Maingueneau, 2004, p.107).  As a socio-semiotic 
approach, Critical Discourse Analysis places discourse in a dialogical 
                                                 
15 Original quote in French: "[Twitter] bien plus qu'une caisse de résonance. […] Un tweet 
peut démultiplier par 10 ou 20 une audience de meeting." 
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relationship with its social context wherein it is both socially shaped and 
socially constitutive (Fairclough, 2003).  In the case of computer-mediated 
discourse (CMD), technology constitutes an essential part of this social 
ecosystem. Indeed, Marie-Anne Paveau (2013) argues that online discourse is 
‘techno-discursive’, in the sense that technology (e.g. screen, keyboard, avatars, 
links) is fully integrated into discourse practices and directly involved in verbal 
production (Paveau, 2013, p.13). She defends a constitutive and ecological 
approach to online discourse analysis, in contrast with logocentrism which 
tends to focus on the verbal aspect – the logos - of discourse: 
L’écriture numérique native possède des traits particuliers qui lui sont 
donnés par le dispositif technologique. Mais ces traits ne sont pas des 
traits « en plus », qui laisseraient le logos et le logocentrisme intacts. Ces 
traits affectent la nature même du langage, qui se métisse de 
technologie. (Paveau, 2013, p.13) 
Paveau coined the term ‘techno-genre’ to refer to digital native genres which 
are made of both technological and verbal material (Paveau, 2013, p.12).  For 
example, retweeting is an inherently technological practice: clicking on an icon 
is a requirement of the genre.  Tweets have been compared to a wide array of 
phenomena such as epigrams, aphorisms, and haikus.  However, Paveau 
argues that defining a techno-genre in terms of pre-existing genres is 
problematic because it ignores the cognitive, social, and cultural context of 
production (Paveau, 2013).  For Michele Zappavigna, cross-genre comparison 
is indeed “unlikely to illuminate the complex and meaningful permutations 
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generated by shifting between semiotic modes” (Zappavigna, 2012, p.172).  The 
tweet genre is a product of the Twitter ecosystem and can itself produce other 
techno-practices and ‘microgenres’ endemic to Twitter (Paveau, 2013).  For 
instance, citizen journalism has engendered microgenres of news reporting, 
such as live eyewitness reportage (Zappavigna, 2012).  
Norman Fairclough argues that change in genres is a critical aspect of 
technological change (Fairclough, 2003).  New technologies lead not only to the 
emergence of new genres but also to the mixing of existing genres. Moreover, 
Fairclough (2003) warns against assuming simple correspondences between 
particular genres and actual texts or interactions.  Indeed, texts can be 
innovative by ‘mixing’ several genres in novel ways: 
Actual events (texts, interactions) are not ‘in’ a particular genre, they do 
not instantiate a particular genre – rather they draw upon the socially 
available resource of genres in potentially quite complex and creative 
ways. The genres associated with a particular network of social practices 
constitute a potential which is variably drawn upon in actual texts and 
interactions. (Fairclough, 2003, p.69).  
Websites are a prime example of genre mixing as they bring together genres 
from other technologies (e.g., print) and genres that have developed as a result 
of technological change (e.g., online chat).   
Novelty also stems from ‘multimodality’, which refers to the interplay 
between different semiotic modes, such as visual imagery, video, or music 
(Kress & van Leeuwen, 1996). Each semiotic mode contributes to creating a 
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unified text by adding meaning to the communicative event (Young & 
Fitzgerald, 2006, p. 174). Kress and van Leeuwen suggest that technological 
change is leading to a greater reliance on visual modes, and that few modern 
texts involve only one mode of communication (Kress & van Leeuwen, 1996). 
Twitter itself emerged in 2006 as a product of the participatory web, or Web 
2.0, which Susan Herring defines as follows:  
Web-based platforms that emerged as popular in the first decade of the 
twenty-first century, and that incorporate user-generated content and 
social interaction, often alongside or in response to structures or 
(multimedia) content provided by the sites themselves. (Herring, 2013, 
p.4). 
These platforms have brought in new technological affordances, new contexts 
of communication, and therefore new genres. Susan Herring (2013) suggests 
that Web 2.0 can be classified into three categories: familiar, reconfigured, and 
emergent. Familiar genres result from “the incorporation of new media 
affordances into familiar text types” (Herring, 2013, p.7) and retain many 
features of early CMC. Examples include weblogs, wikis, and discussion 
forums. Familiar genres are primarily textual but have integrated CMC 
features such as nonstandard orthography, emoticons, and internet slang. 
Some studies refer to familiar genres as ‘reproduced genres’ but Herring favors 
the term ‘familiar’ because it suggests continuity in discourse phenomena, 
rather than mere replication. In contrast, reconfigured genres are the product 
of the structural reshaping, or reconfiguration, of online discourse within 2.0 
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environments. They “might on the surface appear new but have traceable 
online antecedents” (Herring, 2013, p.10) and include interactive and 
participatory phenomena such as turn-taking, threading, and intertextuality. 
Retweeting is an example of an older practice (namely, quoting in 
asynchronous messages) which has evolved – and is still evolving – within a 
social platform. When Twitter first launched, retweets were mostly textual and 
followed the structure [RT + original author’s username + quoted tweet + 
optional comment]. Today, retweets resemble shared posts on Facebook and 
allow users to share a clickable tweet on their profile with all its original 
information (media content, replies, etc.). They may also add a commentary, in 
which case the ‘quoted’ tweet is embedded within a new tweet. Retweets are 
inherently intertextual as they incorporate the words of others into a new 
message. Moreover, the ability to retweet replies or even other retweets creates 
multiple levels of embedding. Finally, Herring describes new Web 2.0 genres 
as ‘emergent’. Emergent genres develop through “the use of channels other 
than text, and semiotic systems other than verbal language, to carry on 
conversational exchanges” (Herring, 2013, p.14). They include collaborative, 
multimodal practices such as synchronous and asynchronous video exchanges 
(e.g., vines), and conversational exchanges via images or gifs (e.g., image-
quotes, memes, snapchats). In the case of image-quotes, a picture posted by a 
previous contributor is re-used in a reply, often with modification (e.g., 
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superimposed text, photoshopping, speech balloons). This dynamic process of 
transformation through group collaboration creates a conversational exchange. 
Image-quotes become ‘memes’ when they spread virally beyond a single 
exchange to be utilized in various contexts (Herring, 2013, p.16). 
 
Political tweeting as a genre of discourse 
In response to new technological affordances, the notion of ‘political 
genre’ has rapidly expanded beyond the institutional setting (Fairclough, 
2003). A first wave of democratization occurred in the 1950s as the golden age 
of television brought in political talk shows, campaign ads, and media 
interviews (Oates & Moe, 2017). The internet, specifically Web 2.0, once again 
reshaped political communication: political actors quickly embraced the 
participatory web and have since adapted to a variety of innovative social 
platforms (Negrine, 2008; Parmelee & Bichard, 2012).  
Julien Longhi (2013) argues that the political tweet16 is not just an 
additional communication channel for politicians: it constitutes a genre, or 
genre de discours, in its own right. Indeed, political tweets are shaped by 
affordances and constraints that modify not only the pragmatic aspect of 
messages (e.g. interactional dynamics) but also the grammar itself (Longhi, 
                                                 
16 The term ‘political tweet’ is sometimes applied to any tweet about politics, regardless of its 
author. Here, we focus specifically on the tweets of political actors and candidates. 
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2013, p.25). The overall structure of tweets is characterized by a combination 
of linguistic and technological features, including (a) a character limit, (b) 
grammatical transgressions and constraints, (c) typographic adjustments and 
(d) the insertion of hypertextual elements (e.g., links, hashtags and @mentions) 
resulting in de-linearized utterances. Longhi describes two resulting discourse 
phenomena, semantic condensation and decontextualization (Longhi, 2013, 
p.28). First, due to the character constraint, information ought to be condensed 
and communicated as concisely as possible. This semantic condensation 
requires creativity and strategic word selection. While textese and 
abbreviations are uncommon among politicians, there are other creative ways 
to circumvent the character constraint, such as splitting a message into a 
‘thread’ of numbered tweets (1/3, 2/3, etc.). However, concision can also make 
political communication more effective and more accessible. Politicians are 
indeed more likely to retain their audience’s attention if they condense their 
ideas into short, digestible tidbits, as opposed to long, drawn-out speeches. 
Furthermore, a prevalent feature of Twitter campaigns is ‘self-quoting’ – 
candidates share quotes from rallies or debates on Twitter where they can 
reach a wider audience (Longhi, 2013). These direct quotes have been 
decontextualized i.e., separated from the context in which they were originally 
produced (Longhi, 2013, p.28). Hashtags can however function as contextual 
markers by relating isolated quotes to specific themes or events, as well as to 
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other media (such as TV debates, radio shows or blog posts). Longhi describes 
this tagging process as ‘techno-contextualization’ (Longhi, 2013, p.29). The 
combination of semantic condensation and decontextualization can increase 
the impact of a tweet by formatting it like a universal truth rather than an 
individual opinion (Longhi, 2013). Indeed, the tweet is no longer surrounded 
by the “noise” of its original context while hedges and softening markers are 
often removed for the sake of concision. The most impactful tweets are 
formulated as petites phrases i.e. short, attention-grabbing catchphrases 
(Longhi, 2013, p.26). Alice Krieg-Planque and Caroline Ollivier-Yaniv define 
petites phrases as decontextualized fragments of discourse which manage to 
attract mass media attention because of their polemical undertones (Krieg-
Planque & Ollivier-Yaniv, 2011, p.18). Similar to punchlines, they embody a 
new age of politics dominated by dramatic appeals (Kreis, 2017) and 
conversationalized rhetoric (Fairclough, 1992). 
In sum, politicians have adopted Twitter not just as a network but also 
as a genre of discourse through which they can disseminate ideas and 
ideologies. Longhi (2013) for instance points out that proverbs and fixed 
sayings are commonplace in the tweets of the National Front, befitting the 
party’s emphasis on tradition and national roots. Likewise, because populism 
typically rejects nuanced arguments in favor of moral outrage, Twitter appears 
to be the ideal platform for populist discourse (Bartlett, 2014). Indeed, it allows 
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populist candidates to share simple, unidimensional messages with followers 
who have grown tired of the cold style of ‘office politics’ (Moffitt & Tormey, 
2014). In this regard, Bartlett states that:  
Social media is in many ways the ideal medium for populist 
parties. It is distributed, non-hierarchical and democratic. It is an 
alternative to the mainstream media, which many supporters of 
populist parties strongly distrust. It is therefore not controlled by 
the elites: the content is generated by us – the honest, hard-
working, ordinary citizens – exactly those people who the 
populists are defending. (Bartlett, 2014, p.106) 
Negrine (2008) argues that contemporary political communication in 
characterized by constant adaptation to new discursive and social contexts.  
However, adaptation is not a passive process; it is a strategic response to a 
rapidly evolving sociopolitical landscape (Negrine, 2008).  In recent elections, 
candidates have exploited the technological affordances of Twitter to promote 
and amplify their campaigns (Enli & Skogerbø, 2013; Coesemans & De Cock, 
2017). Multimodality enables cross-platform promotion through links to 
official campaign websites, campaign ads, blog posts, and video recordings 
(Enli & Skogerbø, 2013). Over time, this reconfiguration of political discourse 
leads to the emergence and development of “institutionalized microgenres” 
(Zappavigna, 2012, p.190).  Fairclough suggests that genre analysis can 
contribute to understanding the relationship between technological advance 
and political change by shedding light on how technology gets integrated into 
modern social practices through new techno-genres (Fairclough, 2003, p.77).  
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Chapter 4  
Framework and Methodology 
 
 
 
At issue in all linguistic analysis is the process by which 
lived or imagined experience is turned into text.  
Suzanne Eggins. 
 
Introduction 
The present study makes use of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) in 
conjunction with a systemic-functional (SF) approach to text analysis. This 
methodology chapter first outlines the scope and aims of CDA, specifically 
Norman Fairclough’s dialectical-relational approach (Fairclough, 2003, 2009). 
For Fairclough, the power dynamics and hidden ideologies that underlie 
political texts can be uncovered using interdiscursive analysis, i.e., analyzing 
texts in terms of the different discourses, genres and styles that compose them 
(Fairclough, 2003). I argue that Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) offers 
a set of valuable analytical tools for this type of multi-layered textual analysis 
(Halliday, 1994; Eggins, 2004). I then address the pros and cons of such an 
approach, and I provide a rationale for selecting this particular framework to 
analyze political discourse on Twitter. The second section deals with the 
selection and collection of the data used in this study, which comprises 208 
campaign tweets relating to three real-world events – a press release, a 
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political scandal and a terror attack – that took place during the 2017 French 
presidential campaign. Finally, the last section of this chapter outlines my 
methods of analysis and bridges the gap between Fairclough’s concept of 
interdiscursivity and Halliday’s multifunctional approach to textual analysis 
(Halliday, 1978, 1994). My intent is to show that a critical approach is not 
incompatible with rigorous textual analysis, and to introduce an analytical 
framework that is both replicable and transferrable to other studies. In the era 
of ‘big data’, I also hope to illustrate that Critical Discourse Analysis can 
provide valuable insights on how politicians are adapting their campaign 
tactics to new technologies.  
Conceptual framework 
Scope and aims of Critical Discourse Analysis  
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is a theoretical and analytical 
framework which focuses on the relationship between discourse, power and 
ideology (Fairclough, 1989; Wodak, 1996). CDA operates from the premise that 
discourse is a social practice whereby language is intertwined with how we act 
and how we maintain and regulate our societies (Kress & Hodge, 1988). This 
approach to discourse analysis is “critical” because its focus is not upon 
language itself but upon “the linguistic character of social and cultural 
processes and structures” (Wodak, 1996, p.17). Rather than identifying and 
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describing language patterns for the sake of linguistic research, CDA uses 
those patterns to uncover hidden ideological values: 
[CDA] can allow us to reveal more precisely how speakers and authors 
use language and grammatical features to create meaning, to persuade 
people to think about language in a particular way, sometimes even to 
seek to manipulate them while at the same time concealing their 
communicative emotions. (Machin & Mayr, 2012, p.1) 
CDA researchers believe that power is both transmitted and practiced through 
discourse and seek to uncover the implicit relationship between discourse and 
power by challenging surface meanings and taken-for-granted assumptions 
(Fairclough, 1989). Indeed, language can be used strategically to vehiculate 
particular worldviews and to ultimately ‘naturalize’ them i.e., make them 
appear natural and common-sensical (Fairclough, 2003). For instance, 
politicians may seek to promote ideologies in ways that everyone can agree 
upon, such as the neo-liberal discourse that anything which enhances 
efﬁciency and adaptability is desirable (Fairclough, 2003, p.58). These 
naturalized ideas then become part of the way we organize our social and 
political institutions. The type of ideology that interests CDA researchers is 
the “hidden and latent type of everyday beliefs, which often appear disguised 
as conceptual metaphors and analogies” (Wodak & Meyer, 2001, p. 8). 
Accordingly, the aim of Critical Discourse Analysis is to ‘denaturalize’ 
language in order to expose information that is communicated but not directly 
present in the text (Fairclough, 1989). Indeed, Fairclough argues that “what is 
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‘said’ in a text is always said against the background of what is ‘unsaid’” 
(Fairclough, 2003, p.17). The key to uncovering this ‘unsaid’ is finding out 
which elements are backgrounded or even excluded altogether by discursive 
strategies such as passivation and nominalization (van Leeuwen, 1996; 
Machin & Mayr, 2012).  
Fundamentally, CDA does not refer to one single homogeneous 
framework but encompasses multiple approaches to discourse analysis. Among 
others, we may cite the socio-cognitive approach of Teun A. van Dijk (van Dijk, 
1993), Ruth Wodak’s social-historical approach (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001) or the 
dialectical-relational approach developed by Norman Fairclough (Fairclough, 
2001). Hence, CDA can be defined as a “problem‐oriented interdisciplinary 
research program, subsuming a variety of approaches, each with different 
theoretical models, research methods and agenda” (Unger, Wodak & 
KhosraviNik, 2016, p.2). Nonetheless, all approaches emphasize the need to 
look at discourse both reflectively and interpretively by researching the 
production and reception of texts within social structures (Young & Fitzgerald, 
2006, p.8). To this end, CDA researchers draw on a wide range of linguistic and 
analytical methods (Unger, Wodak & KhosraviNik, 2016).  
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Fairclough’s dialectical-relational approach 
To Fairclough, the term ‘discourse’ signals “the particular view of 
language in use as an element of social life which is closely interconnected with 
other elements.” (Fairclough, 2003, p.3). Fairclough has a dialectical-relational 
approach to text analysis (Fairclough, 2009), meaning that he is concerned 
with the analysis of the dialectical relationship between discourse and other 
elements of social practices (Fairclough, 1993).  
 
The dialectics of discourse 
Fairclough is perhaps best known for his three-dimensional framework, 
which aims to map three forms of analysis onto one another: (a) the analysis of 
texts (i.e. lexicogrammatical features), (b) the analysis of discourse practices 
(i.e. the production, distribution and consumption of texts), and (c) the analysis 
of texts as sociocultural practices (Fairclough, 1993): 
Each discursive event has three dimensions or facets: it is a spoken or 
written language text, it is an instance of discourse practice involving 
the production and interpretation of text, and it is a piece of social 
practice. (Fairclough, 1993, p.136). 
This conceptualization of discourse emphasizes the mutual determination and 
connection of the micro and macro levels (see Figure 4.1). Semiosis (i.e., 
meaning-making) occurs between the micro level of linguistic features and the 
macro level of social practices (Fairclough, 1993). Accordingly, an internal 
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analysis of political discourse has limited value if detached from the political 
field and its wider frame. 
 
Figure 4.1: Norman Fairclough’s three-dimensional network 
Fairclough argues that researchers can reconcile these three dimensions 
through ‘interdiscursive analysis’, that is, by “seeing texts in terms of the 
different discourses, genres and styles they draw upon and articulate together” 
(Fairclough, 2003, p.3). Discourses, genres and styles are the three main ways 
in which discourse ﬁgures as a part of social practices. Together, they form 
unique combinations which Fairclough calls ‘orders of discourse’ and which 
encapsulate “the totality of discursive practices of an institution, and 
relationships between them” (Fairclough, 1993, p.138). These three elements 
are described below:  
1) Discourses are ways of representing and construing aspects of the world.  
Fairclough attaches several meanings to the term ‘discourse’. As an 
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abstract noun, discourse broadly refers to “language use conceived as social 
practice” while the count noun indexes a “way of signifying experience from 
a particular perspective” (Fairclough, 1993, p.138). Discourses are 
generally associated with different positions of different groups of social 
actors. For instance, the discourse that “immigrants are a threat to 
national identity” is rampant in far-right circles.  
2) Genres are ways of acting and interacting in discourse. Genres are more 
or less conventionalized with recognizable and reproducible elements (e.g. 
the expression “once upon a time” indicates that a text belongs to the 
fairytale genre). This study approaches campaign tweets as part of a 
broader ‘tweet genre’ with its own set of conventions, such as hashtags and 
@mentions (Longhi, 2013; Paveau, 2013). For Fairclough, genre analysis 
can make a signiﬁcant contribution to research on the relationship 
between technological advancement and wider social change, especially in 
terms of how the integration of new technologies into social processes is 
instantiated through new “emergent genres” (Fairclough, 2003, p.78).  
3) Styles are ways of being and of construing one’s identity in discourse. 
The present study bears upon the notion of ‘presidentiability’ i.e., 
communicating through discourse that one is “presidential caliber” (Alduy, 
2017). Indeed, being a politician is partly a matter of developing the 
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appropriate semiotic style, and Donald Trump’s disregard of “political 
correctness” has been a key component of his outsider persona (Oates & 
Moe, 2017).  
Genres, discourses and styles are dialectically related: each element 
‘internalizes’ the others. Together, they illustrate the dialectical relationship 
of the text to the event, to the wider social context, and to the social actors 
involved in the event (Fairclough, 1993). 
 
Internal and external relations 
Fairclough’s approach is a relational approach to text analysis as it is 
concerned with several ‘levels’ of analysis and with the relations between these 
levels: 
Figure 4.2: Fairclough’s levels of analysis (Fairclough, 2003) 
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We can distinguish the ‘external relations’ from the ‘internal relations’ of texts. 
The external relations of texts refer to their relations with other elements of 
social events and, more abstractly, social practices and social structures. In 
contrast, internal relations correspond to semantic, grammatical, lexical and 
phonological relations within a text (Fairclough, 2003, p.36). Discourses, 
genres and styles belong to the intermediate level of discourse – a mediating 
level between the text and its social context, and between internal and external 
relations:   
Discourses, genres and styles are both elements of texts, and social 
elements. In texts they are organized together in interdiscursive 
relations - relations in which different genres, discourses and styles may 
be “mixed”, articulated and textured together in particular ways. As 
social elements, genres, discourses and styles are articulated together 
in particular ways in orders of discourse – the language aspects of social 
practices in which language variation is socially controlled. (Fairclough, 
2003, p.37). 
In other words, an interdiscursive perspective allows us to connect concrete 
social events to more abstract social practices, and to ask broader questions 
about the role of language in social life. Fairclough’s dialectical-relational 
approach is motivated by his belief that “texts have social, political, cognitive, 
moral and material consequences and effects”, and that “it is vital to 
understand these consequences and effects if we are to raise moral and political 
questions about contemporary societies” (Fairclough, 2003, p.14). Accordingly, 
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textual description should not be seen as prior to or independent of social 
critique but as a dynamic dialogue across disciplines, methods, and theories. 
SFL and the social functions of language 
Fairclough’s approach draws heavily from Systemic Functional 
Linguistics, a social semiotic theory of language developed by Michael Halliday 
(Halliday, 1978, 1994). Essentially, SFL is the study of the relationship 
between language and the ‘social functions’ it has evolved to serve (Wodak & 
Meyer, 2009, p. 27). SFL thus emphasizes the interrelation of form and 
meaning, and approaches language as an elaborate system of ‘options’ through 
which speakers can ‘realize’ a wide array of ‘meaning potentials’ according to 
social circumstances (Eggins, 2004).  
The semogenic power of language 
SFL and CDA are part of what Karen Tusting calls ‘critical social 
linguistics’ - an umbrella term for areas in linguistics that explore the role of 
language in broader social processes, or “language as social practice” (Tusting, 
2005, p.42). The common goal of these disciplines is to uncover the 
‘sociosemantics’ of texts, i.e., “the meanings of language in use in the textual 
processes of social life” (Eggins, 2004, p. 2).  
84 
 
A social semiotic approach to discourse analysis recognizes that 
language cannot be divorced from the social context in which it is embedded, 
and that speakers create texts by selecting or excluding semiotic resources 
from a network of shared options (Machin & Mayr, 2012, p.19). Indeed, 
Halliday argues that a text is a continuous process of semantic choice: “Text is 
meaning, and meaning is choice” (Halliday, 1978, p.137). The concept of 
‘realization’ describes the process through which grammatical choices 
represent (or ‘realize’) social meanings (Eggins, 2004; Young & Fitzgerald, 
2006). Hence, the meaning of a text is dependent upon the choices made by the 
speaker from the options within the language system. Because language has 
the ability to generate new meanings, it is a ‘semogenic’ system:  
Not all semiotic systems are also semogenic: a system of traffic signals, 
for example, is a system of meaning, but its meaning is fixed – it cannot 
create meanings that are not built into it. By contrast, the meaning 
potential of a language is open-ended: new meaning(s) always can be, 
and often are being, created. (Halliday, 2009, p. 60) 
This semogenic system is the result of the constant interaction of three levels 
of meaning: (a) discourse-semantics, (b) lexicogrammar, and (c) expression. Per 
this model, abstract meanings are realized by words and structures which in 
turn are realized by sounds or writing (see Figure 4.3).  
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Figure 4.3: The three strata of language. 
Halliday (1978) coined the term ‘lexicogrammar’ to reflect the interdependence 
of syntax (grammar) and vocabulary (lexis). The lexicogrammar is the 
intermediate level responsible for turning meanings into wordings as speakers 
pick from an available repertoire of discrete signs (Eggins, 2004, p.14). Each 
sign consists of an abstract meaning (the signified) being arbitrarily realized 
by a concrete expression (the signifier). As such, the lexicogrammar enacts the 
pairing of a meaning with its realization (Halliday, 1978).  
In describing how a text forms a unified whole, Halliday and Hasan 
(1976) introduce the concept of ‘texture’ as the property that holds the clauses 
of a text together to give them semantic and structural unity (Halliday & 
Hasan, 1976, p.2). Texture involves the interaction of two components: 
cohesion and coherence. Eggins defines cohesion as the process through which 
“referential, lexical and logical ties bind passages of language into relatively 
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coherent, unified semantic units” (Eggins, 2004, p.53). In a cohesive text, each 
clause can be linked to the clauses that precede it. This process of ongoing 
contextualization is an essential element of the meaning-making process: 
“there has to be cohesion if meanings are to be exchanged at all” (Halliday & 
Hasan, 1976, p.300). Coherence, on the other hand, refers to a text’s 
relationship with its extra-textual context (i.e., with the social and cultural 
context of its occurrence). Indeed, SFL posits that texts display continuity not 
just with elements within their boundaries but also with the context within 
which they take place: “Just as all texts in fact point outwards, to context, and 
depend upon context for their interpretation, so also all texts carry their 
context within them” (Eggins, 2004, p.87).  
For Halliday, “a text is a sociological event, a semiotic encounter through 
which the meanings that constitute the social system are exchanged” 
(Halliday, 1978, p.139). He thus approaches language as a form of 
socialization, enabling individuals to perform meaningful actions within 
‘contexts of situation’. Halliday describes the ‘context of situation’ as “a 
theoretical construct for explaining how a text relates to the social processes 
within which it is located” (Halliday, 1991, p.277). This concept was borrowed 
from the anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski, who argued that a text has no 
meaning when taken out of its situational context: 
87 
 
A word without linguistic context is a mere fragment and stands for 
nothing by itself, so in reality of a spoken living tongue, the utterance 
has no meaning except in the context of situation. (Malinowski, 1946, p. 
307; quoted in Eggins, 2004, p.89). 
Furthermore, Malinowski argued that the context of situation itself can only 
be understood if placed within the larger ‘context of culture’. In other words, 
linguistic interpretation depends on contextual information about the 
situation and the culture within which the text is located. As a social systemic 
approach, SFL apprehends textual analysis in terms of ‘linguistic 
predictability’ (Firth, 1957). That is, contextual cues enable us to make 
predictions about patterns of language use (cf. Figure 4.4).  
 
Figure 4.4: The SFL model of text-in-context. 
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According to this model, patterns of social organization in a culture (i.e., social 
structures) are realized by patterns of social interaction in a situation (i.e., 
social practices), which in turn are realized by patterns of language use in a 
text. The context of culture thus constitutes “the total environment in which a 
text unfolds” (Halliday, 1978, p.5). 
Because linguistic production relies on the context of situation, we can 
infer that it is only by reference to the various situations in which language is 
used that we can understand its functioning. Halliday coined the term ‘register’ 
to refer to “variety according to use” (Halliday, 1994, p.87). Hasan (2014) 
describes register as follows: 
Language is not realized in the abstract: it is realized as the activity of 
people in situations, as linguistic events which are manifested in a 
particular dialect or register. A speaker positioned in a specific context 
of situation would in all likelihood speak with relevance to it; in other 
words, he would speak ‘in’ register. (Hasan, 2014, p.4)  
In order to identify the main ‘situation types’ associated with distinct registers, 
Halliday suggests “a classification [of register] along three dimensions, each 
representing an aspect of the situation in which language operates and the 
part played by language in them” (Halliday, 1994, p.90). Registers can thus be 
distinguished according to three ‘register variables’: field, tenor (also referred 
to as ‘style’) and mode:  
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1) The field of discourse is concerned with the nature of the social event 
of which language forms a part. Language can be fully constitutive of 
the activity (e.g. a lecture or an essay) or can have more of a secondary 
role (e.g. a soccer game). Each activity or event involves participants, 
processes and participants organized into particular taxonomies that 
distinguish one field from another.  
2) The tenor of discourse or style of discourse is concerned with social 
relations between the participants, and with how social status (equal vs. 
unequal) and social distance (close vs. distant) affect these relations and 
by extension patterns of language use (e.g. colloquial vs. polite).  
3) Finally, the mode of discourse refers to the semiotic mode of the 
language activity, and to how it affects the role played by the language 
activity in the social situation. One primary distinction is between 
spoken and written language.  
Each variable portrays the interrelationship between text and context by at 
once representing an aspect of the situation in which language plays a role, 
and an aspect of the role played by language in the situation (Halliday, 1994). 
As such, tenor, field and mode bear upon three social functions of language: 
enacting relationships, construing experience, and packaging these 
enactments and construals into meaningful discourse (Martin & Rose, 2008).  
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Halliday’s systemic functional grammar 
Halliday’s main contribution to linguistics is his development of a 
‘systemic functional grammar’ that aims to represent how different strands of 
meaning are expressed in clause structures (Halliday, 1994). The 
term systemic refers to Halliday’s view of language as “a network of systems, 
or interrelated sets of options for making meaning” (Halliday, 1994, p.15). In 
that sense, SFL emphasizes paradigmatic relations over syntagmatic 
relations. While syntagmatic relations refer to relations between elements that 
are actually present in a text, paradigmatic relations are relations of choice 
that draw attention to relations between actual and potential elements 
(Fairclough, 2003). That is, texts include particular features that realize 
particular meanings, but they could have included others which were available 
to the speaker but were not selected. Eggins explains that “wherever people 
have the possibility of choice, there we find the potential for semiotic systems, 
as the choices we make are invested with meaning” (Eggins, 2004, p.15). The 
context of situation ‘activates’ a set of available features, while the chosen 
features ‘realize’ (i.e., project) a particular representation of the world. 
Interpreting texts from a paradigmatic perspective thus allows us to consider 
the appropriacy (or inappropriacy) of linguistic choices in relation to their 
contexts of use (Eggins, 2004, p.3).  
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Central to SFL methodology is the use of ‘system networks’ (or ‘sys-nets’) 
that represent the ‘options’ available to speakers for the realization of meaning. 
Sys-nets are networks of interrelated options that are organized 
paradigmatically (Hasan, 2014). Below are two examples of system networks 
representing lexical choice and grammatical choice, respectively.  
1) Lexical choice  
Figure 4.5: Lexical choice, specifying attitude.  
 
System networks of lexical choice capture the semantic relations of contrast or 
opposition between lexical items (Eggins, 2004, p.16). Eggins (2004) gives the 
example of a social situation where a mother is describing the latest exploits 
of her five year-old child to a friend. The mother faces multiple word options 
for referring to her progeny, such as child, kid, brat, darling, angel, etc. Her 
decision requires her to select which ‘dimension(s) of contrast’ she wishes to 
encode (Eggins, 2004, p.17). For instance, she may choose to specify her 
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‘attitude’ towards the child, with words such as darling or angel realizing a 
positive attitude, while brat or punk encode a negative attitude (cf. Figure 4.5).  
2) Grammatical choice 
 
 
           Figure 4.6: Grammatical choice, specifying Mood.  
 
Although paradigmatic relations are foregrounded in SFL, features in 
grammatical systems are realized as structures, or ‘syntagms’, rather than as 
individual words. The elements that constitute these structures (or 
‘constituents’) are given functional labels that describe the contribution they 
make to the structure as a whole. Figure 4.6 outlines three main combinations 
of Mood constituents found in English clauses. For example, the structure 
[Subject ^ Finite ^ Predicator ^ Complement ^ Adjunct] describes the 
syntagmatic (i.e., sequential) organization of declaratives in English. In 
technical terms, a structure can thus be described as a “set of functional 
constituents in syntagmatic relation” (Eggins, 2004, p.193).  
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Most networks cannot be described with only one system (i.e., one set of 
options). Additional systems are added to the network to capture further 
choices and extend the network in ‘delicacy’. Simply put, the first system in the 
network represents the ‘least delicate’ choice. As the network expands, it moves 
in delicacy, with the final system being the ‘most delicate’ choice (Eggins, 2004, 
p.196-197).  
 
Figure 4.7: An extended system network (Eggins, 2004). 
The ‘scale of delicacy’ refers to the logical priority among choices. For example, 
picture a situation where you must select a side for your main dish at a 
restaurant (illustrated in Figure 4.7). Before you can choose between mashed 
or baked potatoes, you must first have chosen between potatoes and beans, 
which in turn means you must first have chosen cooked vegetables rather than 
salad as your side choice. Each step in the process leads to a more ‘delicate 
choice’ than the previous one(s). 
SFL is also functional, as Halliday posits that language has evolved and 
continues to evolve in response to socio-functional needs. Indeed, he argues 
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that the clause is a simultaneous realization of these three major strands of 
meanings, which he calls ‘metafunctions’ (Halliday, 1978):  
1) The ideational metafunction refers to the linguistic 
representation of action (i.e., who does what to whom). Its function is 
thus to “encode our experience of the world” by representing the 
processes, participants, and circumstances that surround us. 
2) The interpersonal metafunction is concerned with how speakers 
exchange information (statements, questions, commands and 
requests), and with how they introduce stances and attitudes into 
their discourse. This includes stances and attitudes towards their 
topic but also towards their interlocutor(s).  
3) The textual metafunction involves the different ways in which 
speakers connect parts of their discourse so that their messages are 
communicated in a cohesive and coherent fashion. Textual resources 
therefore ensure information flow by coordinating how “ideational 
and interpersonal meanings are distributed in waves of semiosis, 
including interconnections between waves” (Martin & Rose, 2008, 
p.24).  
These three metafunctions are fused together in all linguistic units (Eggins, 
2004, p. 3). They are expressed simultaneously at the level of the clause, which 
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SFL regards as the pivotal unit of grammatical meaning. According to 
Halliday:  
With only minor exceptions, whatever the speaker is doing with 
language he will draw on all three components of grammar. He 
will need to make some reference to the categories of his own 
experience – in other words, the language will be about 
something. He will need to take up some position in the speech 
situation; at the very least he will specify his own communication 
role and (will) set up expectations for that of the hearer – in terms 
of statements, questions, response and the like. And what he says 
will be structured as ‘text’ – that is to say, it will be operational 
in the given context. (Halliday, 1973, p.100) 
Eggins argues that because SFL seeks to describe clause structure at several 
levels of functional organization, it can be described as “a multi-functional 
approach to language”. (Eggins, 2004, p.135). With this orientation, system 
networks become instruments for revealing the meaning potential of language, 
as they reflect its organization into bundles of interdependent options (Martin 
& Rose, 2008, p.29). 
Furthermore, Halliday (1978) suggests that the metafunctions 
‘resonate’ systematically with the three variables of register. Accordingly, the 
linguistic patterns oriented to the ideational metafunction correlate with the 
field of discourse, those deriving from the interpersonal metafunction correlate 
with the tenor of discourse, while the resources of the textual metafunction 
correlate with the mode of discourse. In other words, this metafunctional 
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orientation can provide guidance for identifying the lexicogrammatical 
patterns capable of realizing the social meanings pertaining to each situational 
variable (namely, construing experience, enacting relationships and 
organizing discourse). For Hasan:    
The metaphor of ‘resonance’ is apt for referring to the reciprocal 
relations of context and metafunction. The metafunctions have evolved 
in language being used as a form of action, as a means of enacting 
interpersonal relations, and also as a means of creating relevance, 
continuity and coherence in interaction. (Hasan, 2014, p.12) 
To conclude, SFL is oriented to asking questions about the relationship 
between meaning potentials and actual realizations. For Eggins, “[i]t is only 
by knowing what a speaker could have meant that we can understand in full 
the meaning of what they did in fact mean” (Eggins, 2004, p.204; original 
emphasis). In other words, SFL researchers study what speakers actually 
mean by describing the choices they made and relating them to the other 
possibilities they had. This requires looking outward to the social and cultural 
context, for the linguistic system itself can only produce circular explanations. 
In order to avoid this trap, we must consider the relationship between the 
social roles of the interactants and the meaning potentials to which they have 
access (Eggins, 2004). Indeed, Martin and Rose suggest that “as language 
realizes its social contexts, so each dimension of a social context is realized by 
a particular functional dimension of language” (Martin & Rose, 2008, p.11). 
The potential/actual orientation of SFL offers a framework within which we 
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can compare different choices and consider the appropriacy and the relevance 
of these choices according to the social circumstances (Hasan, 2014).  
 
Two complementary approaches 
Halliday’s systemic functional framework is closely tied to Critical 
Discourse Analysis. In fact, Wodak argues that “an understanding of the basic 
claims of Halliday’s grammar and his approach to linguistic analysis is 
essential for a proper understanding of CDA” (Wodak, 2001, p.8). Fairclough, 
who cites Halliday as his “main point of reference within existing literature on 
text analysis”, describes SFL as a socially-oriented approach to discourse: 
SFL is profoundly concerned with the relationship between language 
and other elements and aspects of social life, and that its approach to 
the linguistic analysis of texts is always oriented to the social character 
of texts. (Fairclough, 2003, p.5)  
Young and Fitzgerald (2006) argue that critical approaches to discourse look 
at language both reflectively (by asking why speakers chose certain features 
and not others) and interpretively (by analyzing relations between language 
use and social structures). Halliday’s SFL and Fairclough’s dialectical-
relational approach to CDA thus share numerous similarities:  
(1) Language as social practice: Halliday and Fairclough share a 
dialectical view of text-in-context whereby discursive events shape and 
are shaped by the contexts in which they occur. SFL operates from the 
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premise that language structure is integrally related to social functions. 
For Halliday, language is central to the development of culture; Culture 
is instantiated in texts and becomes tangible to speakers as they 
participate in a variety of social practices (Hasan, 2014).  
(2) Language as ideological: Eggins (2004) argues that our use of 
language is inevitably influenced by our ideological positions: “to use 
language at all is to use it to encode particular positions and values” 
(Eggins, 2004, p.11). In acknowledging that language is ideologically 
based, both SFL and CDA provide specific attention to the construction 
of ideology in discourse. Halliday suggests that grammar itself is an 
“ideological interpretant built into language” (Halliday, 2003, p.135). 
That is, ideologies take shape through repeated manifestations of 
semantic patterns instantiated by particular lexical and grammatical 
choices (Halliday, 2003). 
(3) Language as multidimensional: Both approaches posit that 
language operates across multiple interrelated dimensions of meaning, 
which in turn coincide with several levels of analysis. Fairclough and 
Halliday emphasize the need to link the micro analysis of texts to the 
macro analysis of culture, thereby situating textual analysis within 
organizational analysis. To that end, Fairclough (1993) calls for a theory 
of language “which stresses its multifunctionality” and “which sees any 
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text as simultaneously enacting what Halliday calls the ‘ideational’, 
‘interpersonal’ and ‘textual’ functions of language” (Fairclough, 1993, 
p.134).  
However, CDA differs from SFL in its primary concern with how language 
contributes to creating, sustaining and challenging power relations within 
society (Fairclough, 1989). Indeed, Fairclough argues that the productivity and 
creativity of discourse practices are controlled and restrained by power 
relations. That is, discourse practices “are ideologically invested in so far as 
they incorporate significations which contribute to sustaining or restructuring 
power relations” (Fairclough, 1992, p.91). In sum, SFL and CDA are 
complementary approaches: while SFL analysis asks how grammar realizes 
meanings, CDA seeks to determine how and why these meanings can be used 
to exert power and influence over others (Young & Fitzgerald, 2006). By doing 
so, CDA brings the linguistic field into the domain of social and political 
relevance. Fairclough’s approach in particular aligns with the Marxist view 
that in order to achieve social change, we must first document the hegemonic 
structures that foster social inequalities (Fairclough, 2003). SFL provides an 
angle and a toolkit that this study can exploit to understand how these 
structures are expressed in discourse. Fairclough himself has adapted 
Halliday’s multifunctional approach to his analysis of political and 
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institutional discourses, such as academic discourse (Fairclough, 1993) and the 
discourse of New Labour (Fairclough, 2000).  
 
Strengths and weaknesses of the CDA approach 
From theory to practice 
Because of its emphasis on ideology and relations of power, CDA 
emerged as the most appropriate approach for this study, for political discourse 
plays a crucial role in the “enactment, reproduction, and legitimization of 
power and domination” (van Dijk, 2001, p.95). CDA seeks to understand the 
nature of social power and dominance and to “formulate ideas about how 
discourse contributes to their reproduction” (van Dijk, 1993, p. 254). To this 
end, it exposes strategies that appear neutral on the surface but that are in 
fact ideological and seek to shape representations of events and people to 
particular ends (Fairclough, 1992).  
However, some critics have questioned whether CDA adheres to 
“standards of careful, rigorous and systematic analysis” (Fairclough & Wodak, 
1997, p.259). Specifically, the qualitative approach within CDA has been 
criticized for extrapolating conclusions from a limited amount of minutely 
examined data. In other words, critics are concerned that CDA encourages 
broad generalizations about social representation and social change without 
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the linguistic evidence to support it (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999). 
Fairclough and Wodak have responded to this criticism by arguing that while 
the social scientific knowledge of texts is possible and increasing, it is still 
inevitably partial (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997). Indeed, reality cannot be 
reduced to our knowledge of reality, which is contingent, shifting, and most of 
all incomplete. Consequently, there is no such thing as a “complete” or 
“definitive” analysis of a text. Furthermore, textual analysis is also inevitably 
selective; In any analysis, our motivations lead us to ask particular questions 
about texts (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997). Yet, transdisciplinarity allows us to 
increase and extend our knowledge of texts. For Fairclough, discourse analysis 
should indeed be seen as “an open process which can be enhanced through 
dialogue across disciplines and theories, rather than a coding in the terms of 
an autonomous analytical framework or grammar” (Fairclough, 2003, p.6). By 
drawing upon various disciplines and approaches, researchers can 
operationalize a wide range of social and theoretical perspectives in textual 
analysis (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997; Fairclough, 2003). Moreover, most CDA 
scholars insist that discourse analysis requires the application of some level of 
“linguistic expertise” (Meyer, 2001, p. 30) during the analytical process, for 
“detailed textual analysis will always strengthen discourse analysis” 
(Fairclough, 1992, p. 194). Chouliaraki and Fairclough argue that “the social 
concerns of CDA do not deflect from the detailed and careful linguistic (and 
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semiotic) analysis of texts” and that systematic analysis can in fact “give a 
firmer linguistic grounding to its social claims about discourse” (Chouliaraki & 
Fairclough, 1999, p. 152). The development of Systemic Functional Linguistics 
has been driven by its constant extension into new contexts of use and new 
areas of research (Halliday, 2009, pp. 60-61). According to Eggins, SFL seeks 
to develop “both a theory about language as social process and an analytical 
methodology which permits the detailed and systematic description of 
language patterns” (Eggins, 2004, p.21). Halliday’s systemic-functional 
approach to language use aims to show how social actors draw on all three 
metafunctions to “mediate between the potentialities of language structure 
and the actualities of what ends up being said or written in any given event” 
(Tusting, 2005, p.47).  
While textual analysis is a valuable supplement to social research, it 
shall not be seen as a replacement for informed social critique. Fairclough 
indeed argues that the ideological effects of texts can only be assessed by 
framing textual analysis within organizational analysis, i.e., by linking the 
‘micro’ analysis of individual texts to the ‘macro’ analysis of how power 
relations work across networks of social practices and structures (Fairclough, 
2003, p.15). Because language reflects and reproduces power relations in 
society, uncovering linguistic strategies can help us understand, expose, and 
challenge power inequalities: 
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Since language can (re)produce social life, what kind of world is being 
created by texts and what kinds of inequalities and interests might this 
seek to perpetuate, generate, or legitimate? (Machin & Mayr, 2012, p.24) 
Hence, the purpose of CDA is not only to highlight power equations within 
texts, but also to suggest ways of bringing about social and political change 
(Fairclough & Wodak, 1997, p.258). Stubbs (1997) argues that it is precisely 
because CDA raises important social issues and has an agenda of “potentially 
very considerable social significance” (Stubbs, 1997, p.114) that enhancing its 
methodology should be a priority. 
In sum, this study acknowledges the limitations of qualitative discourse 
analysis but seeks to show that it can provide valuable insights when combined 
with systemic analysis. Accordingly, my goal is not to infer broad 
generalizations on how French politicians exploit Twitter for political gain, but 
rather to uncover how the 2017 presidential candidates utilized particular 
discursive strategies in order to realize a variety of discourses, genres, and 
styles.  
Researcher bias 
As discussed in the previous section, there is no such thing as “objective” 
discourse analysis (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997). CDA researchers must accept 
this inevitability and acknowledge that the discourse being analyzed is seen 
through the lens of the researcher:  
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What we are able to see of the actuality of a text depends upon the 
perspective from which we approach it, including the particular social 
issues in focus, and the social theory and discourse theory we draw upon. 
(Fairclough, 2003, p. 16).  
As a result, any analysis of political discourse must account for the researcher’s 
political leanings. Fairclough himself states that he is “a socialist” (Fairclough, 
2003, p.4) and recognizes that his political commitment motivates his selection 
of texts. Fairclough openly condemns ‘new capitalism’ and notes that terms 
such as ‘globalization’, ‘post-modernity’, ‘information society’, ‘knowledge 
economy’ and ‘consumer culture’ are all characteristic ways of referring to 
“changes in contemporary capitalism” (Fairclough, 2003, pp. 4-5). As a French 
citizen, I was personally invested in the 2017 presidential election. I identify 
as a social democrat and I support policies that promote social equality and 
fair distribution. It is worth noting that I did not feel strongly in favor of any 
of the 2017 candidates. However, my political views imply a bias against 
conservative candidates such as François Fillon and Marine Le Pen. Indeed, it 
was my opposition to Marine Le Pen and to her beliefs that motivated my vote 
for Emmanuel Macron, rather any strong affinity for the candidate himself. 
The nature of CDA research and its dealing with power and ideology make this 
disclosure necessary. However, I argue that the integration of SFL methods 
can help reduce ideological bias by allowing a greater sensitivity to texts 
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resulting in more precise and transparent analysis (Young & Fitzgerald, 2006, 
p.53). 
Finally, it is important to acknowledge that digital culture has become 
an integral part of our social lives. Web 2.0 discourse is now fully embedded in 
our everyday thoughts and conversations, even when we are “off the grid”. We 
could thus argue that studies focusing on online discourse adopt an 
ethnographic approach requiring the “systematic presence of the researcher in 
the context of the practice under study” (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999, 
pp.61-62). Nancy Thumim (2012) argues that because CMD researchers are 
“writing both from within and about digital culture” (Thumim, 2012, p.11), 
they do not yet have the benefit of hindsight regarding the repercussions of 
new media on our society. 
Application to computer-mediated environments 
This study seeks to illustrate how CDA can be applied to the analysis of 
computer-mediated communication (CMC). The use of social media represents 
an important aspect of contemporary politics and has disrupted long-standing 
campaign norms - from how candidates run their campaigns to how voters 
receive and share information (Schill & Hendricks, 2017). Espousing this 
‘digital turn’ thus seems essential for CDA to remain a relevant framework for 
the analysis of political discourse. The challenge, however, lies in adapting 
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existing methods of analysis to the properties of online discourse (Herring, 
2011). Because CDA focuses on the social dimension of language rather than 
on linguistic units per se, texts are analyzed against genre-specific 
backgrounds to address their processes of production, distribution and 
consumption: 
A fully ‘critical’ account of discourse would (…) require theorization and 
description of both the social processes and structures which give rise to 
the production of the text, and of the social structures and processes 
within which individuals or groups as social historical subjects, create 
meanings in their interactions with texts. (Wodak, 2001, p.3) 
Before engaging in detailed analysis, CDA scholars must account for the 
nature of the data, the intended audience, the semiotic features of the language 
used, and the possibilities provided by the genre of communication (Unger, 
Wodak & KhosraviNik, 2016). Moreover, we must acknowledge how new 
affordances influence the overall qualities of texts when considering how a 
framework can be applied to social media data (Herring, 2013).  
However, the framing of the ‘online world’ as a separate discursive 
arena, as advocated by early CMC studies, does not sit well with the social 
aspirations of CDA research. Hence, just as CDA scholars would not endorse 
an analytical approach that separates linguistic production from its social and 
cultural context, they should not treat ‘the online’ and ‘the offline’ as separate 
and independent of one another - a perspective Jurgenson (2012) calls ‘digital 
dualism’:   
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As social‐media scholars we view the participatory Web as part of a 
media apparatus which is used by individuals in society, hence we do 
not treat digitally‐mediated texts as part of a “virtual” world that is 
separate from the physical world and “reality”, despite acknowledging 
that digitally‐mediated contexts have specific features that may affect 
our analyses. (Unger, Wodak & KhosraviNik, 2016, p.8) 
In recent years, politics and social media have become inextricably linked, as 
the online bleeds onto the offline and transcends virtual space (Schill & 
Hendricks, 2017). Online political discourse should be analyzed within this 
new interactive context, while bearing in mind that the social nature of 
communication is a core property of the participatory web (Herring, 2013). A 
challenge pertains to the apparent ‘hybridity’ of discourse on Web 2.0 
platforms. Despite being a predominantly written mode of communication, 
Twitter bears many similarities with spoken modes (Zappavigna, 2012). 
Eggins (2004) notes that spoken discourse often contains spontaneity 
phenomena, including slang, dialect features (e.g. y’all) and non-standard 
grammar. In contrast, she argues that written texts correlate with ‘prestige’ 
vocabulary and standard grammatical constructions (cf. Table 4.1). Twitter is 
asynchronous, meaning that its users have the ability to reflect and carefully 
craft their messages (Tagg, 2012; Zappavigna, 2012). Yet, users often try to 
emulate casual spoken language – a deliberate stylization Caroline Tagg calls 
‘speech-like performativity’ (Tagg, 2012, p.176). 
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SPOKEN DISCOURSE WRITTEN TEXT 
Face-to-face 
Synchronous 
Language-as-action 
Spontaneous / unrehearsed 
Casual / informal 
Non-standard grammar 
Grammatical complexity 
Everyday lexis 
Lexically sparse 
Not face-to-face 
Asynchronous 
Language-as-reflection 
Not spontaneous / polished 
Not casual / formal 
Standard grammar 
Grammatical simplicity 
‘Prestige’ lexis 
Lexically dense 
Table 4.1: Characteristics of spoken and written language.  
When analyzing Twitter data, we must thus reflect beyond the old 
spoken/written dichotomy, which portrays spoken discourse as interactive and 
informal and written texts as static and formal. 
Accordingly, this study is concerned with how Twitter and its online 
ecosystem affect the linguistic productions of political figures. Fairclough 
argues that texts lead social and cultural change in contemporary society as 
they can “transform prior texts and restructure existing conventions (…) to 
generate new ones” (Fairclough, 1992, p.270). Hence, he believes that genre 
analysis can make a signiﬁcant contribution to research on the relationship 
between technological change and wider social change - in terms of how “the 
integration of new technologies into social processes is instantiated through 
new genres”, and of how these genres get “woven into the fabric of the 
information society” (Fairclough, 2003, p.78). 
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Corpus and data collection  
This study focuses specifically on the 2017 French presidential election, 
which culminated in the victory of Emmanuel Macron on May 7, 2017 after a 
run-off with Marine Le Pen.  From November 2016 to May 2017, I followed the 
latest developments of the campaign on Twitter, and collected tweets relating 
to twenty-eight “breaking news” events.  Because this is a qualitative study, 
however, I have limited my analysis to three major events.  These events 
constitute ‘contexts of situation’ for the tweets I have collected, providing three 
distinct ‘snapshots’ of the election.  As defined by Popescu and Pennacchioti 
(2010), a Twitter snapshot is a tripartite concept consisting of (a) a target 
entity (such as a specific event), (b) a given time period, and (c) a set of tweets 
about the entity from the given time period (Popescu & Pennacchioti, 2010, 
p.1873). On Twitter, users often post about events as they are happening – a 
practice called ‘livetweeting’ – meaning that Twitter language is highly 
temporarily bound. In other words, “the time at which the snapshot occurs 
impacts on the kind of language retrieved from the Twitter stream” 
(Zappavigna, 2012, p.177). A main appeal of doing discourse analysis on 
Twitter is to study the raw reactions of people to live events. The aim of a 
“snapshot approach” is not to provide a representative description of linguistic 
activity on Twitter across all users and topics, but rather to conduct a case 
study in which field variables are held relatively constant to afford a rich 
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investigation of meaning-making in a single specific domain (Zappavigna, 
2012).  
 
Events 
The tweets discussed in this study were posted in reaction to three “breaking 
news” events which occurred during the 2017 French election. I approached 
these events as three distinct ‘contexts of situation’ (Halliday, 1994) or ‘frames’ 
through which the election could be analyzed: a press release, a political 
scandal, and a terror attack. These events are introduced in Figure 4.8 (for 
ease of reference, a hashtagged title was assigned to each event):  
Figure 4.8: Description of events.
On December 1, 2016, President François Hollande 
announced that he would not seek re-election.
#HollandeRenonce
(50 tweets)
On January 25, 2017, Republican nominee François Fillon 
was accused of misusing more than €500,000 in state funds 
through a 'fake job' he created for his wife Penelope.
#Fillongate
(78 tweets) 
On April 20, 2017, three National Police officers were shot 
by Karim Cheurfi, a French national wielding an AK-47 on 
the Champs Elysées in Paris. One officer, Captain Xavier 
Jugelé, did not survive the attack. 
#ChampsElysées
(80 tweets)
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Each event was chosen for its overall impact on the election and for the 
likelihood that it would bring out a variety of genres, discourses, and styles. 
 
Participants 
For the purpose of this study, I focused on five 2017 presidential candidates: 
Emmanuel Macron (EM), Marine Le Pen (FN), François Fillon (LR), Jean-Luc 
Mélenchon (FI), and Benoît Hamon (PS).  
 
PARTY 
AFFILIATION 
 
 
EN 
MARCHE! 
FRONT 
NATIONAL 
 
LES 
RÉPUBLICAINS 
FRANCE 
INSOUMISE 
 
PARTI 
SOCIALISTE 
 
CANDIDATE 
Emmanuel 
Macron 
Marine Le 
Pen 
François 
Fillon 
Jean-Luc 
Mélenchon 
Benoît 
Hamon 
TWEETS 38 44 43 45 23 
Table 4.2: Top five candidates in the 2017 French presidential election. 
Although eleven candidates ran in 2017, the six candidates who were excluded 
from this study attracted little national attention and garnered only a small 
portion of the vote (from 0.18% to 4,70%). Despite the former president’s 
aversion for Twitter (Larrouturou, 2013), the tweets of François Hollande (PS) 
were also included in the study to offer a comparison between Hollande’s 
“presidential voice” and the “presidentiable claims” of the candidates. A brief 
description of each politician is given in Figure 4.9: 
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Figure 4.9: Description of candidates. 
With respect to the three events chosen for this study, the participants tweeted 
at different rates (cf. Table 4.3), which could be imparted to their individual 
•A former investment 
banker, Emmanuel 
Macron was Hollande's 
Minister of Finance until 
his resignation in August 
2016. Shortly after, he 
launched En Marche!, his 
independent movement. 
Macron ran on a centrist 
platform, which he 
described as “neither right 
nor left”.
@EmmanuelMacron
•Marine Le Pen is the 
leader of the National 
Front (FN), a far-right 
party founded by her father 
in 1972. Le Pen has sought 
to distance herself from her 
father’s legacy by leading a 
campaign of “de-
demonization” of the FN. 
Yet, her politics remain 
centered on immigration. 
@MLP_officiel
•François Fillon won the 
Republican nomination in 
December 2016. An early 
favorite, Fillon positioned 
himself as the champion of 
traditional Christian 
values. In January 2017, 
however, he became the 
center of a financial 
scandal for his alleged 
misuse of public funds. 
@FrancoisFillon
•Jean-Luc Mélenchon is 
the leader of La France 
Insoumise, a far-left 
movement he founded in 
2016. Mélenchon prides 
himself on being 'anti-
establishment' and has 
called for a complete 
overhaul of French politics. 
@JLMelenchon
•Benoît Hamon won the 
Socialist nomination in 
January 2017. Seen as 
"Hollande's heir", Hamon 
suffered from the 
unpopularity of the 
previous administration. 
@benoithamon
•Under the banner of the 
Socialist Party, François 
Hollande won the 
presidency in 2012. 
Hollande remains one of 
the most unpopular 
presidents of the Fifth 
Republic with approval 
ratings as low as 6%. 
@fhollande
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platforms and beliefs. For instance, Marine Le Pen was most vocal regarding 
the terror attack on the Champs-Élysées whereas, Fillon tweeted mostly in 
relation to the “Fillongate” financial scandal. As to François Hollande, the 
former president shared his decision not to seek re-election on Twitter but 
remained discreet during most of the 2017 campaign.  
 
Sampling and collection methods  
A main challenge regarding data collection pertained to downsizing the 
volume of data to a manageable amount. While the term ‘political discourse’ 
has multiple meanings – it can refer to the discourse of politicians or more 
generally to any discourse about politics – this study focuses on political 
discourse as defined by Le Bart (2003):  
Le discours politique, (…) défini de façon restrictive comme le discours 
émanant des seuls acteurs investis dans le champ politique.  
[Political discourse, defined in a restrictive way as the discourse 
emanating from the sole actors invested in the political field.]  (Le Bart, 
2003, p.97)  
I originally collected the bulk of my data during the presidential campaign and 
compiled 1,236 tweets from twelve separate events and three user groups 
(presidential candidates, non-candidates and the public). However, such a 
large dataset would not have allowed for close, in-depth textual analysis. 
Indeed, van Dijk (2001) argues that “complete discourse analysis of a large 
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corpus of text or talk, is totally out of the question” as “a ‘full’ analysis of a 
short passage might take months and fill hundreds of pages” (van Dijk, 2001, 
p. 99). I thus narrowed my focus to three events and to six users (cf. Table 4.3).  
 Hollande Le Pen Fillon Mélenchon Hamon Macron ALL 
#HollandeRenonce 13 4 4 12 10 7 50 
#Fillongate NA 11 29 25 8 5 78 
#ChampsElysées 2 29 10 8 5 26 80 
TOTAL 15 44 43 45 23 38 208 
Table 4.3: Distribution of tweets by event and by user. 
 
The corpus used in this study consists of three datasets totaling 208 tweets 
published between December 2016 and April 2017. All tweets were collected 
manually through Twitter’s ‘advanced search’ option, which tailors search 
results to specific usernames, date ranges, words, phrases, hashtags, locations 
and languages (cf. Figure 4.8). Because I sought to analyze how the candidates 
commented on the events both directly and indirectly, limiting my search to 
specific keywords or hashtags would have been too restrictive and would likely 
have excluded valuable results. Instead, I tailored my search to specific 
usernames and to specific date ranges: 
 From these accounts: @fhollande; @EmmanuelMacron; @FrancoisFillon; 
@JLMelenchon; @benoithamon; @MLP_officiel  
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 Date ranges: December 1 to December 3, 2016; January 25 to February 6, 
2017; April 20 to April 22, 2017.  
 
Figure 4.10: Twitter’s advanced search option. 
I combed through the content published by these accounts during each time 
period (excluding retweets) and collected all the tweets related to my three 
events. Finally, I organized my data into three datasets – one for each event – 
in which the tweets are numbered and organized by user. All three datasets 
are available in Appendix A. Albeit labor-intensive, this method proved to be 
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the most effective for extracting tweets related to specific events from a small 
number of accounts.   
In sum, my sampling strategy was determined by the nature and 
purpose of this research, which aims to show how CDA can help uncover 
ideological beliefs through close and in-depth textual analysis. Thus, my 
purpose is not to make a descriptive list of linguistic patterns, but rather to 
investigate how those patterns form an order of discourse that sheds light on 
the social processes involved within a particular field (namely, electoral 
campaigns on Twitter). In statistical terms, my sample size is purposive rather 
than representative; This is because Critical Discourse Analysis requires a 
small dataset in order to subject each sentence to a complex analysis of 
semantic and syntactic parameters (van Dijk, 2001; Fairclough, 2003).  
Methods of analysis 
The present study examines how each event can trigger its own ‘order 
of discourse’, i.e., its unique set of discourses, genres and styles reflecting some 
of the main power dynamics underlying the 2017 election. With this goal in 
mind, I have adopted a CDA approach rooted in SFL methodology, specifically 
metafunctional analysis (Halliday, 1978, 1994). However, SFL tools are used 
in light of Fairclough’s dialectical-relational approach, rather than as a 
separate method. This combined approach centers on specific 
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lexicogrammatical features to help uncover the relation between text (i.e., 
campaign tweets) and context (i.e., real-world events). However, it is worth 
nothing that SFL is highly complex and that it is beyond the scope of this study 
to cover all of its aspects. This section identifies the aspects which are most 
relevant to my research. 
 
Metafunctional analysis 
A functional analysis analyzes how clauses realize ideational, 
interpersonal and textual meanings in a text (Halliday, 1994). Fairclough 
(1993) argues that the interdiscursive character of a text is realized in 
semantic, grammatical and lexical features at all three levels of text 
organization: 
Particular semantic relations or grammatical categories and relations 
will be seen as primarily associated with either genres, or discourses, or 
styles. ‘Primarily’, because there is not a simple one-to-one relation – so 
for instance modality will be seen as primarily associated with styles, 
but also germane to genres and discourses. (Fairclough, 2003, p.67) 
 
Together, the metafunctions bring in descriptive richness as three 
complementary kinds of meaning and their distinctive structuring principles 
are brought into play (Martin & Rose, 2008, p.29). Most importantly, the 
functions of language are dialectically related as they work together to realize 
meaning. Accordingly, all three aspects of meaning should be accounted for in 
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a textual analysis. This analysis is concerned with how discourses, genres and 
styles are simultaneously realized by ideational, interpersonal and textual 
resources. A textual analysis of these interwoven meanings involves looking at 
the grammar of the clause (such as transitivity and modality), cohesive 
relations between clauses and between sentences (including lexical relations) 
and at generic forms and overall structure of texts.  
I argue that a meta- and multi-functional approach can help us answer 
a set of analytical questions which in turn can reveal the interdiscursive 
character of texts. SFL analysis is concerned with how grammar realizes 
meanings, while CDA asks how these meanings can be used to exert influence 
over others, and how they reflect unbalanced relationships between powerful 
and weaker groups (see Table 4.4).  
METAFUNCTION SFL CDA 
Ideational What are the main patterns 
in terms of participants, 
processes and 
circumstances? 
Can we identify who has the 
power in this text by identifying 
who is doing what to whom – 
when, where, how? 
Interpersonal What are the main patterns 
of choices that express 
attitudes, opinions, and 
judgments? 
How do the attitudes and opinions 
reinforce the impression of power 
of the main participants? 
Textual What are the main features 
that make the discourse a 
unified whole? 
What do the cohesive features tell 
us about who is in power and who 
is not? 
Table 4.4: Analytical questions (Young and Fitzgerald, 2006). 
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In Halliday’s systemic model of language, the lexicogrammar is the level 
responsible for turning ‘meanings’ into ‘wordings’, thus enabling us to 
understand how language realizes meanings (Eggins, 2004). My rationale for 
this study is to look for interdiscursivity (genres, discourses and styles) in the 
lexicogrammar and its realizations. The following sub-sections outline the 
different lexicogrammatical resources featured in my analysis.  
 
Ideational resources: Transitivity and representation 
According to Halliday, the ideational function describes how 
participants, processes, goals, and circumstances are represented in discourse 
(i.e., who is doing what to whom, where, when, why and how). It is also 
concerned with how concrete or abstract these representations are and, 
importantly, with what information is included or excluded from the text 
(Machin & Mayr, 2012). In SFL, an analysis of ideational meanings is 
primarily concerned with transitivity.  
Transitivity refers to the study of social action and of the various roles 
played by social actors (Halliday 1994). A transitivity analysis of clause 
structure involves three components: (a) processes realized by verbal groups, 
(b) participants involved in these processes and (c) circumstances expressed by 
adverbial groups or prepositional phrases. Halliday outlines six main ‘process 
120 
 
types’: material, mental, behavioral, verbal, relational, and existential. The 
system of transitivity is shown in Figure 4.8. 
 
Figure 4.11: System of Transitivity  
Participants play different roles according to the type of process in which they 
are involved. For example, the subjects of material processes are referred to as 
Actors, while the subjects of mental processes are called Sensers. All processes 
require at least one participant, but can have up to three. With the exception 
of Sensers and Behavers, participants may be either animate or inanimate. 
For Halliday, “each process type constitutes a distinct model or schema for 
construing a particular domain of experience as a figure of a particular kind” 
(Halliday & Matthiessen, 2014, p.213). The six main process types and their 
participants are summarized in Table 4.5. 
CLAUSE
material Pr:material; +Actor; (+Goal) (+Range) (+Beneficiary)
mental Pr:mental; +Senser; (+Phenomenon)
verbal Pr:verbal; +Sayer; (+Receiver) (+Verbiage)
behavioral Pr:behavioral; +Behaver; (+Behavior) (+Phenomenon)
existential Pr:existential; +Existent
relational
Pr:attributive; +Carrier; +Attribute
Pr:identifying; +Token; +Value
Pr:possessive; +Possessor; +Possessed
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Type Meaning Participants French Examples 
Material  
‘doing’ 
‘happening’ 
Actor - Goal 
Range, Force, Scope  
Beneficiary, Initiator 
faire, donner, prendre, créer, 
construire, détruire, travailler, 
protéger, sortir, etc. 
Mental  
‘sensing’ 
‘thinking’ 
‘wanting’ 
‘feeling’ 
Senser  
Phenomenon 
Inducer 
Perceptive: voir, entendre, etc. 
Cognitive: penser, comprendre, etc. 
Desiderative: vouloir, espérer, etc. 
Emotive: aimer, haïr, craindre, etc.   
Verbal  ‘saying’ 
Sayer  
Receiver, Verbiage, 
Medium, Target 
dire, raconter, demander, 
annoncer, ordonner, répondre, 
écrire, etc. 
Behavioral  ‘behaving’ 
Behaver  
Behavior, Phenomenon 
regarder, écouter, rire, sourire, 
pleurer, soupirer, tousser, etc. 
Existential  ‘existing’ Existent ‘il y a’, exister, rester, subsister, etc.  
Relational  
‘attributing’ 
‘identifying’ 
‘having’ 
‘being’ 
Carrier – Attribute 
Token – Value  
Possessor, Possessed 
Attributor, Assigner  
Attributive: être, devenir, etc. 
Identifying: être, représenter, etc. 
Possessive: avoir, posséder, etc. 
Circumstantial: durer, causer, etc. 
Table 4.5: Summary of Transitivity. 
- A material process is an action or event of a physical nature. It typically 
features two main participants: the Actor who carries out the process and 
the Goal who is affected or changed by the process. The Beneficiary 
(sometimes referred to as Recipient or Client) is the participant towards 
whom the process is directed.  
- In contrast, a mental process is an event of a cerebral nature. It can be 
perceptive (see, hear, etc.), cognitive (think, realize, believe, etc.), 
desiderative (want, wish, desire, etc.) or emotive (love, hate, etc.). The 
Senser is the conscious participant who is experiencing the mental process, 
while the Phenomenon expresses the content of the experience. 
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- A verbal process is a process of communication. The Sayer is the 
participant who projects the Verbiage (i.e., what is being said) in relation 
to a Target or a Receiver (i.e., the participant to whom the Verbiage is 
directed).  
- A behavioral process is a “half-way house between mental and material 
processes” (Eggins, 2004, p.233). However, it functions more like a process 
of ‘doing’ rather than of ‘sensing’. Examples include laugh, cry, listen, 
watch, smell, cough, etc. A behavioral process typically involves a Behaver 
and a Phenomenon. 
- An existential process simply states the existence of an entity, the 
Existent. In French, it is most commonly realized by il y a.  
- A relational process depicts a relationship between two elements. As 
such, they always require two participants. There are two main types of 
relational processes: attributive and identifying. An attributive relational 
process relates a Carrier to an Attribute, i.e., to one of its features or 
characteristics. In contrast, an identifying relational process relates a 
Token to a co-referential Value. Finally, a relational process may also be 
circumstantial or possessive. The latter involves two participants: a 
Possessor and a Possessed.   
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Texts can be analyzed to see which kinds of processes tend to be used to 
represent the actions of particular groups. In fact, J.R. Martin (2000) argues 
that transitivity analysis is most relevant to CDA researchers: 
From the perspective of ideational meaning we are interested in how a 
text (…) constructs power. In the experience of CDA analysts, one 
relevant part of language is transitivity; its purpose is to construct 
processes, the participants involved in them and the circumstances in 
which they take place. […] Clearly this dimension of meaning is central 
to the analysis of the inequality and power in discourse. It allows us to 
ask questions about who is acting, what kinds of actions they undertake, 
and who or what if anything they act upon. (Martin, 2000, p.276) 
In other words, transitivity plays a key role in highlighting power dynamics 
within texts, as certain processes can obscure responsibility by suppressing or 
removing agents from representations. On that account, van Dijk (2000) 
argues that ethnic minorities are more likely to be represented in passive roles 
unless they are involved in actions deemed reprehensible. By showing us what 
kinds of participants are given active or passive roles, transitivity can help us 
uncover assumptions and ideologies that are not overtly stated (Machin & 
Mayr, 2012). Agency can be backgrounded or suppressed through a variety of 
discursive strategies, such as passive agent deletion and nominalization (van 
Leeuwen, 1996). 
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Interpersonal resources: Mood and modality 
The interpersonal function describes interactions between participants 
(such as asking questions, making statements, or giving commands) as well as 
attitudes and stances regarding what is being said or who they are interacting 
with (Eggins, 2004). In other words, while the ideational function realizes the 
content of our information, the interpersonal function realizes the ways in 
which we modify the ‘yes/no’ aspect of our information in order to express our 
attitudes and positions (Young & Fitzgerald, 2006). Interpersonal meanings 
are primarily expressed through two interrelated grammatical categories: 
Mood and modality.  
Mood  
Taylor and Van Every define mood as “the grammatical expression of 
modality that appears in the structural representation of the sentence as an 
inflection (the mood) of the main verb” (Taylor & Van Every, 1999, pp. 127-
128). In SFL, Mood (with a capital ‘M’) refers to the types of exchanges, or 
speech functions, which are used in a given context of situation. Halliday 
(1994) explains that whenever we use language to interact, we establish a 
relationship with our interlocutor(s) by assuming different speech roles in the 
exchange: giving and requesting. Moreover, we decide on the kind of 
commodity we are exchanging: information or goods/services. By cross-
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classifying these two dimensions of ‘speech role’ and ‘commodity’, we obtain 
what Halliday calls the four basic speech functions: statement, question, offer, 
and command (cf. Figure 4.10).  
 
Figure 4.12: The four speech functions (Halliday, 1994) 
Mood analysis refers to the analysis of these speech functions and to the ways 
they are expressed grammatically. Speech functions are expressed through 
three basic Mood types: declarative, interrogative and imperative. Different 
Mood choices express different commitments and reflect different relationships 
between interlocutors. These choices are often influenced by contextual 
demands and power relations (Fairclough, 2003, p.165).  
Modality and attitude 
Bybee and Fleischman describe modality as a semantic category pertaining to 
“the addition of a supplement or overlay to the most neutral semantic value of 
the proposition of an utterance, namely factual and declarative” (Bybee & 
Fleischman, 1995, p.2). That overlay is usually taken to refer to the attitude or 
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stance of the speaker, or to their degree of commitment to an action or state. 
Halliday (1994) offers the following definition of modality: 
Modality means the speaker’s judgement of the probabilities, or the 
obligations, involved in what he is saying. A proposition may become 
arguable by being presented as likely or unlikely, desirable or 
undesirable – in other words, its relevance specified in modal terms. 
(Halliday, 1994, p.75). 
In other words, modality is an aspect of identification which describes how 
speakers commit themselves to propositions in a text, with respect to truth, 
obligation and evaluation (Fairclough 2003). As such, modality includes any 
unit of language that expresses the speaker’s personal opinion of or 
commitment to what they say. Fairclough argues that modality plays an 
important role in the “texturing of identities” (Fairclough, 2003, p.166). 
Modality choices in texts reflect the speaker’s identity (through the 
commitments they make and the stances they take) as well as their own sense 
of perceived status and power over others (Fairclough, 2003). For instance, 
modals expressing a high level of certainty and confidence may be used in order 
to convince the audience (e.g. “We must act now! We will not fail!”). Through 
the use of modal elements, speakers can modify factual statements in order to 
communicate their opinions, beliefs, and perspectives (Young & Fitzgerald, 
2006). Linguistically, modality is expressed in a variety of ways, not only by 
the mood of the verb but also through modal verbs, auxiliaries and adjuncts, 
and sometimes just by intonation or phrasing (Taylor & Van Every, 1999).  
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SFL distinguishes two semantic dimensions within modality: 
modalization and modulation (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2014). Modalization 
corresponds to epistemic modality and is used to argue about probability and 
usuality (i.e., frequency). Modulation, on the other hand, is concerned with the 
expression of obligation and inclination. In other words, it combines deontic 
modality (which relates to the moral world and expresses obligation and 
permission) and dynamic modality (which relates to the physical world and 
expresses ability and physical possibility). These dimensions are shown in 
Figure 4.11 below: 
Figure 4.13: System of modality (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2014) 
Modulation and modalization can be realized in the clause in three possible 
ways: (a) a finite modal operator (e.g. “Son train doit arriver à dix heures.”), (b) 
a modal adjunct (e.g. “Son train arrive normalement à dix heures.”) and (c) the 
combination of a modal operator and a modal adjunct (e.g. “Son train doit 
normalement arriver à dix heures.”). Halliday argues that modality interacts 
MODALITY 
TYPE
modalization
probability
usuality
modulation
obligation
inclination
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with polarity in the sense that a modal process expresses some intermediate 
degree between positive and negative. In other words, the four types of 
modality all constitute varying degrees of polarity and “different ways of 
construing the semantic space between the positive and negative poles” 
(Halliday & Matthiessen, 2014, p.692). This relationship between modality and 
polarity is summarized in Figure 4.12. 
Figure 4.14: Relation of modality to polarity 
 
However, modality and engagement can also be expressed through a variety of 
discursive strategies, such as hedges, evidentials, and attitude markers:   
 Hedges, or hedging statements, use lowered modality. Speakers can use 
hedging to create a strategic ambiguity within their claims, by avoiding 
directness or commitment (Machin & Mayr, 2012, p.192). They may for 
instance seek to distance themselves from their claims (e.g. “some people 
say”) or to dilute the force of their statements with vague aggregation 
such as “sometimes” or “quite often”.  
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 Evidentials refers to modality markers that indicate the source of 
information, and that reflect the speaker’s commitment to the 
information and the credibility of their claims (Hyland, 2005; Smirnova, 
2015). The source of information directly affects information reliability 
(e.g. hearsay information is perceived as less reliable than direct 
perception of the event). Evidentials serve as an “indexing of knowledge” 
(Jaffe, 2009, p.7); By not naming an explicit referent, the speaker does 
not directly attribute this knowledge to any one referent in particular 
(Bouguerra 1999). The avoidance of evidential forms emerges as a 
general feature of totalitarian discourse, which often presents opinions 
as absolute truth that cannot be questioned (Friedman, 2003).  
 Mitigators, or mitigating evidentials, provide nuances that reveal the 
speaker’s evidence of the idea being expressed (Mullan 2010). Examples 
of mitigating evidentials in French include je pense, je crois, and je 
trouve.  
 Attitude markers indicate the speaker’s emotions and feelings rather 
than simply commitment. Attitude is an aspect of modality which refers 
to “the feelings and values that are negotiated with readers” (Martin & 
Rose, 2008, p.31). An SFL analysis of attitude looks at three main 
dimensions: affect (expressing emotion), judgment (assessing behavior) 
and appreciation (estimating value).   
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Textual resources: cohesion and coherence 
The textual metafunction shows how ideational and interpersonal 
meanings are weaved together into meaningful discourse (Eggins, 2004). 
Textual analysis describes the flow of information within and between texts, 
including how texts are organized, how the known and the new are related, 
and what is made explicit as opposed to what is assumed as background 
knowledge (Halliday & Hasan, 1976). Any text, no matter how short or long, 
conveys meaning to others when it contains two essential elements: cohesion 
and coherence. While cohesion refers to internal ties within the text and among 
its clauses, coherence refers to external ties between the discourse and the 
context in which it occurs (Young & Fitzgerald, 2006, p.108).  Cohesion creates 
semantic and structural links between clauses in order to form a “whole” 
(Eggins, 2004). Contrary to rally speeches or blog entries, tweets consist of 
“fragments of discourse” of no more than 140 characters. Yet, political 
candidates defending a position will often try to build cohesion between 
individual tweets relating to the same topic, so that they can be read as one 
longer thread. Another common practice is to transpose a speech onto Twitter 
by segmenting it into multiple “tweet-sized” quotes (Longhi, 2013). Although 
those quotes are partly decontextualized (i.e., cut off from their context of 
production), they usually retain some degree of cohesion allowing the reader to 
relate them to one another.  
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Lexical cohesion  
Lexical cohesion refers to how the speaker uses lexical items to consistently 
relate the text to its field. An analysis of lexical relations allows us to describe 
how words in a text relate to each other, and how they cluster to create ‘lexical 
strings’ (Eggins, 2004, p.42). SFL recognizes two main kinds of lexical 
relations:  
 taxonomic relations where one item is related to another through 
either class/sub-class (félin-chat) or part-whole (moteur-voiture) 
relations. 
 expectancy relations where there is a predictable relation between a 
process and the one(s) affected by it (miauler-chat; conduire-voiture).  
Words can be taxonomically related through either classification or 
composition. Classification refers to the relationship between a 
superordinate item and its members (or ‘hyponyms’). This includes (i) co-
hyponymy (banane:cerise), (ii) class/sub-class (fruit:cerise), (iii) contrast 
(sucré:salé) and (iv) similarity through synonymy (délicieux:succulent) or 
repetition (délicieux:délicieux). Composition is the part/whole relationship 
between lexical items which are meronyms (corps:jambe) or co-meronyms 
(jambe:bras). In contrast, expectancy relations operate between a verbal 
element and a nominal element. The relation may be between an action and 
the doer of the action (pleurer/bébé), or between an action and the participant 
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affected by that action (jouer/piano). Collocation refers to patterns of co-
occurrence between lexical items, i.e., “the company words keep” (Martin, 
2016, p.24). Lexical items contribute to setting a particular context within a 
text, as we come to expect particular semantic domains. Lexical strings thus 
enable speakers to create texture by using words or phrases that are 
semantically related to one another.  
Reference  
Reference pertains to how a speaker introduces participants (people, 
places or things) and keeps track of them throughout a text (Eggins, 2004, 
p.33). Participants may be either “presented” explicitly to the audience or 
“presumed” (i.e., encoded in such a way that their identity (or referent) needs 
to be retrieved from elsewhere). The identity of a presuming participant can 
be retrieved from the general context of culture (homophoric reference), from 
the immediate context of situation (exophoric reference) or from within the text 
itself (endophoric reference). Endophoric reference builds cohesion by shaping 
the internal texture of the text, while homophoric and exophoric reference both 
contribute to the text’s coherence (Eggins, 2004). Reference analysis looks for 
ties of dependency between presuming participants and their referents within 
a text. In whole text referencing, the referent is more than a single participant 
– it may be a sequence of events or actions mentioned previously, or even “the 
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whole text up to this point” (Eggins, 2004, p.36). On Twitter, this commonly 
occurs in “threads” of tweets which require the audience to read a series of 
tweets in linear order whereby the meaning of each tweet relies on the one that 
precedes it (Longhi, 2013).  
Registerial or situational coherence 
A text has registerial coherence when all of its clauses occur within an 
identifiable register (Martin & Rose, 2008). This happens when we can specify 
the domain the text is focusing on (its field), the relationships between the 
participants (its tenor) and the role language is playing in the activity (its 
mode). Due to Twitter’s strict character limit, tweets often rely on the 
audience’s familiarity with the context of situation. Exophoric reference, 
wherein the referent is retrieved from the immediate context of situation, is of 
particular importance in CDA – as meaning is present not only in what is 
clearly stated but also in what Fairclough calls “signiﬁcant absences” and 
“common-sense assumptions” (Fairclough, 2003, p.37). Indeed, ideological 
discourse constructs hegemonic attitude, opinions and beliefs in such a way as 
to make them appear natural or “commonsense” to the audience. Political 
actors may use commonsense assumptions to create a basis for their 
arguments; for instance, the argument that “French culture being under attack 
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by immigration” presupposes that there is such a clearly identifiable thing as 
“French culture” (Machin & Mayr, 2012, p.222).  
Generic coherence  
A text has generic coherence when we can recognize the text as belonging 
to a particular genre (Martin & Rose, 2008). Generic coherence occurs when 
we can identify a unified purpose motivating the language (e.g. it tells a story 
or accomplishes a transaction). This purpose is usually expressed through a 
predictable generic or schematic structure. For example, the primary purpose 
of news texts is to inform, while tabloid forms focus more on entertainment 
(Fairclough, 2003). Halliday explains that most contexts of situation are not 
unique, but often reoccur as situation types that make up “a scenario of persons 
and actions and events from which the things which are said derive their 
meaning” (Halliday, 1978, pp. 28-30). Over time, these situation types become 
conventionalized as participants develop typified ways of interacting. Generic 
structure specifies “the semantic configurations that the speaker will 
typically fashion” within particular situation types (Halliday, 1978, p.110). 
Indeed, if genres are different ways of using language, texts of different genres 
will reveal different lexico-grammatical choices. In other words, realization 
patterns will differ across genres (Eggins, 2004). Some genres are highly 
conventionalized with recognizable elements; for example, a news article 
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usually contains a headline, a lead paragraph and several satellite paragraphs 
(Fairclough, 2003). Most genres, however, are far less standardized ways of 
using language in less ritualized activities (Martin & Rose, 2008). SFL uses 
the distinction between obligatory and optional schematic structure elements 
to define what constitutes a particular genre. The inclusion of optional 
elements gives more extended variations of the genre (Eggins, 2004). In longer, 
more complex texts, Martin (1992) suggests we may need to identify the entire 
text as an example of a macro-genre, within which it is possible to identify a 
range of other genres being used. Another possibility, genre hybridity, refers to 
combining or blending different genres to produce ‘hybrids’ (Eggins, 2004, 
p.81). This study focuses primarily on the ‘political tweet’ genre as defined by 
Julien Longhi (2013) and as described in chapter 3. It thus explores the 
conventions which characterize campaign tweets as examples of the political 
tweet genre, including ‘techno-discursive’ elements (Paveau, 2013) such as 
hashtags and hyperlinks.  
 
Coding and labelling  
SFL prioritizes language function and offers a description of language 
that is multifunctional (Eggins, 2004). Because all three strands of meaning 
operate simultaneously in the clause, any separation is artificial to an 
extent. However, the ability to focus an analysis in terms of a particular level 
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of meaning allows for the production of information more specific to the issue 
under discussion. Furthermore, SFL distinguishes formal labels from 
functional labels. Formal labelling involves classifying an item in terms of its 
class membership (e.g. noun, adjective, adverbial phrase) whereas functional 
labelling involves classifying an item in terms of its role relative to the unit of 
analysis (e.g. Subject, Deictic, Classifier, etc.). This study prioritizes functional 
labelling, as a functional perspective can highlight how multiple constituents 
contribute to meaning-making within the clause structure (Eggins, 2004, p.61). 
Functional labels were used to conduct of clause-by-clause analysis of 
transitivity, modality (i.e. modalization and modulation) and polarity. These 
labels were supplemented by bracketing, color coding and highlighting.  
Transitivity 
A transitivity analysis requires the researcher to first identify the figures in a 
text and then label each figure’s constituents. A functional approach looks at 
the semantic and pragmatic functions (or ‘roles’) of the constituents instead of 
approaching them in terms of class. Indeed, the concepts of ‘process’, 
‘participant’ and ‘circumstance’ are semantic categories that explain in the 
most general way how phenomena of our experience of the world are construed 
as linguistic structures. The categorization of the six processes types (material, 
mental, relational, verbal, existential and behavioral) is based upon the 
experiential structure of the clause (the syntax and semantics of the elements, 
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specifically the process and participants). Importantly, SFL is concerned with 
how participants relate to the process and to other participants. For example, 
Actors are inherent to material processes whereas Sensers are inherent to 
mental processes.  
As part of my analysis, I manually identified 438 figures. Each figure 
was then organized into a table where its constituents were manually labelled 
according to the categories aforementioned in Table 4.5. Examples for each 
process type are provided below. Additionally, the full transitivity analysis of 
#HollandeRenonce is shown in Appendix B. 
(1) [material] Monsieur #Fillon va désosser l'État. 
Monsieur #Fillon va désosser l'État 
Actor Pr : material Goal 
 
(2) [mental] J’aime la fonction publique! 
J’ aime la fonction publique 
Senser Pr : mental Phenomenon 
 
(3) [behavioral] Toute la salle éclate de rire. 
Toute la salle éclate de rire 
Behaver Pr : behavioral Behavior 
 
(4) [verbal] De Gaulle disait : "La vague ne détruit pas le granit…" 
De Gaulle disait "La vague ne détruit pas le granit…" 
Sayer Pr : verbal Verbiage 
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(5) [existential] Il n’y a pas de gauches irréconciliables. 
Il n’y a pas de gauches irréconciliables 
Pr : existential Existent 
 
(6) [relational : attributive] Nos enfants ne sont pas protégés dans notre pays! 
Nos enfants ne sont pas protégés dans notre pays 
Carrier Pr : rel-attr Attribute Circ : place 
 
(7) [relational : identifying] Ma bataille est celle des idées. 
Ma bataille est celle des idées 
Token Pr : rel-ident Value 
 
(8) [relational : possession] Les violents n'auront pas le dernier mot. 
Les violents n’auront pas le dernier mot 
Possessor Pr : rel-attr : possession Possessed 
Most tweets in my corpus contain several figures, i.e. several sentences and/or 
sentences made of several clauses (or ‘clause complexes’). I have summarized 
my findings into three tables showing the distribution of process types by user 
and by event. These tables are shown in Chapter 5. 
 
Social actor analysis 
This stage of analysis is concerned with the representation of social actors. It 
consists in tracing human referents as realized by nominal groups as well as 
subject and object pronouns. This process can give us a picture of how texture 
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is created as reference chains develop across a group of tweets. A convenient 
way to do this is to highlight the mentions of individual and collective entities 
(in two different colors) and then to organize them into lists for each dataset 
and for each user. For example, Table 4.6 provides a list of all the social actors 
mentioned by Benoît Hamon in the dataset #HollandeRenonce: 
 Individuals Groups and collective entities 
 #Hamon2017 (S) 
 François Hollande (x2) 
 [le] PR 
 @Linda_Gourjade 
 @MathieuHanotin 
 
 la gauche (x2) 
 une gauche totale (x2) 
 la gauche des prochaines années  
 [des] gauches irréconciliables 
 son camp 
 [la] droite 
 [l’]ext-droite 
 tous les candidats 
 [les] autres 
 bien d’autres 
Table 4.6: Example of reference patterns in #HollandeRenonce.  
Importantly, an analysis of reference patterns on Twitter must not omit so-
called ‘techno-words’ (Paveau, 2013) such as hashtags and @mentions. A tweet-
by-tweet analysis of these features can enable us to determine their pragmatic 
functions and to study how they contribute to the meaning-making process. 
Next, I analyzed the distribution of subject and object pronouns throughout the 
corpus. To this end, each pronoun type was assigned a particular color code. I 
then counted the instances for each pronoun type and organized them into two 
tables, one for subject pronouns (cf. Table 5.6) and one for object and disjunct 
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pronouns (cf. Table 5.7).  As compared to automated analysis, manual coding 
allowed me to limit my selection to pronouns referring to conscious actors (e.g. 
excluding non-referential il) and to make certain distinctions, such as between 
inclusive and exclusive ‘on’.  
Modality and polarity  
As described earlier in this chapter, SFL views modality as the ability to 
express four different stances: (a) probability, (b) usuality or frequency, (c) 
obligation and (d) inclination. At the clausal level, these stances may be 
realized by modal verbs and pseudo-modals (devoir, pouvoir and falloir) as well 
as modal adjuncts (certainement, fréquemment, etc.). In order to analyze the 
distribution of modal processes in the corpus, I assigned a unique color code to 
each stance which I then used to highlight instances of each type. Examples 
are given below:  
(9) [probability] Il vient le plus probablement de sa propre famille. 
(10) [usuality] Une nouvelle fois, ce sont nos policiers qui ont été visés. 
(11) [obligation] Il faut retrouver nos frontières nationales. 
(12) [inclination] J'entends combattre ce mal qui nous aggresse. 
Moreover, I took count of all the processes with a negative polarity. 
Percentages of modal and negative processes were calculated in relation to the 
total number of finite clauses in the corpus (cf. Table 5.8). 
141 
 
Lexical strings 
A ‘lexical string’ is a list of all the lexical items that occur sequentially 
in a text that can be related to a ‘head word’ either taxonomically or through 
an expectancy relation (Eggins, 2004, pp.44-46). One way to capture the lexical 
cohesion in a text is to list all related lexical items, showing how they form 
lexical strings that add texture to the text. Some words can be linked to more 
than one string (thus contributing to texture through both semantic relations). 
As part of my analysis, I have compiled sets of lexical strings for each dataset. 
This required me to go through each dataset multiple times in order to identify 
words belonging to the same lexical field. Below is an example of a lexical 
string from the #ChampsElysées dataset. The letters in bold correspond to the 
initials of the six study participants: 
Family (33 items) 
 
FH famille – proches | MLP famille – unité – unité – unit – membres x famille – 
autorité –enfants – chez nous – jeunesse – compatriotes – mère – enfants – enfants | 
FF les nôtres | JLM familles – famille – familles – unis – patrie – fraternité | BH 
les siens – compagnon – famille | EM concitoyens – unité – cohésion – famille – 
proches – proches – famille  
 
The lexical strings for all three datasets are shown in Appendix D.  
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Quantitative tools 
Fairclough (2003) argues that qualitative social analysis is ‘labor-
intensive’ and can thus only be applied productively to samples of research 
material rather than large bodies of text.  However, he affirms that critical 
analysis can be supplemented by quantitative tools borrowed from corpus 
linguistics (Fairclough, 2003). Indeed, corpus analysis can identify keywords 
(or ‘tokens’) in a corpus of text(s) and show patterns co-occurrence and 
collocation between these tokens. Even though this study is primarily 
qualitative, I provide some quantitative data about the frequencies and 
distribution of linguistic structures, as is often done in classical content 
analysis. Nonetheless, CDA relies on context to assign meaning to linguistic 
forms and requires that quantitative ﬁndings be complemented with detailed 
textual analysis. Indeed, van Dijk (1997) stresses that meaning is not 
‘immanent’ but rather emanates from social interactions between groups and 
institutions, Accordingly, if we aim to understand discourse, we must also seek 
to understand the context in which it appears. 
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Chapter 5 
Analysis 
 
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of the lexicogrammatical analysis of 
the three datasets introduced in §4.3. The entire corpus of tweets can be found 
in Appendix A. This is a contrastive analysis which examines how different 
systems of meaning are realized across three distinct but interrelated events 
(Hollande’s announcement, Fillongate and the Champs-Elysées attack) by six 
different users (François Hollande and the main five 2017 candidates). Each 
dataset has been analyzed for the following systems and categories: (a) 
transitivity, (b) self- and other- representation, (c) modality and engagement, 
(d) texture and (e) generic structure. All examples within this chapter are 
numbered and labelled with the user’s initials and the dataset from which it 
was extracted (namely, E1, E2 and E3). For instance, [MLP, E3] refers to a 
tweet from Marine Le Pen / @MLP_officiel regarding the Champs Elysées 
attack.  
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Transitivity and representation 
Transitivity is the main function of the ideational metafunction, which 
highlights the “features of the clause which contribute to the linguistic 
representation of the speaker’s experience” (Halliday, 1976, p.159). This first 
section presents the results of the transitivity analysis of each event. A total of 
438 verbal processes were identified. Table 5.1 shows the distribution across 
the events and the users. Hollande did not react to the Fillon affair on Twitter, 
and is therefore absent from the Fillongate dataset. 
 
 
E1 
(#HollandeRenonce) 
E2 
(#Fillongate) 
E3 
(#ChampsÉlysées) 
ALL 
Hollande 32 N/A 3 35 
Le Pen 12 26 57 95 
Fillon 7 66 18 91 
Mélenchon 23 60 12 95 
Hamon 18 19 8 45 
Macron 11 9 57 77 
ALL 103 180 155 438 
Table 5.1: Number of processes per user and per event. 
 
To conduct this analysis, I first identified all the predicates in each dataset, 
then manually labeled the processes and their accompanying participants and 
circumstances. The results are aggregated and tabulated in the following 
subsections. For illustration purposes, the full transitivity analysis of 
#HollandeRenonce can be found in Appendix B. 
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#HollandeRenonce 
The #HollandeRenonce dataset contains 103 processes belonging to five 
process types (material, relational, mental, verbal and existential). Table 5.217 
below presents the total number of clauses of each process type for each user. 
Percentages were rounded to the next decimal point.  
 Material 
Relational 
Mental Verbal Exist. ALL 
Id. Attr. 
Hollande 
10  
(31.2%) 
5 
(15.6%) 
11  
(34.4%) 
5  
(15.6%) 
1  
(3.2%) 
0 32 
Le Pen 
2  
(16.7%) 
0 
7  
(58.3%) 
2  
(16.7%) 
0 
1  
(8.3%) 
12 
Fillon 
3  
(42.8%) 
0 
1  
(14.3%) 
0 
2  
(28.6%) 
1  
(14.3%) 
7 
Mélenchon 
6  
(26.1%) 
3  
(13%) 
8  
(34.8%) 
1  
(4.4%) 
3  
(13%) 
2  
(8.7%) 
23 
Hamon 
3  
(16.7%) 
2 
(11.1%) 
5  
(27.8%) 
5  
(27.8%) 
1  
(5.5%) 
2  
(11.1%) 
18 
Macron 
1  
(9.1%) 
1  
(9.1%) 
7  
(63.6%) 
1  
(9.1%) 
1  
(9.1%) 
0 11 
ALL 
25  
(24.3%) 
11 
(10.7%) 
39 
(37.9%) 14  
(13.6%) 
8  
(7.8%) 
6  
(5.8%) 
103 
50 (48.5%) 
Table 5.2: Process types in #HollandeRenonce 
As this table shows, relational processes are dominant (48.5%), followed by 
material processes (24.3%), mental processes (13.6%), verbal processes (7.8%) 
and finally existential processes (5.8%). This suggests that the tweets featured 
in this dataset deal primarily with the description and categorization of the 
                                                 
17 Key: Id. = Identifying; Attr. = Attributive; Exist. = Existential 
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event. We find several noteworthy patterns when we look at the users 
individually: 
Hollande’s declaration contains a slight majority of attributive relational 
processes (34.4%), followed by material processes (31.2%). After announcing 
his attention not to seek reelection, Hollande proceeds to list his 
accomplishments as president. Most of these accomplishments are realized by 
material processes, as in examples (1) and (2): 
(1)  J'ai engagé nos armées dans le monde pour nous protéger, pour lutter 
contre le terrorisme. [FH, E1] 
J’ ai engagé nos armées dans le monde 
Actor Pr : material Range Circ : place 
 
(2) J'ai modernisé notre démocratie avec la réforme territoriale. [FH, E1] 
J’ ai modernisé notre démocratie avec la réforme territoriale 
Actor Pr : material Goal Circ : means 
 
Although his agency is implied by the context of situation, Hollande represents 
himself as an Actor (i.e., the doer of the action) in only five instances during 
his declaration. Indeed, he tends to resort to passive structures (most likely 
unconsciously) that have the effect of downplaying his involvement. 
Passivation signals a shift from action to description, as loss of agency 
transforms a material process into a relational process.  The participant who 
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carries out the action is missing, and the action itself becomes an Attribute, as 
exemplified in the examples below:  
(3) L'égalité entre les couples a été renforcée. [FH, E1] 
L’égalité entre les couples a été renforcée 
Carrier Pr : rel-attr Attribute 
 
(4) Les comptes publics ont été assainis. [FH, E1] 
Les comptes publics ont été assainis 
Carrier Pr : rel-attr Attribute 
Moreover, some material processes are mitigated by mental processes, a 
phenomenon Halliday calls ‘projection’ (Halliday, 1994). In this scenario, a 
mental process ‘projects’ a dependent material process, as portrayed in 
example (5): 
(5)  J’ai fait en sorte d’aider les embauches. [FH, E1]  
J’ ai fait en sorte  d’aider les embauches 
Senser Pr : mental Pr : material Goal 
 
Here, Hollande is not an Actor but a Senser who provides a ‘modal assessment’ 
of the projected material clause. Specifically, he does not say that he reduced 
unemployment but that he tried to do so. Whether or not he was successful is 
up to the reader’s interpretation. In sum, the French president downplays his 
active involvement in most of the actions he presents to his audience. 
Mechanisms such as passivation and projection are likely to have contributed 
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to Hollande’s reputation as a ‘backstage president’ who lacks authority (Alduy, 
2017). 
Le Pen’s tweets contain a majority of attributive relational processes 
(58.3%). In example (6), the far-right leader undermines France’s two 
mainstream parties by boasting the alleged superiority of the National Front 
with the Attribute donnés (‘given’): 
(6)  Nous sommes donnés au second tour. [MLP, E1] 
Nous sommes donnés au second tour 
Carrier Pr : rel-attr Attribute 
 
Moreover, Le Pen uses a possessive relational process to emphasize the fact 
that neither mainstream party has a de facto leader, which she attributes to 
weakness (faiblesse) with an attributive process (where ce is an anaphoric 
referent): 
(7) Pourquoi il y a des primaires à droite et à gauche ? Parce qu'ils n'ont 
pas de leader. [MLP, E1] 
Ils n’ont pas de leader 
Possessor Pr : rel-attr : possession Possessed 
 
(8) C'est une preuve de faiblesse. [MLP, E1] 
C’ est une preuve de faiblesse 
Carrier Pr : rel-attr Attribute 
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Mélenchon is on the offensive. His main target is the Socialist Party (le PS), 
from whom he distances himself tweet after tweet. Specifically, Mélenchon is 
on a crusade to expose lies and false appearances. Most of the relational 
processes in his tweets have a corrective function, as he juxtaposes what he 
perceives to be falsehoods with ‘the truth’:   
(9) La primaire du #PS n'est pas une primaire: c'est un congrès. [JLM, E1] 
(10) En janvier, ce n'est pas la primaire de la gauche, c'est la primaire du 
#PS. [JLM, E1] 
Ce  n’est pas la primaire de la gauche, 
Token Pr : rel-ident Value 
 
c’ est la primaire du #PS 
Token Pr : rel-ident Value 
 
In addition, Mélenchon sets up a false dilemma with an existential process (il 
y a) in (11): 
(11) Maintenant, il y a le choix entre @FrancoisFillon qui dit "chacun pour 
soi et Dieu pour tous" et moi qui dis "Un pour tous, tous pour un". [JLM, 
E1] 
Maintenant, il y a le choix entre… 
Circ : time Pr : existential Existent 
 
The tweet invites a reading where voters only have two options, Fillon or 
Mélenchon, and obscures the existence of the other candidates.  
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Fillon first positions himself as a reporter, who describes and comments on 
Hollande’s announcement in real time. In (12), the verbal process admet 
frames the tweet as a paraphrase of the announcement rather than as a biased 
interpretation: 
(12) Ce soir, le Président de la République admet, avec lucidité, que son 
échec patent lui interdit d'aller plus loin. [FF, E1] 
le Président  admet, avec lucidité, que son échec patent… 
Sayer Pr : verbal Circ : quality Verbiage 
 
The Republican nominee then puts on his candidate persona and commits to 
rebuilding France with the material process bâtirons:  
(13) Nous bâtirons sur la vérité sans laquelle il n'y a pas de confiance, et 
l'action courageuse seule en mesure d'obtenir des résultats. [FF, E1] 
Nous bâtirons sur la vérité 
Actor Pr : material Circ : manner 
 
Hamon’s tweets also contain a high number of desiderative mental 
processes, i.e., processes of ‘wanting’. Hamon is above all a Senser who wants 
to share his vision of a united Left oriented towards social progress: 
(14)  La primaire tranchera ce que sera la gauche des prochaines années. Je 
la veux tout entière tournée vers justice et progrès social. [BH, E1] 
Je la veux 
Senser Phenomenon Pr : mental 
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In this particular dataset, Hamon positions himself as the spokesperson of la 
gauche (‘the Left’) and thus presents his positions as those of the party rather 
than his own: 
(15)  Plus que jamais, la gauche doit porter 1 alternative sociale, écologique 
et démocratique face à droite et ext-droite [BH, E1] 
la gauche doit porter 1 alternative sociale… 
Actor Pr : material Circ : quality 
  
By representing the Left as the main Actor, Hamon backgrounds his individual 
agency and portrays himself as a middleman rather than as a unique voice.  
Finally, Macron does not directly mention Hollande’s announcement. 
Instead, he capitalizes on the event to reiterate his desire to unite the country 
and to end political cleavages. In (16), he expresses his determination with the 
material process rassembler projected by the desiderative mental process veux:  
(16) Je veux rassembler les Françaises et les Français. [EM, E1] 
Je veux  rassembler les Françaises et les Français 
Senser Pr : mental Pr : material Range 
In this first dataset, Macron’s tweets are unadorned, with vague qualifiers 
(difficile, facile, heureux, vraies) and few adjuncts. The form reflects the 
content: not only is Macron explicitly saying that he wants to end cleavages, 
his discourse itself is inclusive (e.g. les Françaises et les Français) and 
consensual.  
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#Fillongate 
 Material 
Relational 
Mental Behav. Verbal Exist. ALL 
Id. Attr. 
Le Pen 
3  
(11.5%) 
1  
(3.8%) 
12  
(46.3%) 
6  
(23.1%) 
0 
3  
(11.5%) 
1  
(3.8%) 
26 
Fillon 
23  
(34.9%) 
1  
(1.5%) 
21  
(31.8%) 
11  
(16.7%) 
1  
(1.5%) 
7  
(10.6%) 
2  
(3%) 
66 
Mélenchon 
12  
(20%) 
10  
(16.7%) 
15  
(25%) 
5  
(8.2%) 
4  
(6.7%) 
10  
(16.7%) 
4  
(6.7%) 
60 
Hamon 
3  
(15.8%) 
1  
(5.3%) 
4  
(21%) 
5  
(26.3%) 
1  
(5.3%) 
5  
(26.3%) 
0 19 
Macron 
1  
(11.1%) 
2  
(22.2%) 
5  
(55.6%) 
0 0 
1  
(11.1%) 
0 9 
ALL 
42  
(23.3%) 
15 
(8.3%) 
57 
(31.7%) 27  
(15%) 
6  
(3.3%) 
26  
(14.5%) 
7  
(3.9%) 
180 
72 (40%) 
Table 5.3: Process types in #FillonGate 
The #Fillongate dataset contains a majority of relational processes (40%), and 
attributive processes (31.7%) are clearly dominant over identifying processes 
(8.3%). 23.3% of the clauses are material processes, followed by mental 
processes (15%), verbal processes (14.5%), existential processes (3.9%) and 
behavioral processes (3.3%). The tweets of Fillon and Mélenchon contain 
instances of all six process types whereas Macron’s only contain three 
(relational, material and verbal). However, this could very well be due to 
sample size. Indeed, Macron was the least vocal on Twitter regarding the Fillon 
affair. Unsurprisingly, Fillon was the most reactive with 29 tweets and 66 
processes. Mélenchon closely followed with 25 tweets and 60 processes. Even 
though he was not directly involved in Fillongate, Mélenchon ran on an anti-
establishment platform that focused on ending the tyranny of the 1% and 
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combatting corruption in mainstream politics. The very nature of the scandal 
thus had a strategic appeal. Some of the differences between the candidates 
are explored below:  
Material processes are dominant in Fillon’s tweets – a trend we find in all 
three datasets and which distinguishes him from the other candidates. With 
this abundance of material processes (34.9%), Fillon assumes an active role as 
he fights to restore his public image. To this end, Fillon denies any wrongdoing 
and chooses instead to portray himself as the victim of a vicious witch hunt. 
He emphasizes his ‘determination’ and even his ‘courage’ despite relentless 
‘attacks’. This tenacity is partly expressed through material processes, as in 
example (17) below: 
(17) Chaque jour, je reçois en pleine figure de nouvelles bourrasques. Je fais 
front, j’avance, garde mon cap et trace ma route. [FF, E2] 
Fillon also represents himself as a Target (reçois, déverse sur moi) through an 
extended storm metaphor (bourrasques, torrents de boue):  
(18) Cela fait 2 mois que la presse déverse sur moi des torrents de boue. [FF, 
E2] 
la presse  déverse sur moi des torrents de boue 
Actor Pr : material Recipient Goal 
 
This metaphorical language allows Fillon to remain vague not only about the 
nature of the accusations made against him, but also about the identity of his 
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accusers. By replacing human agency with a natural force, such as ‘gusts of 
wind’ (17) or ‘torrents of mud’ (18), Fillon approaches the scandal indirectly 
and shifts the focus to his victimhood. Another way to obscure responsibility is 
through the ‘nominalization’ of verbal constituents. Indeed, Halliday argues 
that nominalization results in a loss of ideational meaning: “the 
configurational patterns of participant roles are lost or obscured when figures 
are realized as groups or phrases” (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2014, p.715). In 
example (19), a desiderative mental process (‘vouloir’) is nominalized into the 
noun volonté and a verbal process (‘présenter’) is nominalized into présentation. 
These two nouns are the grammatical subject and object of the sentence, 
respectively. Although both processes imply human agency, conscious actors 
are absent from the tweet:  
(19) Seule la volonté de nuire peut expliquer la présentation mensongère 
des éléments publiés ce soir par le #CanardEnchainé. [FF, E2] 
This strategy is part of Fillon’s conspiratorial style; While he claims that there 
is ‘a willingness to hurt him’ (volonté de nuire), he employs nominalizations to 
avoid naming specific actors. Other nominalizations that contribute to this 
conspiracy-mongering include attaques (20), interrogations (21), and 
manipulation (22): 
(20) Ces attaques ne sortent pas de nulle part. [FF, E2] 
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(21) Je comprends les interrogations, et le besoin de me voir clarifier les 
choses. [FF, E2] 
 
(22) Je ne pouvais imaginer être victime d'une manipulation pareille. [FF, 
E2] 
Finally, Fillon panders to his supporters by showering them with positive 
Attributes (fiers, forts, volontaires) and implying that they share the same 
ordeal (notre chemin): 
(23) Soyez fiers, soyez forts, soyez plus volontaires que tous les obstacles 
qui se dressent sur notre chemin, que toutes les volontés adverses ! [FF, 
E2] 
Le Pen’s tweets contain few material processes compared to the other 
candidates (11.5%). Attributive relational processes clearly dominate and 
constitute almost half of the clauses in her tweets (46.3%). In this dataset, Le 
Pen is not an Actor: she is a commentator, a narrator who offers a ruthless 
portrayal of her rival’s predicament. Indeed, Le Pen criticizes Fillon from 
multiple angles: his campaign (campagne), his presidential bid (candidature), 
his character (caractère), his personality (personnalité), his behavior 
(comportement) and finally his relationship with the French people:  
(24) La campagne de M. #Fillon est en jachère. [MLP, E2] 
La campagne de M. #Fillon est en jachère 
Carrier Pr : rel-attr Attribute 
 
(25) Le comportement de François #Fillon est incohérent. [MLP, E2] 
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(26) La candidature de François #Fillon était déjà très fragile. [MLP, E2] 
Yet, Le Pen does not involve herself in any of these representations: she simply 
states what ‘is’ or ‘was’. Accordingly, her use of descriptive relational processes 
in (24-26) allows her to present her personal opinions as undisputable truths.  
Mélenchon uses verbal processes to represent his inability to talk about 
serious matters due to Fillon’s shenanigans. Indeed, he expresses his 
frustration through his repeated use of parler (‘talk’) in conjunction with the 
pseudo-modal pouvoir (‘be able to’) and the expression of negation ne…plus (‘no 
longer’):  
(27)  On ne peut plus parler du fond avec ce candidat. [JLM, E2] 
On ne peut plus parler du fond 
Sayer Pr : verbal Verbiage 
 
Moreover, Mélenchon’s tweets contain several behavioral processes. This 
process type is absent from the other datasets and there are only six instances 
in #Fillongate, four of which are found in Mélenchon’s tweets. Three out of four 
of these processes refer to laughter and ridicule (éclate de rire, rigole, huent) 
and are used to describe the public’s reaction to Fillon:   
(28) C'est terrible ! On ne peut plus parler de #Fillon sans que tout le 
monde rigole ! [JLM, E2] 
tout le monde rigole 
Behaver Pr : behavioral 
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(29) Ce n'est plus possible. Les gens le huent. [JLM, E2] 
Les gens le huent 
Behaver Phenomenon Pr : behavioral 
In these examples, Mélenchon implies that Fillon has become a national 
laughing stock and thus that his candidacy has lost all credibility and 
legitimacy. 
Hamon differs from his rivals in that he uses a majority of verbal and 
mental processes (52.6%). For instance, he expresses his indignation with 
respect to Fillon’s behavior with the performative verbal process accuse: 
(30) J’accuse François Fillon d’indignité, ce candidat n'est pas digne de 
cette élection [BH, E2] 
J’ accuse François Fillon 
Sayer Pr : verbal Target 
 
Overall, Hamon’s tweets describe a ‘break of communication’ as a result of the 
Fillon affair, with verbs such as parler, interroger and dire: 
(31) Je parle aujourd’hui des 12 millions de personnes en situation de 
handicap et on m’interroge sur les costumes de M. Fillon [BH, E2] 
Je parle aujourd’hui des 12 millions de personnes… 
Sayer Pr : verbal Circ : time Verbiage 
 
on m’ interroge sur les costumes de M. Fillon 
Sayer Receiver Pr : verbal Verbiage 
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Macron’s tweets echo his reaction to Hollande’s announcement. He only 
mentions Fillon once, while his other tweets use the scandal as a way to 
address the subject of morality in politics. Once again, Macron adopts a 
consensual discourse and avoids cleavages through his use of generic ‘catch-
all’ terms. While he offers some vague propositions, he does not explicitly 
represent himself as the one who will enact them. Instead, he relies heavily on 
relational processes (77.8%) and on strategies that suppress agency, such as 
passive agent deletion, nominalization and non-finite clauses: 
(32) Indispensable moralisation de la vie publique. Elle doit être inscrite 
dans la loi. [EM, E2] 
In example (33), the non-finite clauses function as grammatical participants in 
an attributive clause, allowing the social actor(s) responsible for the actions to 
be excluded. 
(33) Moraliser la vie politique, c’est exiger que la rémunération des 
parlementaires soit plus transparente et déclarée en totalité. [EM, E2] 
Moraliser la vie publique c’est exiger que… 
Token Pr : rel-ident Value 
 
Moreover, Macron often resorts to the impersonal expression il faut to express 
necessity:  
(34) Il faut remettre du pluralisme et de la moralisation dans la vie 
publique. C'est le ciment de cette alliance. [EM, E2] 
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Unlike the modal verb devoir, falloir enables a speaker to state a necessity 
without making the personal commitment to tackle the issue. In (34), Macron 
does not mention who or what is involved in his concept of moralisation. 
Human actors are absent from the process.  
#ChampsElysées 
 
 Material 
Relational 
Mental Verbal Exist. ALL 
Id. Attr. 
Hollande 
1  
(33.3%) 
0 
1  
(33.3%) 
0 
1  
(33.3%) 
0 3 
Le Pen 
15  
(26.3%) 
3  
(5.3%) 
23  
(40.3%) 
9  
(15.8%) 
5  
(8.8%) 
2  
(3.5%) 
57 
Fillon 
9  
(50%) 
4  
(22.2%) 
2  
(11.1%) 
2  
(11.1%) 
0 
1  
(5.6%) 
18 
Mélenchon 
3  
(25%) 
1  
(8.3%) 
7  
(58.4%) 
0 
1  
(8.3%) 
0 12 
Hamon 
4  
(50%) 
0 
2  
(25%) 
1  
(12.5%) 
1  
(12.5%) 
0 8 
Macron 
18  
(31.5%) 
5  
(8.8%) 
14  
(24.6%) 
14  
(24.6%) 
4  
(7%) 
2  
(3.5%) 
57 
ALL 
50  
(32.3%) 
13 
(8.4%) 
49 
(31.6%) 26  
(16.8%) 
12  
(7.7%) 
5  
(3.2%) 
155 
62 (40%) 
Table 5.4: Process types in #ChampsElysées 
 
Relational processes (40%) and material processes (32.3%) are the two 
dominant process types in #ChampsElysées. Most of the tweets in this dataset 
consist of solemn statements about the attack and of condolences addressed to 
law enforcement. Several candidates (Le Pen, Fillon and Macron) use material 
processes to describe the actions they would take against terrorism if they were 
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elected. Mental processes constitute 16.8% of the processes but are 
predominantly used by Le Pen and Macron. While Le Pen uses mental 
processes to express her anger and sorrow with respect to the attack, Macron 
expresses his determination to act against terrorism once elected president.  
Le Pen describes the attack through relational processes coupled with 
multiple negative qualifiers. In examples (35) and (36), she enumerates 
negative Attributes in reference to Islamism and to the ‘useless’ government: 
(35) La guerre qui nous est menée est asymétrique, révolutionnaire, qui a 
pour objectif notre soumission à une idéologie totalitaire. [MLP, E3] 
 
(36)  Nos prétendus gouvernants, insuffisants et pusillanimes, sont dénués 
de toute autorité et de toute force morale. [MLP, E3] 
Moreover, she relies heavily on emotive language. Her emotions are often 
expressed through possessive processes wherein she is represented as the 
Possessor of various feelings (tristesse, colère): 
(37) J'ai un sentiment de tristesse pour nos forces de l'ordre qui paient un 
lourd tribut. [MLP, E3] 
J’ ai un sentiment de tristesse 
Possessor Pr : rel-attr : possession Possessed 
 
(38) J'ai une colère sourde. Tout n'est pas fait pour mettre nos compatriotes 
à l'abris [sic]. [MLP, E3] 
 
(39) Je suis une mère, j'ai 3 enfants, et je ne veux pas avoir la boule au 
ventre quand ils vont dehors. [MLP, E3] 
161 
 
Furthermore, she uses several verbal processes as calls for action with the 
verbs appeler, demander and ordonner. Le Pen already positions herself as the 
commanding voice in the country as she affirms her authority with orders and 
commands:  
(40) J’appelle tous les Français à l’unité, une unité profonde comme celle 
qui unit les membres d’une même famille dans l’épreuve. [MLP, E3] 
Yet, she is a Sayer and a Senser rather than an Actor. While she outlines what 
she believes are necessary measures for tackling terrorism, she avoids making 
the explicit commitment of tackling it herself. Instead, she demands it from 
others through verbal processes (41) or conveys a sense of urgency through 
mental processes (42): 
(41) À ce gouvernement éphémère, usé par l’inaction, je demande 
d’ordonner la restauration immédiate de nos frontières nationales. 
[MLP, E3] 
À ce gouvernement 
éphémère, 
je demande 
 
d’ordonner la restauration… 
Receiver Sayer Pr : verbal Pr : verbal Verbiage 
 
(42) Je ne veux pas que l'on s'habitue au terrorisme islamiste [...] c'est fini 
le laxisme, c'est fini la naïveté ! [MLP, E3] 
Je ne veux pas que l’on s’habitue au terrorisme islamique 
Senser Pr : mental Phenomenon 
 
Additionally, Le Pen resorts to multiple strategies that suppress agency such 
as nominalization (la réponse, la lutte) and impersonal structures (il faut): 
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(43) Puisque le pays est en état de guerre, la réponse doit être globale, totale, 
c’est-à-dire celle du pays tout entier. [MLP, E3] 
 
(44) La lutte contre le terrorisme commence par retrouver nos frontières 
nationales. [MLP, E3] 
 
(45) Face au terrorisme, il faut retrouver nos frontières nationales [MLP, 
E3] 
In sum, while she expresses the need for action, Le Pen does not explicitly 
position herself as the Actor who will undertake those actions.   
Rather than commenting on the circumstances of the attack, Mélenchon 
remains focused on the election and poses as a guide for his supporters with 
modalized material processes (46-47) and imperatives (48-49): 
(46) Nous devons faire la démonstration que nous ne sommes pas intimidés 
par les tueurs. [JLM, E3] 
(47) Nous devons faire notre devoir de citoyens. [JLM, E3] 
(48) Pas de panique. Restons unis. [JLM, E3] 
(49) Continuons le processus électoral. [JLM, E3] 
In the examples above, we notice that Mélenchon has become one with his 
supporters through the use of the plural pronoun nous. He is the literal voice 
of the entire movement, as exemplified in (50) where nous (‘us’) is the Sayer in 
the verbal process adressons:  
(50) Nous adressons une pensée émue à la famille du policier décédé et aux 
familles des policiers blessés. [JLM, E3] 
Nous adressons une pensée émue 
Sayer Pr : verbal Verbiage 
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Macron, whose discourse had until now focused on description than action, 
shifts his perspective in this last dataset. Indeed, his tweets contain a majority 
of material processes (31.5%) as he projects a presidential ethos with first-
person pronouns and verbs of ‘doing’: 
(51) J'installerai une task force, organe de renseignement auprès du 
président de la République, pour lutter contre Daech. [EM, E3] 
J’ installerai une task force 
Actor Pr : material Goal 
 
(52) J’ai annulé deux rassemblements publics car je veux que les forces de 
l’ordre soient mobilisées sur les priorités. [EM, E3] 
Macron also represents himself as a Sayer by emphasizing the performativity 
of verbal processes (dis, redire, témoigne). In (51), for example, not only does 
Macron express his condolences, but he also portrays himself as enacting the 
verbal process by prefacing the Verbiage (ma solidarité) with je dis (‘I say’): 
(53) Je dis ma solidarité à l’égard des forces de l’ordre et des proches de la 
victime. [EM, E3] 
Je dis ma solidarité 
Sayer Pr : verbal Verbiage 
 
(54) Je veux redire ma solidarité à l'égard des forces de l'ordre qui assurent 
notre sécurité. [EM, E3] 
 
(55) Je témoigne toute ma solidarité à l’égard de nos forces de l’ordre. [EM, 
E3] 
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Even though he is omnipresent in this dataset through the use of the first-
person pronoun je, Macron’s use of generic language and nominalized referents 
enables him to remain vague with respect to his policy platform. In (56), for 
instance, Macron claims that an ‘action’ will be undertaken against terrorism, 
but he does not offer any clues as to the nature of this action nor does he take 
personal responsibility for undertaking it: 
(56) Une action vigoureuse sera engagée pour lutter contre la 
radicalisation islamiste. [EM, E3] 
Une action vigoureuse sera engagée pour lutter… 
Carrier Pr : rel-attr Attribute Circ : purpose 
The word action creates the illusion that Macron is actively ‘engaging’ himself 
in a process of ‘doing’, yet une action vigoureuse is all but a vague 
nominalization whose agent has been suppressed.  
The main participants in this dataset are police officers and terrorists. 
Police officers are represented positively as Carriers in relational processes 
and as Actors in material processes: 
(57) Nos policiers sont attaqués parce qu’ils sont les symboles de l’État. 
[MLP, E3] 
Nos policiers sont attaqués 
Carrier Pr : rel-attr Attribute 
 
ils sont les symboles de l’État 
Token Pr : rel-ident Value 
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(58) Nos services de police font un travail formidable. [MLP, E3] 
Nos services de police font un travail formidable 
Actor Pr : material Range 
 
The material process with which the police is most often associated is protéger 
(‘protect’) with the French people as the Goal (i.e., those who receive the 
protection): 
(59) Nos policiers, nos gendarmes, nos militaires doivent être remerciés, 
soutenus et respectés parce qu'ils protègent les Français. [FF, E3] 
ils protègent les Français 
Actor Pr : material Goal 
 
(60) Merci à nos forces de l'ordre de nous protéger au quotidien. [EM, E3] 
 
(61) Hommage aux forces de l'ordre qui donnent leur vie pour protéger les 
nôtres. [FF, E3] 
In contrast, the terrorists themselves are mentioned mostly indirectly as 
the majority of tweets comment on the concept of terrorism in general, rather 
than on terrorists as individuals. The attackers are represented by nouns 
whose meaning does not include the semantic feature ‘human’ – a 
representational strategy called impersonalization (van Leeuwen, 1996): 
(62) Les actes terroristes ne seront jamais impunis, les complices jamais 
oubliés. [JLM, E3] 
 
(63) Soutien total aux forces de l'ordre contre le terrorisme. [BH, E3] 
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(64) Nous vivons et vivrons durablement avec la menace terroriste. [EM, 
E3] 
Le Pen and Fillon rely on hyperbolic abstractions that highlight the barbaric 
aspects of terrorism: 
(65) L’islamisme est une idéologie hégémonique monstrueuse qui a 
déclaré la guerre à notre nation, à la raison, à la civilisation. [MLP, E3] 
 
(66) J’en appelle au réveil de l’âme millénaire de notre peuple capable de 
s'opposer à une barbarie sanguinaire. [MLP, E3] 
 
(67) J'entends combattre ce mal qui nous agresse d'une main de fer. [FF, 
E3] 
 
Mélenchon does not once mention terrorism. Instead, he describes the 
attackers through negative appraisements realized by nouns that denote 
violence and murder (violents, tueurs, criminels, complices). However, he 
remains vague as to the crime that was committed, and his representations 
require the audience to be familiar with the context of situation:  
(68) Les violents n'auront pas le dernier mot. [JLM, E3] 
 
(69) Nous devons faire la démonstration que nous ne sommes pas intimidés 
par les tueurs. [JLM, E3] 
 
(70) Les criminels ne seront jamais impunis et leurs complices jamais 
oubliés. [JLM, E3] 
Indetermination is another representational strategy (van Leeuwen, 1996) 
whereby agents are replaced by indefinite pronouns, such as the demonstrative 
pronoun ceux (‘those’) in (71) and the subject pronoun ils (‘they’) in (72). In 
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these examples, the identity of the referents is implied by the context of 
situation (namely, the Champs Elysées attack): 
(71) Il faut être implacable à l’égard de ceux qui veulent remettre en cause 
nos valeurs dans notre démocratie [BH, E3] 
 
(72) C'est la démocratie qui est visée, notre cohésion qu'ils veulent ébranler, 
nos valeurs auxquelles ils veulent porter un coup décisif. [EM, E3] 
 
We also find a high occurrence of passivated sentences where the focus is 
placed on the victims of the attack rather than on the perpetrators: 
(73) La France n’est pas visée pour ce qu’elle fait mais pour ce qu’elle est, 
les Français pour la simple raison qu’ils sont Français. [MLP, E3] 
 
(74) Nos policiers sont attaqués parce qu’ils sont les symboles de l’État. 
[MLP, E3] 
Passivation can serve as a means of topicalization, i.e., of foregrounding one 
constituent rather than another (namely, La France and nos policiers).   
 Finally, this last event is characterized by an unanimously positive 
representation of the French nation. Nearly all the candidates participate in 
this national self-glorification: 
(75) Notre feuille de route est la devise de la patrie : Liberté, Égalité, 
Fraternité. [JLM, E3] 
 
(76) La nation est solidaire avec les policiers. [FF, E3] 
 
(77) Je sais que les Français n'ont pas peur. Je sais, chers concitoyens, que 
vous tiendrez bon. Je sais que nous saurons maintenir notre unité. [EM, 
E3] 
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These tweets portray a heterogeneous French nation, who must stay united in 
the face of adversity.  
 
Personal pronouns  
Tables 5.5 and 5.6 show the distribution of personal subject and object 
pronouns in the corpus:18  
je il/elle19 
on 
nous vous ils/elles 
inclusive exclusive 
Hollande 16 0 0 0 0 2 0 
Le Pen 12 7 2 0 2 0 5 
Fillon 28 0 2 2 4 5 2 
Mélenchon 10 5 6 4 7 1 2 
Hamon 8 2 1 3 0 3 0 
Macron 21 0 1 1 4 1 3 
ALL 95 14 
12 10 
17 12 12 
Table 5.5: Distribution of clitic subject pronouns 
 
me/moi 
le/la/lui 
lui/elle 
nous vous 
les/leur 
elles/eux 
Hollande 4 0 3 2 0 
Le Pen 0 4 3 0 1 
Fillon 11 2 2 8 3 
Mélenchon 4 2 0 1 1 
Hamon 2 3 3 0 3 
Macron 0 0 2 1 1 
ALL 21 11 13 12 9 
Table 5.6: Distribution of disjunct and clitic object pronouns 
                                                 
18 Because there were no instances of tu (singular second person) in the data, it is not 
included in tabulations. 
19 These numbers do not include any impersonal/non-referential uses of il. 
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The presidential je 
In #HollandeRenonce, François Hollande uses the presidential je to outline 
his responsibilities as the head of the State. In addition to subject pronouns, 
this sense of duty is also expressed through possessive articles (e.g. mon seul 
devoir, ma tâche, ma décision, mon mandat): 
(78)  Je ne suis animé que par l'intérêt supérieur du pays. L'expérience m'a 
apporté l'humilité nécessaire dans ma tâche. [FH, E1]  
Of all candidates, Fillon is the one who uses the most singular first-person 
pronouns. A majority of his tweets revolve around himself as he battles what 
he claims to be a ‘political assassination’: 
(79)  Je vais affronter les attaques jusqu’au bout, et je serai candidat à 
l’élection présidentielle. [FF, E2] 
 
(80) Ceux qui ont pensé m’atteindre doivent être certains de ma 
détermination. [FF, E2] 
For Mélenchon, je is a way to assert his individuality and to distance himself 
from establishment politicians, i.e., the mainstream Socialist Party. Indeed, 
lays heavy emphasis on his outsider persona in #HollandeRenonce before 
shifting to a populist nous which encompasses him and the French people in 
the other datasets: 
(81) Pourquoi me demande-t-on à moi de rejoindre la primaire du #PS ? 
[JLM, E1] 
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(82) Je suis candidat depuis février, je le reste. Je n'affronte pas un 
personnage de la primaire #PS. Mon adversaire, c'est M. #Fillon. [JLM, 
E1] 
 
As the election grows nearer, Macron becomes more assertive. The presidential 
je is omnipresent in #ChampsElysées, as Macron projects an ethos of president 
onto his audience: 
(83)  Je sais que les Français n'ont pas peur. Je sais, chers concitoyens, 
que vous tiendrez bon. Je sais que nous saurons maintenir notre unité. 
[EM, E3] 
 
Nous and vous: establishing a relationship with the electorate  
In political discourse, the primary purpose of nous (‘we’) and vous (‘you’) is 
to reduce the distance between politicians and the people (Fairclough, 1992, 
Laclau, 2005). The concept of nous is slippery in political discourse. Indeed, its 
referent is open-ended: it can refer to a particular audience but can also refer 
to the French people as a whole. By leaving this open to interpretation, 
politicians can frame their ideas as being the people’s ideas (Fairclough, 1992). 
For instance, when Mélenchon uses nous instead of je in (84), he talks in the 
name of the people, and presents his words as those of the people: 
(84)  Nous adressons une pensée émue à la famille du policier décédé et 
aux familles des policiers blessés. [JLM, E3] 
The collective nous is also a way for Mélenchon to reaffirm one of the pillars of 
his campaign: his commitment to replace the corrupt establishment with one 
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ruled directly by the people. From #HollandeRenonce to #ChampsElysées, 
Mélenchon progressively shifts from je to nous. In #ChampsElysées, he has 
fused with his electorate as he and his movement have become one: 
(85)  Nous devons faire notre devoir de citoyens. Pas de panique. Restons 
unis. [JLM, E3] 
Next, the use of vous allows for the audience to feel included in the discourse, 
as politicians seem to be addressing them directly. In #Fillongate, we find 
multiple instances of Fillon begging his audience for approval and support. By 
telling his supporters not to let themselves be intimidated, Fillon also implies 
that Fillongate is part of a larger conspiracy that is targeting the entire party:  
(86)  Mes amis, j’ai besoin de vous. Ne vous laissez pas faire. Ne vous 
laissez pas intimider ! [FF, E2] 
There are only two instances of the formal singular vous in the corpus. In (87), 
Hamon uses the formal singular vous in order to address Fillon directly. The 
first vous is a coreferential dislocated disjunct pronoun.  
(87)  Vous M.Fillon vous avez ruiné le pays. [BH, E2] 
 
Exclusive and inclusive on 
As a subject pronoun, on possesses a wide range of potential meanings and 
referents. Moreover, on can be either inclusive or exclusive, i.e., it can either 
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include or exclude the speaker. This versatility can create ambiguity, whether 
this is done intentionally or not. In some cases, the vagueness of on can instill 
a sense of paranoia suggestive of a sinister conspiracy. In the examples below, 
Fillon paints himself and his supporters (nous) as the victims of a hit job whose 
perpetrators (on) remain unidentified:  
(88) On voudrait nous éliminer de la course à la présidentielle ? Au profit 
de quoi et de qui ? [FF, E2]  
 
(89)  Au-delà de ma seule personne, on cherche à casser la droite, à lui 
voler son vote [FF, E2] 
Next, the use of on can create an ‘us vs. them’ distinction, which we often find 
in populist discourse (discussed in chapter 6). In (90), Mélenchon appears to be 
including himself with the people (on) against the political establishment (ils). 
In (91), however, he distances himself from on and suggests to his audience 
(vous) that the election is being rigged by the establishment (on):  
(90)  Le plus frappant, c'est qu'ils ne comprennent pas ce qu'on leur 
reproche. [JLM, E2]  
 
(91)  Vous n'êtes pas fatigués qu'on vous arrange l'élection d'avance ? 
D'abord c'était #Juppé, après #Fillon, maintenant #Macron... [JLM, 
E2]  
As such, on establishes a differentiation between the Self and the Other, and 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’. 
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The faceless ils  
Ils is used to refer to collective entities. In (92), for instance, Macron uses ils to 
refer back to les terroristes: 
(92)  Les terroristes cherchent à bousculer les élections. Ils veulent la 
contemplation du désastre. Je ne céderai en rien. #le79inter [EM, E3] 
Unlike the first and second persons, the third person is external to the 
discourse. It also helps establish an ‘us vs. them’ distinction, as in (93): 
(93)  C'est la démocratie qui est visée, notre cohésion qu'ils veulent 
ébranler, nos valeurs auxquelles ils veulent porter un coup décisif. 
[EM, E3] 
As such, ils may be used with no directly given referent to invoke a faceless 
enemy and to create a sense of threat heightened by the anonymity of the 
referent. 
 
Modality and attitude 
Modality and polarity  
Table 5.7 shows the number of instances belonging to the four types of 
modality recognized by SFL (probability, usuality, obligation and inclination) 
as well as the number of processes with a negative polarity. The system of 
modality interacts with polarity in the sense that modal processes express 
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intermediate stances, i.e., stances that are situated somewhere between the 
positive and negative polarities.  
 
TYPE FH MLP FF JLM BH EM ALL 
modalization: 
probability 
2 
(5.7%) 
2 
(2.1%) 
11 
(12.1%) 
7 
(7.4%) 
2 
(4.4%) 
6 
(7.8%) 
30 
(6.8%) 
modalization: 
usuality 
0 
7 
(7.4%) 
3 
(3.3%) 
3 
(3.2%) 
0 
2 
(2.6%) 
15 
(3.4%) 
modulation: 
obligation 
3 
(8.6%) 
6 
(6.3%) 
7 
(7.7%) 
2 
(2.1%) 
6 
(13.3%) 
6 
(7.8%) 
30 
(6.8%) 
modulation: 
inclination 
4 
(11.4%) 
7 
(7.4%) 
5 
(5.5%) 
9 
(9.5%) 
8 
(17.7%) 
15 
(19.5%) 
48 
(10.9%) 
negation 
1 
(2.8%) 
11 
(11.6%) 
11 
(12.1%) 
28 
(29.5%) 
4 
(8.8%) 
6 
(7.8%) 
61 
(13.9%) 
no. of clauses 35 95 91 95 45 77 438 
Table 5.7: Modality and polarity of verbal processes 
Hollande uses a majority of modulated processes (i.e., processes of 
obligation and inclination) in order to emphasize the moral responsibility tied 
to the presidential function. In (94), for instance, he uses the pseudo-modal 
devoir in conjunction with the material process diriger l'État (‘lead the State’). 
Additionally, the reflexive clitic me attached to devoir implies that it is a 
personal duty concomitant with his function as président de la République: 
(94) Comme président de la République je me dois de diriger l'État. [FH, 
E1] 
This sense of duty is also realized by nouns (devoir, mandat, tâche, 
responsabilité, engagement) and by adjectives (nécessaire), as in the following 
example:  
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(95) Je ne suis animé que par l'intérêt supérieur du pays. L'expérience m'a 
apporté l'humilité nécessaire dans ma tâche. [FH, E1] 
On the other hand, Hollande completely avoids the negation and his tweets 
contain only one process with a negative polarity (2.8%). This suggests a 
willingness to focus solely on the positive aspects of his mandate, which is 
largely at odds with the public’s perception of his presidency.  
Le Pen uses an equal proportion (7.4%) of processes of usuality and 
inclination. In #ChampsÉlysées, she uses numerous adjuncts of usuality (une 
nouvelle fois, une fois encore, à nouveau) and verbs such as recommencer, 
s’habituer to suggest that terrorist attacks occur at a high frequency. This 
creates a sense of constant threat and urgency as part of a fear-mongering 
strategy: 
(96) Je ne veux pas que l'on s'habitue au terrorisme islamiste. [MLP, E3] 
 
(97) J'ai appris que le cauchemar recommençait, une fois encore. [MLP, 
E3] 
 
(98) Notre pays a vécu une nouvelle fois la barbarie d’une attaque 
terroriste en plein cœur de notre capitale. [MLP, E3] 
 
(99) Émotion et solidarité pour nos forces de l'ordre, à nouveau prises pour 
cible. [MLP, E3] 
 
Next, she presents current immigration policies as unacceptable with negative 
processes coupled with the modal verbs pouvoir and vouloir:   
176 
 
(100) On ne peut pas laisser à nos enfants un pays impuissant à les 
défendre. [MLP, E3] 
 
(101) Je ne veux pas dire à notre jeunesse de s'habituer à vivre avec le 
terrorisme. [MLP, E3] 
 
In some instances, the negative polarity of the process is amplified by other 
markers of negation such as the determiner aucun, or the pronouns personne 
and rien.  
(102) La campagne de M. #Fillon est en jachère. Plus rien ne s’y passe. Plus 
aucune proposition. Il a déserté le débat public ! [MLP, E2] 
In example (102), the adjectives en jachère and déserté further reinforce Le 
Pen’s representation of Fillon as having lost all relevance and legitimacy as a 
candidate.  
Fillon uses a majority of modalized processes (15.4%) as he asserts his 
certainty regarding his innocence and as he depicts the relentlessness of his 
presumed attackers: 
(103) Ceux qui ont pensé m’atteindre doivent être certains de ma 
détermination. [FF, E2] 
In terms of negation, the adverb jamais (‘never’) conveys his indignation as he 
claims to have a spotless public record:  
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(104) En 36 ans de vie publique, jamais mon honneur n’avait été mis en 
cause. [FF, E2] 
 
(105) Je n’ai jamais hurlé avec les meutes, ni fouillé dans les poubelles de 
mes adversaires ! [FF, E2] 
 
In (106), the modal verb pouvoir, which expresses ability (or lack thereof), 
emphasizes his disbelief:  
(106) Je ne pouvais imaginer être victime d'une manipulation pareille. [FF, 
E2] 
 
Mélenchon’s tweets are remarkable for the proportion of negative 
processes they contain (29.5%), which sets him apart from the other 
candidates. In #HollandeRenonce, for example, Mélenchon uses numerous 
negative processes in an effort to distance himself from the mainstream 
Socialist Party: 
(107) Je ne suis pas membre du #PS. Je l'ai quitté, ce n'est pas pour y 
retourner. [JLM, E1] 
In Mélenchon’s tweets, negative polarity often has corrective and/or 
contrastive function, especially when used in parallel structures such as (108):  
(108) En janvier, ce n'est pas la primaire de la gauche, c'est la primaire du 
#PS. [JLM, E1] 
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Mélenchon offers a critical and pessimistic representation of the country which 
lays emphasis on the government’s wrongdoings. Yet, he offers few positive 
alternatives: 
(109) @fhollande n'a pas appliqué son programme. [JLM, E1] 
 
(110) Monsieur #Fillon avait dit qu'il ne serait pas candidat s'il était mis 
en examen. Il ne respecte pas sa promesse. [JLM, E2] 
 
(111) #Fillon n'écoute rien et #LePen refuse d'aller aux convocations ! 
[JLM, E2] 
 
Like Fillon, Mélenchon engages in conspiracy-mongering, suggesting that the 
public are being lied to, and that mainstream parties as backstabbers who 
cannot be trusted:  
(112) @fhollande n'a pas renoncé à l'élection présidentielle : il en a été éjecté 
par ses propres amis. [JLM, E1] 
 
(113) Le coup contre #Fillon ne vient pas de la gauche. Il vient le plus 
probablement de sa propre famille. [JLM, E2] 
In #ChampsÉlysées, however, he adopts a more reassuring voice, as he tells 
his supporters that they must not be afraid in the face of terrorism:  
(114) Nous devons faire la démonstration que nous ne sommes pas 
intimidés par les tueurs. [JLM, E3] 
However, Mélenchon’s attitude could be interpreted as dismissive as he seems 
to diminish the gravity of the attack. Surprisingly, he invites his supporters to 
place their trust in the justice system and to focus on the election instead (115). 
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As such, he uses imperatives to remind them that voting is their duty as 
French citizens, and that must stay united within the movement (116): 
(115) Continuons le processus électoral. Les violents seront toujours 
battus par les républicains. [JLM, E3] 
 
(116) Nous devons faire notre devoir de citoyens. Pas de panique. Restons 
unis. [JLM, E3] 
With this controversial take, Mélenchon distinguishes himself from Fillon who 
temporarily halted his campaign in the wake of the attack: 
(117) Je considère qu'il n'y a pas lieu de continuer une campagne électorale 
parce que nous devons manifester notre solidarité avec les policiers. [FF, 
E3] 
In (116) and (117), Mélenchon and Fillon use the same modal expression of 
obligation (devons), yet they have different priorities. While Mélenchon 
emphasizes the necessity to keep the eyes on the prize, Fillon argues that the 
country must for now focus on expressing solidarity for law enforcement. 
Hamon uses mostly modulated processes as he shares his vision for the 
Left. The Socialist nominee expresses his desire for a united Left and outlines 
the necessary steps his party must take to remain a key player in French 
politics. Accordingly, Hamon’s tweets contain numerous modal verbs that 
express obligation (devoir, falloir) and inclination (vouloir): 
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(118) Il faut désormais une gauche totale, qui veut à la fois gouverner et 
transformer, pour défendre le #ProgrèsSocial [BH, E1] 
 
(119) La gauche doit se positionner radicalement différemment sur le 
travail, le progrès social si elle veut être entendue. [BH, E1] 
 
Finally, Macron is the candidate who uses the most modulated processes 
of inclination (19.5%), along with very few negative processes (7.8%). Most of 
these negative processes are actually optimistic in tone, as he promises the 
French people that he will not bow down to terrorism (120) and tells them that 
they have a great future ahead of them despite the Champs Elysées attack 
(121):  
(120) Les terroristes cherchent à bousculer les élections. Ils veulent la 
contemplation du désastre. Je ne céderai en rien. [EM, E3]  
 
(121) L’ombre sur cette fin de campagne n’enlève rien au fait que nous 
devons construire notre avenir, et que nous avons un grand avenir [EM, 
E3].  
 
Engagement and evidentiality 
Evidentiality reflects the speaker’s commitment to the information they 
share and to the credibility of their claims (Hyland, 2005; Smirnova, 2015). 
The avoidance of evidential forms presents the information as absolute facts 
and truth that cannot be questioned. Longhi (2013) argues that the concise 
format of tweets invites the removal of hedging and evidential for the sake of 
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concision. This study seems to confirm his hypothesis hedges and markers of 
evidentiality are rare across the corpus.  
In French, evidentiality is primarily expressed through mitigating mental 
processes. Halliday refers to the mitigation, or ‘projection’, of another process 
by a mental process as modal assessment (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2014, 
p.900). Modal assessments are subjective assessments of modality whereby the 
speaker expresses his or her personal attitude or stance about the process (e.g. 
je pense, je crois, je veux, etc.). In (122-124), the projecting clause (i.e. the 
mental process) is a ‘modal assessment’ of the projected clause. Together, the 
two clauses form a ‘clause complex’ (Halliday, 1994): 
(122)  Je considère qu’il n’y a pas de gauches irréconciliables. [BH, E1] 
(123)  Je sais que les Français n'ont pas peur. [EM, E3] 
(124)  Je vois que la séquence des boules puantes est ouverte. [FF, E2] 
The most common form of modal assessment is je veux (‘I want’) across all three 
datasets. This is not unexpected considering the electoral context: through je 
veux, the candidates share their vision for the future. Indeed, 53.7% of the 
mental processes in the corpus belong to the desiderative subtype, which 
expresses a modality of inclination (cf. Table 5.8).  
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 Perceptive Cognitive Desiderative Emotive ALL 
Hollande 0 1 3 1 5 
Le Pen 2 5 8 2 17 
Fillon 1 5 4 3 13 
Mélenchon 0 2 3 1 6 
Hamon 0 2 8 1 11 
Macron 0 5 10 0 15 
ALL 3 (4.5%) 20 (29.8%) 36 (53.7%) 8 (11.9%) 67 
Table 5.8: Subtypes of mental processes 
Moreover, tenses and aspects can also affect the type of modality expressed by 
mental processes (cf. Table 5.9).  
 
Present 
Past 
Future Cond. ALL  
IMP PC PQP 
Hollande 13 3 13 1 3 1 34 
Le Pen 63 4 15 1 0 1 84 
Fillon 60 5 10 1 10 3 89 
Mélenchon 70 4 8 1 7 3 93 
Hamon 37 1 3 0 2 0 43 
Macron 54 0 3 0 9 0 66 
ALL 297 
(72.6%) 
17 
(4.1%) 
52 
(12.7%) 
4 
(1%) 
31 
(7.6%) 
8 
(2%) 
409 
Table 5.9: Tenses and aspects. 
For example, Hollande uses the past structure j’ai voulu (‘I wanted’) which has 
the effect of mitigating the process by framing it as an intention rather than a 
success. In the example below, Hollande merely conveys a past wish, and it is 
unclear whether it came to fruition: 
(125)  J'ai voulu que soit maintenue la cohésion nationale. [FH, E1] 
183 
 
Another occurrence in Hollande’s tweets is je pensais (‘I thought’), which in 
(126) expresses wrong assessment of ability: 
(126)  Je pensais qu'elle pouvait nous unir, elle nous a divisé. [FH, E1] 
In comparison, the future simple can convey certainty: 
(127) Les violents seront toujours battus par les républicains. [JLM, E3] 
As such, it may be used to make a formal commitment – a strategy which 
electoral candidates can exploit to express their determination to enact 
particular policies once elected: 
(128) De Washington à Moscou, je prendrai l'initiative diplomatique pour 
bâtir une coalition mondiale contre le terrorisme islamique. [FF, E3] 
 
(129)  Je serai implacable pour vous protéger. [EM, E3] 
However, while (128) outlines a specific policy, (129) expresses a general 
commitment. In other words, Fillon explains what he would do to fight 
terrorism, but Macron does not elaborate on his promise.  
 
Texture and genre 
Lexical cohesion 
Table 5.10 provides a summary of the main lexical strings (i.e., with ten or 
more lexical items) in each dataset:  
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Event #HollandeRenonce #FillonGate #ChampsElysées 
No. of 
strings 
12 10 10 
Heads  
(no. of 
words) 
 
décision (22) 
guerre (20) 
construction (19) 
progrès (18) 
conclusion (17) 
justice (17) 
cohésion (16) 
préservation (16) 
division (14) 
leader (14) 
responsabilité (13) 
échec (12) 
 
légalité (29) 
corruption (21) 
débat (14) 
morale (13) 
faux semblants (12) 
attaque (12) 
bataille (12) 
vérité (11) 
presse (10) 
argent (10) 
 
guerre (40) 
nation (40) 
sécurité (34) 
autorité (30) 
terrorisme (28) 
famille (25) 
unité (18) 
domination (12) 
mort (12) 
peur (11) 
Table 5.10: Main lexical strings (> 10 items). 
Lexical strings enable us to see each event as a whole by informing us about 
the recurring themes, images, emotions and activities associated with the 
event. This is especially useful on Twitter, where lexical strings create texture 
by relating multiple individual tweets to the same ‘context of situation’ 
(Halliday, 1994; Martin, 2000). As such, they are threads running through 
interrelated tweets that help establish a cohesive and coherent narrative 
around an event (Eggins, 2004). The #HollandeRenonce narrative is woven 
around the concepts of décision, guerre and construction. The décision string is 
predictable given the immediate context of situation (namely, Hollande 
announcing his decision not to seek reelection). The guerre string, however, is 
more unexpected. If we study the co-text (i.e., the textual context) surrounding 
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the lexical items, we find that this ‘war’ is a metaphorical one.  In fact, it evokes 
one of the most prevalent metaphors in political discourse: ARGUMENT IS WAR. 
In this verbal battle, the candidates’ arguments are built upon a conflict frame, 
i.e., a conceptual model involving two opposing sides. Mélenchon, for instance, 
is waging a war (affronte, combattre) against the political establishment (mon 
adversaire).  Benoît Hamon, on the other hand, frames Hollande’s withdrawal 
(retrait) as a self-sacrificing gesture enabling his political camp (son camp) to 
come up with a new ‘plan of attack’. Finally, the construction string can be tied 
to a building metaphor (Chilton & Ilyin, 1993) through which the campaigning 
process is comparer to a building enterprise. Fillon, in particular, draws 
repeatedly from the lexical field of masonry (bâtis, bases solides, redressement, 
bâtirons, etc.). In #Fillongate, the main lexical strings deal with justice, 
corruption and debate. On the one hand, Fillon denies any guilt (culpabilité) 
claims that he is the victim (victime) of unjust accusations (actes d’accusation) 
from the press and from his political adversaries (inquisiteurs). He goes as far 
as to suggest a sinister conspiracy (entreprise de demolition, manipulation) 
cooked up (mijotées dans les arrière-cuisines) by his detractors (volontés 
adverses) to steal the election (voler l’élection) from him and his supporters. On 
the other hand, his opponents suggest that Fillon is an illegitimate candidate 
due to the illegality of his actions. According to them, he is a liar who made 
false promises (promesses) and who fooled the people with dirty tricks 
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(arrangements, combines). As such, he has no dignity (dignité) and cannot be 
trusted (confiance). The candidates also lament that Fillon has hijacked (prend 
en otage) the election because the media (la presse) is more concerned with his 
shenanigans than with policy debates (le fond, le programme). Finally, the 
main themes discussed in the #ChampsElysées tweets include war, security, 
authority and national identity. The attack is portrayed as symptomatic of a 
war waged against France (la guerre qui nous est menée), and the candidates 
tend to focus on the threat of terrorism (la menace terroriste, le terrorisme 
islamique) in general rather than on the specificities of this particular attack. 
Policemen (les policiers, les forces de l’ordre) were the victims of the attack 
(victimes, martyrs, visés) but they are also being celebrated for their continuous 
effort to keep the French people safe (protéger, en sécurité). On the other hand, 
Le Pen criticizes the Hollande government vehemently for its lack of authority 
(autorité) and moral strength (force morale). The candidates also make 
numerous patriotic appeals whereby they portray the French people as a 
united front (unis, membres d’une même famille) against the enemy.  
In addition to lexical cohesion, rhetorical figures such as anaphora and 
parallelism are another way through which politicians can create a sense of 
continuity between their tweets. In examples (130) and (131), the repetition of 
the expression présider, c’est protéger at the beginning of each sentence enables 
the reader to connect the two tweets:  
187 
 
(130) Présider, c'est protéger à l’extérieur de nos frontières pour lutter 
partout contre le terrorisme islamiste. [EM, E3] 
 
(131) Présider, c'est protéger à l’intérieur de nos frontières en renforçant 
les moyens de sécurité, de renseignement. [EM, E3] 
Moreover, hashtags can place several tweets within the same context of 
situation. As such, hashtags can operate as context markers – a function which 
Longhi (2013) calls ‘techno-contextualization’. In (132) and (133), the hashtags 
#JLMFrance2, #Presidentielle2017 and #15minutesPourConvaincre tell us 
that both tweets are quotes or paraphrases of Mélenchon’s interview on the 
channel France 2, on the guest show 15 minutes pour convaincre, and in the 
larger context of the 2017 presidential election: 
(132) Nous devons faire notre devoir de citoyens. Pas de panique. Restons 
unis. #JLMFrance2 #Presidentielle2017 #15minutesPourConvaincre 
[JLM, E3] 
 
(133) Les criminels ne seront jamais impunis et leurs complices jamais 
oubliés. #JLMFrance2 #Presidentielle2017 #15minutesPourConvaincre 
[JLM, E3] 
Generic coherence 
This section looks at the pragmatic function of ‘techno-words’ (Paveau, 2013), 
i.e. words of both linguistic and technological nature20. On Twitter, such words 
                                                 
20  
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include hashtags and @mentions, which are not only an integral part of the 
discourse but also clickable hyperlinks (Zappavigna, 2012; Paveau, 2013). 
Hashtags 
Throughout the corpus, a distinction emerged between two types or ‘functions’ 
of hashtags, which will henceforth be referred to as ‘topic hashtags’ and 
‘context hashtags’, respectively.   
‘Topic hashtags’ indicate what or who is the topic of the tweet: 
(134) On ne peut plus faire campagne. Chaque jour il y a une nouvelle 
aventure de l'affaire #Fillon. #Elections2017 [JLM, E2] 
 
(135) "La lutte contre le terrorisme commence par retrouver nos frontières 
nationales, et arrêter avec la naïveté." #AttentatChampsElysées 
[MLP, E3] 
Hashtags may be used even when the context is ‘strictly given’. This is because 
hashtags can increase a tweet’s impact and readership by making it 
‘searchable’ (Zappavigna, 2012). In some cases, however, hashtags add needed 
context to decontextualized tweets. In (136), for instance, the hashtag #Fillon 
situates Mélenchon’s tweet within the context of the Fillongate scandal. In 
(137), the hashtag #LutteTerrorisme indicates that Macron’s remark was part 
of a discussion on terrorism.   
(136) Je ne vais pas passer deux mois à critiquer la droite pour autre chose 
que ses idées ! #Fillon [JLM, E2] 
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(137) François Fillon a un problème avec la vérité, c’est chaque jour un peu 
plus manifeste. #LutteTerrorisme [EM, E2] 
‘Context hashtags’ frame tweets as reported speech from interviews or 
rallies. As such, they evoke the physical context of the story being told. These 
hashtags usually reference specific TV channels or talk shows (as in (138)) or 
campaign rallies (as in (139)), and are often prefaced by the candidate’s name 
or initials.  
(138) "Le problème de François #Fillon, c'est le problème de la confiance 
entre le candidat et les Français." #MLPTF1 [MLP, E2] 
 
(139)  Les journalistes me demandent comment je fais pour tenir : grâce à 
vous et à votre ferveur comme ce soir à Quimper ! #FillonQuimper 
[FF, E2] 
Hashtags are usually added to the end of a tweet, but can also be included in 
the proposition itself – especially in reference to people (140) or to specific 
events (141): 
(140) Tout l’espace médiatique a été saturé par M. #Fillon et ses aventures 
avec #LesRépublicains. [JLM, E2] 
 
(141) "La candidature de François #Fillon était déjà très fragile avant le 
#PenelopeGate, à cause de son projet d'une grande brutalité." [MLP, 
E2] 
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Despite few instances in the corpus, it is also worth mentioning ‘self-promoting 
hashtags’, which usually consist of either the candidate’s name followed by the 
election year (as in (142)) or of the candidate’s campaign slogan (as in (143)).  
(142) Le choix du PR de ne pas se représenter à la présidentielle nous 
permet de nous tourner vers l’avenir #Hamon2017 [BH, E1] 
 
(143) Notre premier devoir est un devoir de sang froid. 
#LaForceDuPeuple [JLM, E3] 
In terms of usage, some candidates used more hashtags than others. 
Mélenchon and Le Pen used the most, while Macron and Hollande only used a 
handful of hashtags. There were no noteworthy differences between candidates 
with respect to hashtag functions. 
@mentions 
@mentions often serve as referent markers, providing clickable access to a 
specific person’s or organization’s timeline. They may function as 
circumstantial adjuncts, indicating the sources of articles or the authors of 
quotes shared by the candidates: 
(144) Indispensable moralisation de la vie publique. Elle doit être inscrite 
dans la loi. Mon interview dans @LaCroix: [hyperlink]  [EM, E2] 
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They can also be used to address another user directly (thus indicating the 
addressee of the tweet) or to extend thanks or congratulations to specific social 
actors: 
(145) Merci à @Linda_Gourjade pour son soutien à la #PrimaireGauche. 
[BH, E1] 
In terms of placement, @mentions are usually included directly into the 
propositions. As vocatives, they usually precede the main proposition at the 
beginning of the tweet. However, they can also appear at the end of tweets 
where they resemble context hashtags:   
(146) "Face au terrorisme, il faut retrouver nos frontières nationales, 
expulser les étrangers fichés S pour islamisme !" @bleuprovence 
[MLP, E3] 
 
Embedded multimodal content: 
While Macron uses relatively few hashtags compared to some other candidates, 
he frequently embeds short videos (147), photos (148) or campaign quotes (149) 
into their tweets: 
(147) Ce soir, je veux témoigner toute ma solidarité à l’égard de nos forces 
de l’ordre. [embedded video] [EM, E3] 
 
(148) Solidarité avec nos policiers après les événements de la nuit dernière. 
[embedded image] [EM, E3] 
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(149)  L’ombre sur cette fin de campagne n’enlève rien au fait que nous 
devons construire notre avenir, et que nous avons un grand avenir 
#RTLMatin [embedded campaign quote] [EM, E3] 
Moreover, Twitter now enables the live streaming of rallies, interviews, and 
speeches, as in (150): 
(150) Déclaration à la suite de l'attentat des #ChampsÉlysées [live 
streaming] [FF, E3] 
There were no occurrences of ‘playful’ technological features, such as 
emoticons, gifs or non-standard punctuation. This confirms the hypothesis that 
political tweets differ from other tweets in terms of formality, and that 
politicians are still expected to uphold a certain standard (Longhi, 2013).  
Orality and informality  
French campaign tweets often consist of decontextualized quotes, i.e., of quotes 
that have been extracted from their original context of production, such as 
rallies and TV interviews (Longhi, 2013). Through this process, spoken words 
are being transposed onto a written medium. Le Pen is the only candidate who 
uses quotations marks to distinguish extracted quotes (as in (151)) from 
original tweets (as in (152)). Additionally, the initials at the end of (152) 
indicate that Le Pen was the author of the tweet (rather than one of her staff 
members).  
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(151) "Mes pensées vont à la famille du policier tombé en service, à ses 
camarades blessés et au-delà à toutes nos forces de sécurité." #ConfMLP 
[MLP, E3] 
 
(152) Émotion et solidarité pour nos forces de l'ordre, à nouveau prises 
pour cible. MLP [MLP, E3] 
As a result of this medium transposition, decontextualized tweets often contain 
speech-like linguistic features, such as vocatives (153-154), dislocations (155-
156), and assertive questions (157-158). Fillon employed the most vocatives, 
while both left and right dislocations were mostly found in the tweets of Hamon 
and Mélenchon. Examples of these patterns of orality are shown below. 
Vocatives:  
(153) Mes amis, j’ai besoin de vous. [FF, E2] 
(154) Vous M.Fillon vous avez ruiné le pays. [BH, E2] 
Dislocations: 
(155) Ilsi ont bonne mine les défenseurs de l'ordre et de la justicei ! 
[JLM, E2] 
 
(156) À F. Fillon qui fait de l'autisme une insultei, je veux luii dire que 
les personnes atteintes d'autismeii ne mentent pas ne trichent pas, 
ellesii! [BH, E2] 
Assertive or non-inverted questions:   
(157) Pourquoi il y a des primaires à droite et à gauche ? [MLP, E1] 
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(158) Vous n'êtes pas fatigués qu'on vous arrange l'élection d'avance ? 
[JLM, E2] 
Concision 
As hypothesized from previous research on political tweets, the corpus 
contains very few abbreviations despite the character limit. There are only two 
instances in the entire corpus, contained within one of Hamon’s tweets. In 
(159), Hamon abbreviates une into ‘1’ and extrême-droite into ‘ext-droite’. Then, 
he also removes the articles from ‘droite’ and ‘ext-droite’. Interestingly, the 
tweet only consists of 116 characters. Hamon could have thus spelled out the 
sentence without going over the character limit.  
(159) Plus que jamais, la gauche doit porter 1 alternative sociale, 
écologique et démocratique face à droite et ext-droite [BH, E1] 
However, we find some examples of truncated sentences without predicates. 
Macron is particularly fond of the ‘caption style’ illustrated below:   
(160) Détermination. Avec mes conseillers sécurité avant ma déclaration 
solennelle. @JMFauvergue77 [embedded image] [EM, E3] 
Finally, we find the evidence of a microgenre in the #ChampsÉlysées dataset, 
as all the candidates use Twitter to express their formal condolences (161-164):  
(161) Émotion et solidarité pour nos forces de l'ordre, à nouveau prises 
pour cible. MLP [MLP, E3] 
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(162) Hommage aux forces de l'ordre qui donnent leur vie pour protéger 
les nôtres. #ChampsÉlysées [FF, E3] 
 
(163) Pensée émue pour les policiers mort et blessés et leurs familles. 
[JLM, E3] 
 
(164)  Solidarité avec nos policiers après les événements de la nuit dernière. 
[embedded image] [EM, E3]  
These condolences consist of nominal groups that are elaborated with adjuncts 
and/or relative clauses. 
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Chapter 6 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Political language is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder 
respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind.  
George Orwell. 
 
 
Introduction 
This final chapter recontextualizes the findings presented in the 
discourse analysis phase of this study into a discussion of the discourses, styles, 
and genres underlying the campaign tweets of the 2017 candidates. First, I 
discuss how particular discursive mechanisms contribute to the realization of 
three distinct ideological discourses, namely progressivism, conservatism and 
nationalism. Next, I argue that anti-establishment sentiment is realized by 
two rhetorical frames’ or ‘styles of politics’ in the corpus: the populist style and 
the centrist style. I then discuss the impact of Twitter on political discourse as 
I approach campaign tweets as a genre of discourse with its own affordances 
and constraints. Specifically, I argue that Twitter constitutes a powerful 
platform for anti-establishment politics, as the combination and concision and 
decontextualization can amplify populist appeals. Finally, I conclude this 
study by revisiting the Research Questions and reiterating the significance of 
the methodological components that have guided my analysis. I discuss the 
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potential of CDA and SFL for future research on social media, and offer some 
final thoughts on the state of contemporary politics in the age of social media.   
 
Discourses and styles 
This discussion builds on the findings described in chapter 5 and frames 
them within Fairclough’s concept of orders of discourse. Indeed, we have thus 
far seen that lexicogrammatical choices can signify discourses that shape our 
perception of events, participants, and circumstances. These choices may 
promote particular ideologies that are not overtly stated in the text. 
Additionally, they can index particular ‘styles of politics’ or rhetorical 
strategies used by candidates to further their agendas. In essence, my findings 
show that various discourses (e.g. conservative, progressive, nationalist) and 
styles (such as populism and centrism) comprise many heterogenous elements 
that are arrayed in particular structures. That is, particular combinations of 
lexicogrammatical features are structured as different systems of meaning or 
‘frames of expectation’. Accordingly, discourses function as "template[s] 
imposed upon the world to give the appearance of order to events" (Barkun, 
2016, p.7). In the following section, I discuss how the 2017 candidates took 
advantage of triggering events to evoke preferred discourses and styles.  
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Ideological discourses 
Before we discuss ideological discourses, we must first draw a 
distinction between ideology and party affiliation. Indeed, ideology is not a 
spectrum that runs from the far left to the far right, and even though there is 
some overlap between political parties and particular ideologies, there is no 
neat correspondence between the two. Van Dijk defines ideology as the 
“shared, socio-cognitive system of a group, culture, or society” (van Dijk, 1991, 
p.36). Ideology monitors the development of a particular set of norms, values 
and attitudes, and its application in a way that serves group interests and 
favorizes ideological reproduction (van Dijk, 1991, p.37). As such, ideologies 
are both cognitive representations and social systems shared by social groups. 
The process of ideological reproduction mentioned above aims to maintain the 
in-group’s ‘position’ in a particular social structure or culture. Similarly, 
ideologies are not limited to the domain of ideas, but have a material basis or 
expression in institutions and in the social practices of group members. Van 
Dijk (1998) states that ideologies should not be reduced to discourse, as they 
are also being expressed in other semiotic practices, but that discourse plays a 
unique role in the expression and reproduction of ideologies: “discourse not 
only exhibits ideologies indirectly (…) but also explicitly formulates ideological 
beliefs directly” (van Dijk, 1998, p. 193). The type of ideology that interests 
CDA researchers is the “hidden and latent type of everyday beliefs, which often 
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appear disguised as conceptual metaphors and analogies” (Wodak & Meyer, 
2001, p. 8). Accordingly, the aim of CDA is to uncover how discourse expresses 
and reproduces underlying ideologies by exposing the ideological content 
hidden in minute linguistic details.  
Conservative discourse Progressive discourse Nationalist discourse 
Emphasis on 
authority, moral 
foundations and self-
discipline through: 
- Material processes 
and first-person 
reference 
- Modality of 
obligation  
- Demands and orders  
- References to 
romanticized past 
- Conceptual 
metaphor: ‘countries 
are buildings’ 
- Lexical strings: order 
& disorder, 
restoration, 
authority 
Emphasis on empathy, 
and responsibility to 
protect the common 
good through: 
- Third-person 
reference to 
vulnerable groups 
- Humanizing 
referential choices 
- Modality of 
inclination and 
desiderative mental 
processes 
- Mitigating 
evidentials and 
modal assessments 
- Lexical strings: 
dignity, respect, 
party unity and the 
public sector 
Emphasis on national 
identity and external 
threat through: 
- Modality of usuality 
(repetition) and 
obligation 
- Emotive verbal 
processes 
- ‘Us’ vs. ‘them’ 
dichotomy 
- Genericization and 
dehumanization of 
the ‘other’ 
- Conceptual 
metaphors: ‘nation is 
family’, ‘countries 
are containers’ 
- Lexical strings: war, 
savagery, fear, 
family, and 
patriotism 
Table 6.1: Summary of ideological discourses. 
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The following section deals with three ideological discourses – conservatism, 
progressivism and nationalism – and discusses their realizations in the 
tweets of the 2017 French presidential candidates. As a reference for the 
reader, Table 6.1 offers a summary of the lexicogrammatical features and 
rhetorical figures which I have identified as enabling the realization of each 
discourse. 
Progressive discourse 
In chapter 2, we saw that progressivism relies on the fundamental 
concepts of empathy and equal opportunity. A progressive morality based on 
empathy leads to an ethic of diversity and to the recognition of basic human 
dignity. Accordingly, progressives believe in a strong government that can 
ensure that all citizens are protected from discrimination and are assisted in 
realizing their full potential. In turn, citizens have a moral responsibility to 
contribute to the ‘common good’, which includes public services as well as 
welfare programs for the less fortunate. In this first section, I outline several 
markers of progressive discourse in the tweets of the 2017 presidential 
candidates.  
Throughout the corpus, Socialist nominee Benoît Hamon portrays 
himself as an advocate for public sector workers (les fonctionnaires) and 
marginalized groups such as the handicapped (les personnes handicapées, les 
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personnes atteintes d’autisme). Hamon emphasizes that everyone deserves to 
be treated with dignity and respect, and castigates his conservative rival 
François Fillon for what he perceives to be an utter lack of empathy:   
(1) Quand on prétend devenir chef de l’État, les serviteurs de l’État, 
infirmières, policiers, enseignants, on les respecte M. Fillon! [BH, E2] 
 
(2) À F. Fillon qui fait de l'autisme une insulte, je veux lui dire que les 
personnes atteintes d'autisme ne mentent pas ne trichent pas, elles! 
[BH, E2] 
Hamon chooses to cite infirmières (‘nurses’) and enseignants (‘teachers’) as 
examples of public sector workers. Both occupations have a deeply affective 
appeal as they assist some of the most vulnerable members of society: children 
and the sick. As such, they embody the nurturing role of the government.  
(3) Nommez-les, ces fonctionnaires: ce sont des infirmières, des 
enseignants. [BH, E2] 
Dignity is a concept he mentions on multiple occasions. With respect to 
Fillongate, the term is negatively associated with François Fillon, who lacks 
the dignity expected from a presidential candidate. Hamon thus accuses him 
of indignité in a performative verbal act:  
(4)  J’accuse François Fillon d’indignité, ce candidat n'est pas digne de 
cette élection. [BH, E2] 
In his reaction tweets to the Champs Elysées attack, Hamon barely mentions 
the attack itself. Instead, he focuses on expressing his empathy for the victim, 
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Captain Xavier Jugelé. While the condolences extended by the other 
candidates are more or less vague, Hamon humanizes the victim by referring 
to him by name and not just by his function. He is also the only candidate to 
specifically mention the victim’s life partner (son compagnon) and to go beyond 
the umbrella terms famille and proches.  
(5) Mes hommages au capitaine Xavier Jugelé. Mes pensées vont vers les 
siens, notamment son compagnon qui a eu des mots si forts et si 
justes. [BH, E3] 
Hamon is, above all, a Senser. His tweets contain a majority of mental 
processes (24.5%). In terms of self-reference, he represents himself as a Senser 
(i.e., as the one who experiences the mental process) more than in any other 
role (55.6%).  
(6) a. Cognitive: Je considère qu’il n’y a pas de gauches irréconciliables. 
[BH, E1] 
b. Desiderative: Je la veux tout entière tournée vers justice et progrès 
social. [BH, E1] 
c. Emotive: J’aime la fonction publique ! [BH, E2] 
Transformative social change (transformation de la société) is another 
recurrent theme in Hamon’s tweets. Hamon uses the future tense very 
sparingly, which goes against most preconceived ideas about progressivism21. 
The concept of ‘future’ is mostly realized by various nominal forms (futur, 
                                                 
21 Due to the small sample size, however, we should not infer any general conclusion. 
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avenir, progrès, etc.) and occasionally by adjuncts (désormais). For instance, he 
frames Hollande’s announcement as an opportunity for reinvention rather 
than as a failure: 
(7)  Le choix du PR de ne pas se représenter à la présidentielle nous permet 
de nous tourner vers l’avenir #Hamon2017 [BH, E1] 
Overall, Hamon portrays himself as a progressive socialist (Chaigne, 2017) 
who focuses on protecting the public sector and on making sure that the most 
vulnerable have access to a reliable support system.  
As much as he rejects partisan politics, Macron embraces the 
progressiste label. His tweets mention progressistes and conservateurs on 
several occasions, yet there is no definition or qualification attached to either 
term: 
(8) Les vraies divisions ne sont plus entre les partis, elles sont entre les 
progressistes et les conservateurs. [EM, E1] 
 
(9) Les progressistes de droite et du centre ont vocation à nous rejoindre. 
[EM, E1] 
In other words, Macron presents complex ideologies as “common-sense 
assumptions” (Fairclough, 1995, p.107) not requiring definition. The same 
strategy is applied to overused concepts such as progrès and liberté, which are 
nearly meaningless unless defined and/or placed within a specific context 
(Alduy, 2017): 
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(10) Il faut réconcilier le progrès et la liberté. [EM, E1] 
These presuppositions have the effect of emptying words from their meaning: 
even though Macron proclaims to be a progressiste, we do not know what it 
entails.  
In his declaration, Hollande distinguishes his ‘president persona’ 
(comme président de la République) from his ‘partisan persona’ (comme 
socialiste). In other words, he underlines the fact that he is a progressive but 
that his role as the head of the nation surpasses partisan biases:  
(11) Comme président de la République je me dois de diriger l'État. 
Comme socialiste, je ne peux me résoudre à la dispersion de la gauche. 
[FH, E1] 
Hollande mentions some of the core values of progressivism, such as defending 
the common good in (12), fighting for equality and civil rights in (13) and 
advancing individual freedoms in (14): 
(12) Je ne suis animé que par l'intérêt supérieur du pays. [FH, E1] 
(13) L'égalité entre les couples a été renforcée. [FH, E1] 
(14) J'ai fait avancer les libertés. [FH, E1] 
Yet, quite a few items in Hollande’s list of accomplishments are described as 
maintaining the ‘status quo’: the emphasis is placed on maintaining and 
reinforcing (renforcée, conforté, maintenue, continuer à) rather than on 
transforming:  
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(15) J'ai voulu que soit maintenue la cohésion nationale. [FH, E1] 
(16) J'ai voulu que notre modèle social soit conforté et élargi. [FH, E1] 
These actions are further mitigated by the modal assessment j’ai voulu (‘I 
wanted’) which frames them as wishes rather than as concrete successes. As a 
result, Hollande appears to describe his tenure as an attempt at damage 
control rather than as a transformative presidency.  
Hamon, Hollande and Macron all make numerous references to unity 
and cohesiveness. In electoral contexts, however, these tend to be empty 
‘buzzwords’ exploited across the political spectrum (Alduy, 2017). After all, 
presidential hopefuls all share the same goal: broadening their electorate in 
order to attract as many voters as possible. Hamon distinguishes himself, 
however, by focalizing on the unity of the Left and of the Socialist Party:  
(17) Il faut désormais une gauche totale, qui veut à la fois gouverner et 
transformer, pour défendre le #ProgrèsSocial [BH, E1] 
 
(18) Ce qui m'intéresse c'est de défendre une gauche totale, de 
transformation de la société, pas les petits calculs des autres. [BH, E1] 
Although he values empathy and equality, Hamon’s discourse is also the most 
partisan at a time when the majority of the French electorate felt alienated 
from the Socialist Party.  
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Conservative discourse 
In contrast to progressivism, conservative ideology centers on issues of 
authority and control. As such, conservatives typically believe that morality 
comes from obeying legitimate moral authorities (God, the law, parents, etc.) 
but that we are ultimately responsible for our own destiny. With enough self-
discipline, everyone can pull themselves by the bootstraps. Self-discipline is 
rewarded by the principles of the free market whereas the government poses a 
threat to liberty with excessive regulations and a welfare system that rewards 
laziness (Lakoff, 2005). This worldview is realized mainly in the tweets of 
François Fillon and of Marine Le Pen. 
Fillon portrays himself as a strong believer in the bootstraps principle. 
Indeed, he presents courage and action (action courageuse) as two core 
ingredients to success: 
(19) Nous bâtirons sur la vérité sans laquelle il n'y a pas de confiance, et 
l'action courageuse seule en mesure d'obtenir des résultats. [FF, E1] 
 
(20) Plus que jamais, l'alternance et le redressement de la France doivent 
être bâtis sur des bases solides. [FF, E1] 
In examples (19) and (20), Fillon uses a building metaphor which draws from 
the semantic field of masonry (bâtirons, redressement, bâtis, bases, solides). For 
Machin & Mayr (2012), building metaphors are particularly persuasive as they 
can be used “to give a sense of commitment through abstraction rather than 
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concrete details” (Machin & Mayr, 2012, p.168). The verb bâtir (‘build’) evokes 
hard work and tenacity. Fillon does not plan on building from scratch: the 
structure must rest on solid groundwork (bases solides), i.e., on existing moral 
and historical foundations. The act of building is portrayed as a collective act 
(nous) and the future tense conveys a sense of progress and commitment. 
However, the intransitive structure obscures the nature and the aim of this 
building enterprise.  
Moreover, Fillon highlights tradition and heritage by quoting historical 
figures, such as De Gaulle in (21): 
(21) De Gaulle disait : "La vague ne détruit pas le granit…" 
Je suis toujours là, debout, avec vous, pour vous et pour la France. [FF, 
E1] 
By comparing himself to De Gaulle, Fillon anchors himself in la Grande 
Histoire and evokes a heroic destiny (Duhamel, 2016).  
Fillon and Le Pen both share a concern for discipline and a romanticized 
perception of the past. They are ‘strict fathers’ who comes home after his 
unruly child (France) was left with a permissive and irresponsible parent (the 
government). As such, they express the same desire to restore order (arracher 
au désordre) within the country left in shambles (pagaille, deliquescence): 
(22) Ce quinquennat s'achève dans la pagaille politique et la déliquescence 
du pouvoir. [FF, E1] 
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(23) Je veux arracher le pays au désordre dans lequel l'UMP et le PS l'ont 
plongé. [MLP, E1] 
The NATION IS FAMILY metaphor is omnipresent in Le Pen’s tweets. In (24), she 
calls for French citizens to unite like the members of a same family: 
(24) J’appelle tous les Français à l’unité, une unité profonde comme celle qui 
unit les membres d’une même famille dans l’épreuve. [MLP, E3] 
But because the government itself lacks authority and moral strength (25), it 
is unable to protect the citizens from harm (26): 
(25) Nos prétendus gouvernants, insuffisants et pusillanimes, sont dénués 
de toute autorité et de toute force morale. [MLP, E3] 
 
(26) Le gouvernement est défaillant face au terrorisme. Nos enfants ne sont 
pas protégés dans notre pays ! [MLP, E3] 
 
Finally, she demands action with a variety of verbal processes (appeler à, 
ordonner, demander) and reprimands: 
(27) À ce gouvernement éphémère, usé par l’inaction, je demande 
d’ordonner la restauration immédiate de nos frontières nationales. 
[MLP, E3] 
 
(28) C'est fini le laxisme, c'est fini la naïveté ! [MLP, E3] 
Le Pen thus tries to establish herself as the authoritative voice in a country 
which she sees as currently lacking legitimate figures of authority.  
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Nationalist discourse  
In recent years, France has been the target of several terror attacks 
orchestrated by Islamic extremists, including the 2015 Charlie Hebdo 
shooting, the November 2015 Paris attacks and the 2016 Bastille Day truck 
attack. The April 2017 Champs Elysées attack, which resulted in the death of 
a police officer, occurred three days before the first round of the presidential 
election and led Hollande to declare a state of emergency. These attacks have 
not only contributed to the rise of the Front National as a main political actor, 
but have also played an important role in the increase of nationalist and anti-
immigration sentiment in France (Duhamel, 2016; Alduy, 2017). Moreover, 
political malaise and economic precarity, most notably persistently high levels 
of unemployment, have widened the FN electorate outside its traditional bases 
of influence and have elevated the issue of immigration to the top of the French 
political agenda (Duhamel, 2016; Chaigne, 2017). 
French nationalist discourse encompasses discours frontiste (i.e., the 
discourse of the Front National) and more recently, discours identitaire22 
(‘identitarian discourse’). Van Leeuwen (1996) describes anti-immigration 
discourse as follows: 
                                                 
22 In France, the main identitarian movement is Génération Identitaire, a far-right, white 
supremacist youth movement established in 2012. The movement has since expanded to 
other countries, including the United States under the name Generation Europa.  
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[A] discourse which represents immigration in a way that is founded on 
fear—the fear of loss of livelihood and the fear of loss of cultural identity 
as a result of the ‘influx’ of immigrants who are perceived as ‘other’, 
‘different’ and ‘threatening’. (van Leeuwen, 1996, p.32).  
In the #ChampsElysées dataset, Le Pen exploits the attack to stroke the fire 
on fear-driven islamophobia in a country already traumatized by multiple 
terror attacks.  She uses different formulas to hammer the same talking point: 
attacks from blood-thirsty Islamists are a constant threat that warrants closed 
borders and mass deportation: 
(29) Notre pays a vécu une nouvelle fois la barbarie d’une attaque terroriste 
en plein cœur de notre capitale. [MLP, E3] 
 
(30) Face au terrorisme, il faut retrouver nos frontières nationales, expulser 
les étrangers fichés S pour islamisme ! [MLP, E3] 
Since 2015, a series of deadly terror attacks have triggered a virage sécuritaire 
in French political discourse (Alduy, 2017; Chaigne, 2017). According to Buzan 
et al. (1998), security discourse relies on a sense of acute threat in order to 
‘dramatize’ an issue and to present it as an issue of supreme priority. This 
allows the speaker to claim a legitimate need to address the issue with 
extraordinary measures for the sake of national security. In example (31), for 
instance, Le Pen calls for the immediate closing of France’s borders: 
(31) Je demande d’ordonner la restauration immédiate de nos 
frontières nationales. [MLP, E3] 
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Nationalist discourse uses fearmongering to promote ethnic and religious 
intolerance. Specifically, nationalists attempt to rationalize their intolerance 
by claiming that their anti-immigration stance is solely related to a perceived 
security threat rather than ethnicity or religion. Patrick Teo (2000) refers to 
this strategy as ‘new racism’: 
The people who practice the ‘new racism’ believe in and uphold the basic 
values of egalitarianism, and would thus emphatically deny that they 
are ‘racist’. Nevertheless, they would speak and act in such a way that 
distances them from the ethnic minority, engaging in discursive 
strategies that blame the victims for their circumstances on their own 
social, economic and even cultural disadvantages (Teo, 2000, p.2). 
The aim of fearmongering is to provoke a ‘moral panic’, i.e., an episode which 
makes society worry that the values and principles it upholds may be in 
jeopardy. News coverage of moral panics is often disproportionate to the actual 
social problem (Machin & Mayr, 2012, pp.221-222). Lakoff argues that when a 
well-publicized tragedy occurs, repeated coverage activates its framing over 
and over, strengthening and amplifying particular frames over time. 
Fearmongering harnesses and exploits this potential. For instance, repeating 
examples of shootings or violent attacks by immigrants raises people’s fears 
that it will happen to them despite the miniscule probability (Lakoff, 2017). Le 
Pen uses a high proportion of modalized processes (recommencer, s’habituer) 
and of modal adjuncts of usuality (à nouveau, une nouvelle fois, une fois encore) 
to create a sense of urgency. Moreover, van Dijk (1991) argues that the far 
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right often dramatizes and negativizes ethnic events by intensifying the 
illocutionary force of utterances. Throughout the dataset, Le Pen uses vivid 
and violent imagery to drive her point home with multiple lexical items related 
to the fields of fear, war and death. Le Pen presents her hyperbolic descriptions 
as straightforward statements of fact. In other words, she sacrifices credibility 
in the interest of rhetorical impact:  
(32) J’en appelle au réveil de l’âme millénaire de notre peuple capable de 
s'opposer à une barbarie sanguinaire. [MLP, E3] 
A main feature of nationalist discourse is in-group favoritism coupled with out-
group derogation (van Dijk, 1991). Since its creation in 1972, the Front 
National has been running on the promise of in-group favoritism, which the 
party calls préférence nationale (‘national preference’). Van Dijk (1993) argues 
that aligning us alongside or against a group of people through referential 
choices is a form of ‘ideological squaring’. In European nationalist discourse, 
Muslims tend to be represented as threatening and as refusing to integrate in 
society (Wodak, 2015). This effectively frames the Muslim community as an 
out-group. The discursive construction of a ‘conflict frame’ between two 
opposing sides constitutes the ideological basis of security discourse (Buzan et 
al., 1998). In Le Pen’s tweets, this frame assumes the form of a Manichean 
opposition between Good and Evil, as she creates a radical contrast between 
the innocence of French children and the barbarism of Islamic terrorists. In 
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(33), for instance, she alleges that France is under a state of war, and that the 
war waged against ‘us’ seeks out ‘our’ subjugation, i.e., the destruction of the 
in-group. Moreover, the passive structure makes the ‘enemy’ appear faceless, 
ubiquitous and thus more frightening:  
(33) La guerre qui nous est menée est asymétrique, révolutionnaire, qui 
a pour objectif notre soumission à une idéologie totalitaire. [MLP, E3] 
In contrast, Le Pen referring to herself as une mère (‘a mother’) with three 
children has the opposite effect and humanizes her: 
(34)  Je suis une mère, j'ai 3 enfants, et je ne veux pas avoir la boule au 
ventre quand ils vont dehors. [MLP, E3] 
In (35), she invites the French people to resist foreign attacks by staying united 
as if they were part of the same big family – a family from which Islam is 
excluded:  
(35)  J’appelle tous les Français à l’unité, une unité profonde comme celle 
qui unit les membres d’une même famille dans l’épreuve. [MLP, E3] 
 
Finally, Le Pen relies on several metaphors that are commonplace in anti-
immigration discourse (van Dijk, 1991; Chilton & Ilyin, 1993). In particular, 
the war metaphor serves to create groundless or exaggerated alarm. In the 
corpus, this ‘war’ (guerre) is linked to totalitarianism and subjugation:  
(36)  La guerre qui nous est menée est asymétrique, révolutionnaire, qui 
a pour objectif notre soumission à une idéologie totalitaire. [MLP, 
E3] 
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Another metaphor which plays a crucial role in anti-immigration discourse is 
the container metaphor (Chilton, 2004). The primary function of the COUNTRIES 
ARE CONTAINERS metaphor is to delineate the boundaries between in-groups 
and out-groups. Indeed, countries are being compared to entities that can be 
either sealed or penetrated. As such, this metaphor is often used to disseminate 
value judgments, such as “what is inside is close to the self, and what is outside 
is also outside the law” (Chilton, 2004, p.118). In examples (37) and (38), 
protection from terrorism is anthologized in terms of France as a container 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1980):  
(37)  La lutte contre le terrorisme commence par retrouver nos frontières 
nationales. [MLP, E3] 
 
(38)  Face au terrorisme, il faut retrouver nos frontières nationales. 
[MLP,E3] 
 
In these examples, immigration is strategically replaced with terrorism. By 
suggesting that closing France’s borders is the solution to terrorism, Le Pen 
implies that immigrants are all potential terrorists, and that terrorism and 
immigration are intrinsically connected. Through the actions of extremists, she 
depicts those who practice Islam as potential murderers whose sole objective 
is to annihilate France's national identity.  
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The styles of anti-establishment politics 
In a climate of widespread public distrust, being an established 
politician no longer provides legitimacy in the eyes of the public. This section 
discusses two ‘styles of politics’ or ‘rhetorical frames’ which are often wrongly 
identified as ideologies: populism and centrism (cf. Table 6.2).  
 
The populist style The centrist style 
Othering, fear-mongering and 
lack of nuance through: 
- Relational and existential verb 
processes 
- Tactics that diminish or exclude 
the agent (passivation, 
nominalization, on, falloir) 
- Delineation between “us” and 
“them”  
- Collective and generic reference  
- Lack of evidential and hedging 
features 
- Lexical strings: family & unity, 
deception & betrayal, violence & 
fear 
Building consensus and avoiding 
cleavages through: 
• Verbal processes and 
performativity 
• Modality of inclination and 
desire  
• Collective and generic reference  
• Non-referential il and 
nominalization 
• Inclusive pronouns (nous, vous) 
• Presuppositions and common-
sense assumptions 
• Future simple and commitment 
• Lexical strings: unity & cohesion, 
future & progress, ethics  
Table 6.2: Summary of rhetorical styles. 
Even though they tend to be seen as irreconcilable stances, populism and 
centrism both rely on the same ‘anti-establishment’ appeal; Populist and 
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centrist candidates situate themselves outside of the left-right political 
spectrum and profess to offer an alternative to this traditional bipolar scheme. 
 
The populist style 
From Brexit to Donald Trump, recent years have touted the success of 
political outsiders across the western world. Even though the term ‘populism’ 
typically carries a pejorative connotation, two candidates in the 2017 French 
election happily embraced the label: Marine Le Pen and Jean-Luc Mélenchon. 
Le Pen and Mélenchon situate themselves on opposite sides of the political 
spectrum, yet their discourse shares striking similarities. If they are both 
‘populists’, should we infer that they share the same ideology? According to a 
growing number of political scientists, the characterization of ‘populism’ as an 
ideology is at the core of the issue. Indeed, unlike fully-fledged ideologies such 
as conservatism or progressivism, populism is not associated with a clear set 
of values or with well-articulated social and economic principles. In fact, it is 
more easily defined by what (or who) it stands against than by what it stands 
for (Barr, 2009). The defining feature of populism is that it depicts political 
reality as a moral struggle between the virtuous people and the corrupt elite. 
Populists claim that the elite currently in power has betrayed the people, and 
must be replaced by empathic leaders who will restore the people’s supremacy 
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in politics. As such, populism constitutes a dynamic ‘discourse strategy’ that 
can be exploited by either side of the political spectrum in order to challenge 
the status quo (Bonikowski, 2017, p.10). Moffitt and Tormey (2014) refer to 
populism as a ‘political style’ which they relate to the concepts of performance 
and impression management (Goffman, 1959). This perspective invites an 
approach to populism as a ‘discursive identity’ that politicians can wear or take 
off in order to fit their ideological motivations. As such, populism constructs a 
particular relationship between politicians and citizens, and can assist in 
sustaining ancillary ideologies: “like accent in speech, style (…) is a marker of 
identity and social differentiation” (Cameron, 1996, p.320).  
Populism is characterized by several rhetorical features. First, it always 
involves a binary moral classification (i.e., ‘us vs. them’). The identities of both 
‘the people’ and the ‘the other’ vary according to ancillary ideologies (Westlind, 
1996; Moffitt and Tormey, 2014). Right populism typically blames immigrants 
for the country’s problems while left populists project their wrath onto the rich 
(Bonikowski, 2017). In both instances, however, the political establishment, or 
système, is at fault. For example, Le Pen blames the Champs-Elysées attack 
on the government and on current immigration policies, which she labels as 
dangerously lax and naïve:  
(39) À ce gouvernement éphémère, usé par l’inaction, je demande 
d’ordonner la restauration immédiate de nos frontières nationales 
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[MLP, E3] 
 
(40) C'est fini le laxisme, c'est fini la naïveté ! [MLP, E3] 
Furthermore, Laclau (2005) argues that populism requires forming a common 
‘we’ which presupposes not only an equivalence between the politician and the 
people (‘us’) but also the existence of an imagined other (‘them’). Fairclough 
(2000) notes that the concept of ‘we’ is slippery, as it can be used by politicians 
to make vague statements and to conceal power relations. This is because ‘we’ 
often has an unclear referent, i.e., a referent that has not been clearly 
delineated. In political discourse, ‘we’ can mean the nation, the political party 
or another unspecified group. As such, it can be used strategically during 
political campaigns; when presidential candidates use ‘we’, it can imply that 
the entire country is behind them. Moreover, pronouns like ‘us’, ‘we’ and ‘them’ 
can be used to align the audience alongside or against particular ideas. 
Speakers can present their own ideas as being ‘our’ ideas and thus create out-
groups (‘them’) who are in opposition with those shared ideas.  
Mélenchon’s use of subject pronouns reflects a two-fold strategy. First, he 
builds his outsider persona by distancing himself from the collective Socialist 
Party. He is an independent je who is situated outside of the system: 
(41) Je ne suis pas membre du #PS. Je l'ai quitté, ce n'est pas pour y 
retourner. [JLM, E1] 
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 Once this goal is achieved, Mélénchon becomes one with the French people 
through a populist nous which stands in opposition to the political 
establishment. By the time of the Champs-Elysées attack, the collective nous 
has completely replaced the individual je in Mélenchon’s tweets. Mélenchon 
unifies ‘the people’ by remaining vague about who specifically makes up this 
community (Westlind, 1996). Yet, he talks in the name of ‘the people’ and he 
describes their emotions and their needs. In example (42), for instance, nous is 
the Sayer in the verbal process adressons:  
(42) Nous adressons une pensée émue à la famille du policier décédé et aux 
familles des policiers blessés. [JLM, E3] 
This is symbolical of Mélenchon becoming one ‘voice’ with his supporters, les 
Insoumis – he no longer positions himself as a leader but as a spokesperson. 
This claim of equivalency (Fairclough, 2000) with the people assists politicians 
in building the ‘us vs. them’ discursive trope of populism (Barr, 2009).  
Le Pen uses relatively few personal pronouns, although she sets up the 
‘us vs. them’ dichotomy in the first event when she opposes herself and her 
supporters (‘nous’) to the left and right blocks. She does not differentiate 
between the two mainstream parties – implying that they embody the same 
toxic establishment and are just as destructive:  
(43) Je veux arracher le pays au désordre dans lequel l'UMP et le PS l'ont 
plongé. [MLP, E1]  
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Furthermore, Le Pen is possessive of France: notre pays, notre jeunesse, nos 
enfants, nos policiers – the country is a cherished possession that must be 
protected from outsiders who want to steal it. Fundamentally, Le Pen is using 
presuppositions to construct a homogeneous group of people who share her 
ideas and beliefs. Indeed, she talks about ‘the people’ in the same terms she 
uses to describe France: 
(44) La France n’est pas visée pour ce qu’elle fait mais pour ce qu’elle est. 
[MLP, E3] 
In this metonymical description, France refers to a distinct identity (ce qu’elle 
est) and is represented as the victim (visée) of permissive immigration policies. 
In order to strengthen the common ‘we’, populism relies on the negative 
representation of the Other. Because of its simplistic, unidimensional message, 
populist rhetoric is indeed fundamentally based on denunciation. Both Le Pen 
and Mélenchon engage in ad hominem attacks. Throughout the corpus, they 
criticize a variety of groups (le gouvernement, la gauche, la droite, les 
milliardaires, les immigrés, etc.) and individuals (Hollande, Fillon, Macron, 
etc.). These actors are labelled pejoratively to minimize their power (faiblesse, 
échec): 
(45) Pourquoi il y a des primaires à droite et à gauche ? Parce qu'ils n'ont 
pas de leader. C'est une preuve de faiblesse. [MLP, E1] 
 
(46) La déclaration de @fhollande est un énorme aveu d'échec. [JLM, E1] 
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Instead of discussing the moral implications of Fillongate, Mélenchon chooses 
to ridicule Fillon and to emphasize the fact that he has become a laughingstock, 
and that people start roaring in laughter at the sole mention of his name.   
(47) C'est terrible ! On ne peut plus parler de #Fillon sans que tout le 
monde rigole ! [JLM, E2] 
While they constantly attack the status quo, populists rarely offer alternatives 
besides a few radical yet simplistic ideas such as closing the borders or 
overturning the 5th Republic. Accordingly, the populist is not an Actor but a 
harsh commentator who focuses on describing the chaotic state of affairs 
through relational and existential processes. This judgmental attitude is also 
reflected in the polarity of verbal processes. Compared to other candidates, 
Mélenchon uses more than twice as many negative predicates. He adopts a 
corrective posture and portrays himself as a truth-teller who exposes and 
corrects the lies of the establishment and of the media: 
(48) La primaire du #PS n'est pas une primaire : c'est un congrès. Il n'y a là 
que des gens du #PS. [JLM, E1] 
Several of Mélenchon’s tweets have a distinct conspiratorial bent. Conspiracy 
theories usually posit the existence of secretive coalitions of individuals and 
speculate on their activities. As such, they often serve the needs of populist 
candidates, who blame elites for a variety of issues and suggest that popular 
action can remove them from positions of power.  In (49) and (50), Mélenchon 
222 
 
positions himself as having privileged access to secret knowledge that 
contradicts the official account presented by the political establishment 
(Barkun, 2016). In (49), he evokes an ‘enemy within’ (ses propres amis) who 
lurks inside the Socialist Party. In contrast, example (50) hints at an ‘enemy 
above’ (on) manipulating the election for their own gain (Walker, 2013).  
(49) .@fhollande n'a pas renoncé à l'élection présidentielle : il en a été éjecté 
par ses propres amis. [JLM, E1] 
 
(50) Vous n'êtes pas fatigués qu'on vous arrange l'élection d'avance ? 
D'abord c'était #Juppé, après #Fillon, maintenant #Macron... [JLM, E2] 
In conclusion, populists exploit and even amplify the public’s anger with a 
variety of fearmongering techniques but fail to offer any viable solutions. 
Bourdieu (1991) argue that the power of speech is only created through “the 
belief in the legitimacy of the words and of those who utter them” (Bourdieu, 
1991, p. 170). Therefore, it is Bourdieu’s contention that the audience to 
discursive acts, such as audiences of political speeches, give those discursive 
acts power through the audiences’ legitimation of what is said and by whom. 
This speaks to Le Pen and Mélenchon’s power to construct themselves as 
outsiders, despite their pasts suggesting otherwise. This power to create 
reality comes from the relationship they have established with their electorate, 
i.e. “the relation between those who exercise power and those who submit to 
it” (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 166). The discontent felt by supporters of anti-
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establishment politicians stems from disparity between those who hold no 
power and those who do, which explains the ‘us versus them’ rhetoric (Barr, 
2009).  
The centrist style  
In contemporary politics, centrism is a ‘catch-all’ term that lacks a clear 
or defined meaning. Pundits often talk about ‘centrists’, ‘moderates’ or ‘the 
center’ as an ideological alternative to progressivism or conservativism. Yet, 
the widespread conceptualization of centrism as an ideology is misleading. 
Indeed, Lakoff (2011) argues that there is no such thing as an ideology of the 
‘center’, and relates the concept of centrism to his theory of ‘biconceptualism’. 
Lakoff posits that most people are ‘biconceptuals’, meaning that they apply 
conservative and progressive worldviews to different areas of their lives 
(Lakoff, 2005, 2011). For instance, someone may be socially progressive but 
fiscally conservative. Yet, Lakoff emphasizes that these frames are mutually 
exclusive in the sense that they cannot be activated at the same time. While we 
may apply different worldviews to different contexts, we cannot approach the 
same issue from both perspectives at once. Učeň (2004) suggests that, like 
populism, centrism is not an ideology but a rhetorical frame that politicians 
can use strategically for electoral gain. Indeed, centrist candidates and parties 
capitalize on the electorate’s dissatisfaction with mainstream politics by 
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claiming to offer an alternative that can overturn the political status quo. 
Unlike populism, centrism does not incline towards extremist policies. 
Nonetheless, it is ‘a populist strategy’ in the sense that it is built upon an anti-
establishment appeal. Učeň refers to this phenomenon as ‘centrist populism’. 
Centrist candidates seek to distance themselves from mainstream politics by 
offering a ‘third-way strategy’ that does not align with either side of the 
political spectrum (Učeň, 2004).  
In France, centrist politicians and parties have enjoyed relative success 
in local and regional elections. Macron, however, was the first self-proclaimed 
centrist to reach the second round of a presidential election. Throughout the 
2017 campaign, Macron carefully cultivated his image as a political outsider, 
in spite of some critics accusing him of being more integrated with the 
‘establishment’ than he claimed. At first glance, it may seem counter-intuitive 
to think of Macron as an anti-establishment candidate. Indeed, the young 
politician appears to embody everything that populists despite. As a graduate 
of the École Nationale d’Administration (ENA) who then became a Rothschild 
investment banker, Macron has long been part of France’s political, cultural 
and economic elite. Yet, he successfully reinvented himself as an outsider. His 
movement En Marche!, which was launched just months before the election, 
could be described as an ‘anti-party’ or even as a ‘non-party’; It is ni de droite, 
ni de gauche (‘neither left nor right’). Taking advantage of the anti-
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establishment political climate, Macron claimed to be a reformer not relying 
on traditional party structures. By doing so, he broke the traditional left-right 
bipolar scheme. In the following section, I explore several aspects of Macron’s 
discourse that reflect his non-confrontational approach to politics.  
From the outset, Macron has presented his movement, En Marche!, as 
ideologically amorphous, i.e., as situated outside of the traditional left-right 
axis. As such, Macron’s discourse is fundamentally inclusive and seeks to 
prevent political cleavages. First, Macron privileges generic over specific 
referential choices (van Leeuwen, 1996). For instance, he uses the inclusive 
term les Françaises et les Français in an effort to explicitly include women: 
(51)   Je veux rassembler les Françaises et les Français. [EM, E1] 
Likewise, he refrains from using traditional party labels and frames the 
political landscape in terms of progressistes and conservateurs: 
(52) Les vraies divisions ne sont plus entre les partis, elles sont entre les 
progressistes et les conservateurs. [EM, E2] 
In contrast to Le Pen and Mélenchon who happily engage in ad hominem 
attacks, Macron avoids any direct mention of individual actors. While he does 
state that Fillon has un problème avec la vérité (‘a problem with truth’), his 
reaction tweets to #FillonGate consist of impersonal, vague statements. For 
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instance, he calls for ‘pluralism’ and for the ‘moralization’ of political life, but 
he does not specify what either concept entails: 
(53)  Il faut remettre du pluralisme et de la moralisation dans la vie 
publique. [EM, E2] 
In the example above, Macron also uses the impersonal modal verb falloir, 
which is used with a non-referential il pronoun. Here, falloir enables Macron 
to talk about what ‘must be done’ without positioning himself as an active 
participant in the process.  
Throughout the corpus, Macron uses ‘catch-all’ lexis as he mentions 
abstract concepts (progrès, liberté, vérité, éthique, unité) with vague qualifiers 
(difficile, facile, bel, grand). By leaving his statements open to interpretation, 
Macron avoids the risk of disagreement. Moreover, his frequent use of the 
future tense gives the illusion of involvement and commitment, yet the 
processes themselves are described in abstract, non-specific terms. In the 
following example, Macron uses the nominalization une action as he claims 
that “a rigorous action will be engaged against terrorism”. But ironically, the 
sentence itself lacks any conscious participants: 
(54)  Une action vigoureuse sera engagée pour lutter contre la 
radicalisation islamiste. [EM, E3] 
 
In the process of nominalization, human agency has been removed. In (41), 
action is not a process but a passive participant (namely, a Carrier in an 
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attributive relational process). In example (55), Macron once again uses the 
word action, this time as part of a nominal group enhanced by a relative clause 
(‘the action that I want to understake’). While Macron is included in the 
representation, the modal assessment je veux places action militaire in the 
realm of wishes rather than of concrete actions:   
(55)  L'action militaire que je veux conduire aura pour priorité votre 
sécurité. [EM, E3] 
 
In other words, the future tense (aura pour priorité) allows Macron to feign 
active commitment while avoiding having to inject any substance into his 
words. It is a « performative discourse » filled with (empty) promises. 
Moreover, Macron makes up for this lack of substance by filling his 
discourse with emotive appeals. Indeed, he adopts a resolutely positive tone as 
he constantly panders to the French electorate. Even in the face of terrorism, 
Macron mitigates the negativity by reminding the people that they have a 
great future ahead of them: 
(56) L’ombre sur cette fin de campagne n’enlève rien au fait que nous 
devons construire notre avenir, et que nous avons un grand avenir. [EM, 
E3] 
 
In sum, Macron’s abstract, non-confrontational discourse is a unifying 
strategy which borrows from the discursive trope of populism. Despite the 
striking lack of substance in his words, the concept of ‘the third way’ (Učeň, 
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2004) is vague enough to allow Macron to distinguish himself from other 
parties while getting away with not subscribing to any concrete policies or 
principles. In a broader sense, Macron’s anti-establishment style could be seen 
as a case of ‘soft populism’ posing as a remedy to the hard populism of his 
competitors. Time will tell whether he is merely a conservative with a new 
book cover.   
 
Twitter and ‘sound-bite’ politics   
Social media and the marketization of political discourse 
As Web 2.0 technology started to infiltrate the domain of politics, the 
question arose of whether it would change politics and, if so, how (Vergeer, 
2015). One dominant perspective was that Twitter could potentially change 
political power distribution, meaning that smaller political parties would be 
able to attract more voters and to achieve greater electoral gain thanks to 
digital campaigning. Indeed, the rise of digital campaigning heralded the 
ability to circumvent traditional media in favor of non-hierarchical and 
participatory forms of communication. Schweitzer (2012) argues that the 
participatory web could enable political actors “to free themselves from the 
discretionary power of the mass media and to reach voters in an unfiltered 
way” (Schweitzer, 2012, p.283). In other words, Twitter could break the 
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dominant media logic of the old campaigning style and thus open the way for 
politicians to overcome the deeply rooted disaffection of voters towards 
mainstream politics. Donald Trump in the United States and Pablo Iglesias’ 
Podemos in Spain are two notable examples of successful social media 
campaigns. The Trump campaign, for instance, opted for a campaign style 
which relied on framing the traditional media as elitist, biased and dishonest, 
and harnessed the affordances of social media in order to attract voters who 
had lost faith in the political system (Oates & Moe, 2017; Gross & Johnson, 
2016). Wodak (2015) argues that social media has facilitated the intrusion of 
market logic into the sphere of politics: 
We are witnessing the development of a ‘media-democracy’ across 
Europe and beyond, in which the individual, media-savvy performance 
of politics seems to become more important than the political process. 
(Wodak, 2015, p.11).  
Specifically, the design of social media platforms is inviting users to equate 
visibility with legitimacy by promoting the most visible and impactful content 
at the expense of factuality. KhosraviNik (2018) argues that Trump’s 
performance is a prime example of “the central logic of corporatized 
participatory web” (p.438) which has created a fertile ground for populist 
politics. Populism is the realm of charismatic performers who make colorful 
claims for the people’s sovereignty against the corrupt elites. Incidentally, the 
empowerment of ordinary citizens is one of the core appeals of social media 
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platforms. Twitter not only feeds into an equation of popularity as legitimacy 
but also acts as a challenge to the perceived monolithic nature of traditional 
media (Marwick, 2011, 2013). Bartlett (2014) states that: 
Social media is in many ways the ideal medium for populist parties. It 
is distributed, non-hierarchical and democratic. It is an alternative to 
the mainstream media, which many supporters of populist parties 
strongly distrust. It is therefore not controlled by the elites: the content 
is generated by us – the honest, hard-working, ordinary citizens – 
exactly those people who the populists are defending. Indeed, populist 
parties are far less likely to trust mainstream media sources than the 
typical citizen. (Bartlett, 2014, p. 106) 
In sum, the language of advertising has colonized the domain of politics. In 
recent elections, candidates have become salesmen who sell their platforms as 
products to voters-consumers. 
 
A platform tailored for populist appeals 
Beyond the participatory aspect of the network, Twitter enabled the 
emergence of a genre of discourse that is tailored for populist appeals. Longhi 
(2013) argues that political tweets are characterized by two discursive 
phenomena: semantic condensation and decontextualization. Twitter, unlike 
other social networks, imposes a strict character limit. The 2017 presidential 
candidates had to adhere to a 140-character constraint, which required them 
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to choose their words carefully in order to communicate information as 
concisely as possible. In this process of ‘semantic condensation’, content that is 
deemed superfluous is omitted, such as hedges and evidential markers. 
(Longhi, 2013). As a result, political tweets often lack nuance. On the other 
hand, this brevity lends itself to petites phrases (‘sound bites’), which refer to 
short, quotable phrases or sentences meant to capture the essence of 
utterances (Krieg-Planque, 2011). In recent decades, politicians have learned 
to talk in sound bites to fit the changing nature of television shows and radio 
news. To make it past journalistic gatekeepers, they have indeed been steered 
into expressing their ideas in a concise yet compelling manner (Fairclough, 
1993; Negrine, 2008). This mediated approach has in turn affected the nature 
and the quality of politics, raising the concern that electoral campaigns are 
being turned into popularity contests at the expense of policy platforms. 
Because concision constrains speech within prescribed parameters, it limits 
broader discussions of ideologically charged issues. These parameters also test 
the ability of politicians to project catchy snippets onto their audiences, and 
prioritize style over content (Schweitzer, 2012). We can relate this 
phenomenon to the marketization of politics, which refers to the progressive 
colonization of political discourse by the discourse of advertising (Fairclough, 
1993). One of the features of marketization is the use of vivid images packed 
into short messages for impact. A majority of the tweets analyzed in this study 
232 
 
take the form of self-promoting statements and of attacks on the government 
or other politicians. Actual discussion of political issues is much scarcer, as 
140-character tweets do not allow for much elaboration.  
Moreover, most tweets are decontextualized quotes extracted from 
interviews and from campaign rallies. Quotes are chosen strategically and 
fashioned into impactful sound bites. Through this process of 
‘decontextualization’, the original context of production is overshadowed 
(Longhi, 2013), which carries the risk of oversimplifying or misrepresenting 
aspects of events. Hollande’s announcement is a case in point. The former 
president made the decision not to seek a second term amidst extremely poor 
approval ratings that hinted a low chance of reelection. After stating that his 
retiring at the end of his mandate is in ‘the best interest of the country’, 
Hollande lists a series of accomplishments which appear to frame his 
presidency as highly successful. Given the context, this self-praise creates 
cognitive dissonance. When we look at the transcript of the press conference, 
however, we realize that his original speech was much more nuanced and that 
most of the modal and affective content was stripped off in the process of 
transposing the speech onto Twitter. A side-by-side comparison of two tweets 
and of the corresponding sections of the speech is shown below: 
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Tweet: Je porte un bilan et j'en assure (sic) toute la responsabilité. 
Speech: Voilà ce que j’assume devant vous en revendiquant les avancées, en 
reconnaissant les retards et même en admettant certaines erreurs parce que je 
porte un bilan et j’en assume toute la responsabilité. 
 
Tweet: Les résultats arrivent. 
Speech: Les résultats arrivent plus tard que je ne les avais annoncés, j’en 
conviens, mais ils sont là : l’investissement, la consommation, la construction 
repartent et depuis le début de l’année, le chômage enfin diminue mais il reste 
à un niveau trop élevé et je mesure ce que cette situation peut avoir 
d’insupportable pour nos concitoyens qui vivent dans la précarité. 
 
Hollande appears delusional as a result of his digital alter ego cherry-picking 
the positive in his speech and avoiding the mention of any shortcomings. 
Nuance and affective content were mislabeled as superfluous when they were 
in fact an essential part of his speech. This suggests that Hollande’s Twitter 
announcement is a failed attempt at medium transposition. On the other hand, 
concision can benefit populist candidates as it enables them to share 
unidimensional messages without the need to elaborate. Indeed, populism is 
fundamentally reductive: it rejects nuance in favor of moral outrage 
(Bonikowski, 2017). Twitter allows Le Pen to make sweeping generalizations 
or dubious claims and frame them as undisputed truths.  Moreover, the 
asynchronous nature of the network removes the pressure of having to deal 
with pesky counter-arguments.  
While populism is not a new phenomenon, it has gained considerable 
momentum over recent years (Wodak, 2015). Widespread dissatisfaction with 
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mainstream politics has certainly exacerbated the appeal of populist politics 
(Cevipof, 2017). However, we should not underestimate the role of digital 
platforms and their ability to amplify the performance of populism. Indeed, 
populist politicians have quickly learned to leverage the communicative 
affordances of new media in order to increase their visibility and broaden their 
electoral appeal (Bartlett, 2014). Unlike traditional mass media, the lack of 
external gatekeepers allows them to use Twitter as an unfettered signaling 
device. Most importantly, the influence of Twitter reaches far beyond its active 
users. In the age of Trump, Twitter has become a cross-over medium that links 
social and traditional media (Gross & Johnson, 2016). Because they are 
required to be concise, tweets are formatted for wide distribution not only 
online but also through other media, and they routinely get inserted into news 
cycles. As such, Twitter is “a sound-bite medium for the sound-bite media age” 
(Gross & Johnson, 2016, p.749). 
 
Conclusion 
Revisiting the Research Questions 
Through this dissertation, I have provided a critical discourse analysis 
of political tweets in the context of the 2017 French presidential election. My 
analysis focused on demonstrating a) how the 2017 candidates framed a 
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variety of events through particular patterns of linguistic choice, b) how the 
discursive strategies involved in this framing process relate to particular 
ideological discourses and rhetorical styles, and c) how campaign tweets form 
a unique genre of discourse that plays a pivotal role in the dissemination and 
amplification of political discourse. To this end, this study approached electoral 
campaigning on Twitter as a dynamic social practice with an emerging order 
of discourse (Fairclough, 2003). In our modern information society, social 
processes, developments and changes are all reflected in discourse. As such, 
discourse plays a pivotal role in the production, legitimation and reproduction 
of ideologically-based dominance and inequality (Fairclough, 1992; van Dijk, 
1998). Indeed, texts do not passively report upon the world; They imbue it with 
meaning and shape our perspectives. For Halliday, “a text is a sociological 
event, a semiotic encounter through which the meanings that constitute the 
social system are exchanged” (Halliday, 1978, p.139). In other words, language 
is a form of socialization, enabling individuals to perform meaningful actions 
within ‘contexts of situation’. 
The participatory web has changed how politicians conduct electoral 
campaigns and how private citizens are exposed to political information. The 
growing presence of social media in the political domain has led researchers to 
question whether it could narrow the proverbial gap between citizens and 
politicians (Parmelee & Bichard, 2012). This remains highly questionable. 
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Indeed, research has shown that politicians use Twitter mostly for self-
promotion (Page, 2012), which was confirmed in this study. Politicians can 
project a semblance of proximity with second-person pronouns, informal 
language, and personal anecdotes and stories (Enli & Skogerbø, 2013). 
However, there is little evidence that this “synthetic personalization” 
(Fairclough, 1995) is more than a clever marketing strategy. Twitter is a tool 
in a larger arsenal of resources that politicians use to disseminate their ideas 
and to shape public opinion in their favor. Yet, the affordance of on-going 
communication is an invaluable add-on to this toolkit. As noted by Le Bart 
(1998), political actors constantly seek to affirm the noble motivations behind 
their involvement in politics. The strategic dimension of these pretenses finds 
its manifestation in the process of ‘self-representation’ in which they engage 
(Le Bart, 1998, p. 79).  Twitter enables political actors to ‘personalize’ their 
discourse and to create a false impression of proximity with their followers 
(Parmelee & Bichard, 2012). In this context, we saw that Twitter is tailored for 
populist and affective appeals. Given the concision of tweets, politicians make 
strategic decisions about which elements to use to evoke their discourse. The 
microblogging format enables politicians to communicate mostly in sound bites 
and catchphrases that attract attention but often contain little substance 
(Krieg-Planque, 2011). For some scholars, this is a symptom of the 
‘marketization’ of politics whereby homo politicus has become an object of 
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consumption within the popular media sphere (Bourdieu, 1991; Negrine, 2008; 
KhosraviNik, 2018).  
The 2017 French election was marked by each candidate’s effort to 
transgress discursive norms in an effort to seduce a disgruntled electorate. 
This unpredictable election culminated in the triumph of outsiders and the 
collapse of the left-right axis that had dominated France since the 1960’s. Have 
traditional parties become obsolete in this networked age? Present-day politics 
are primarily centered around the notion of performance, and on the necessity 
to craft an identity that will appeal to a wide array of voters. Candidates rely 
on ‘styles of politics’ that they can activate to invent personas that fit their 
electoral needs. At a time when an overwhelming majority of French voters 
were dissatisfied with their political leaders, the 2017 candidates capitalized 
on the performance of anti-establishment politics. Despite having served as 
finance minister for the deeply unpopular Hollande government, Macron 
managed to reinvent himself as a political outsider. Similarly, Mélenchon 
relied on radical anti-establishment appeals in spite of his lengthy political 
career (including 30 years as a member of the mainstream Socialist Party). The 
ability to craft and frame one’s campaign along a desired identity now seems 
to matter more than the candidate’s actual record. Politics is a stage, and 
politicians are performers: the election is the performance the voters are given 
to see.  
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Relevance and avenues for further research 
With the dawn of the participatory web, political discourse has been 
evolving in an effort to adapt electoral practice to the dominant communication 
paradigm set by social media platforms. Web 2.0 technologies are so embedded 
in modern society that they have become an integral component of our 
everyday lives (Paveau, 2013). As a result, perpetuating the online/offline 
division can inhibit our ability to understand social practices (Zappavigna, 
2012; Bouvier, 2015). On Twitter, politicians create online identities that 
complement their physical interventions (e.g., speeches, interviews, debates) 
and are thus an integral part of their campaigns. Yet, ambiguity in authorship 
is a prevalent concern in Twitter research due to the inability to determine 
whether public figures write their own tweets or whether they have a team of 
‘ghost writers’. Longhi (2013) addresses this conundrum by arguing that tweet 
analysis focuses on (techno)discursive representation of identity. Building an 
online presence is a continuous process which requires stylistic consistency; for 
example, any tweet posted via the Twitter handle @FrancoisFillon is bound to 
François Fillon – it is understood to be his words, regardless of who authored 
them. Analyzing the tweets of presidential candidates can thus allow us to 
uncover their rhetorical strategies, dominant ideologies, and representations 
of real-world events (Longhi, 2013).  
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The challenge lies in adapting existing discourse analysis methods to 
social practices that have emerged in digital environments. The dynamicity 
and participatory character of new social media has brought new types of 
content to be analyzed, new contexts, and new usage patterns (Jenkins, 2009; 
Herring, 2013). Fundamentally, these new forms of communication are not just 
about linguistic innovation and multimodal interaction. They also point to 
ideological shifts resulting from globalization and a market-based neoliberal 
approach to politics and education (Fairclough, 2003; Blommaert, 2010). 
Hence, online discourse should not be studied in isolation from the greater 
sociopolitical landscape (Bouvier, 2015). In order to understand how power 
relations are influenced by shifts in discourse, we need to produce studies that 
tie the micro-level of text to the macro-level of culture (Fairclough, 1992, 2003). 
Indeed, Fairclough (1992) argues that “changing discursive practices are 
an important element in social change” (p. 56) as orders of discourse mutate 
and evolve to adapt to new contexts. New social practices give rise to new 
orders of discourse, while existing orders are constantly reshaped and 
rearticulated. A multifunctional approach to discourse can make a signiﬁcant 
contribution to research on the relationship between technological 
advancement and wider social change, especially in terms of how the 
integration of new technologies into social processes realizes new genres of 
discourse (Fairclough, 2003). The methodology used in this study is embedded 
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in a complex interdisciplinary framework concerned with how discourse 
interacts with social processes (including beliefs, values and ideologies) within 
a particular context of culture. Critical Discourse Analysis and Systemic 
Functional Linguistics are social-semiotic approaches in the sense that they 
look at the micro-level of text to gain understanding of the macro-level of 
culture, and vice versa. Studies focusing on Twitter during political elections 
are becoming increasingly diverse in terms of theory, methodology, and types 
of data being analyzed. Indeed, there is growing interest in interdisciplinary 
research and in crossing field boundaries to gain new insights and methods 
from a wide range of disciplines (Unger et al., 2016). Yet, few studies have 
attempted to analyze online political discourse from the standpoint of critical 
linguistics. Systemic Functional Linguistics is a demanding approach due to 
its complexity and its reliance on a metalanguage. However, it has great value 
in the sense that it applies rigorous analytical methods to texts “in their 
authentic form in their actual contexts of social life” (Eggins, 2004, p.352): 
[W]hen we interpret language in these terms, we may cast some light on 
the baffling problem of how it is that the most ordinary uses of language, 
in the most everyday situations, so effectively transmit the culture, the 
systems of knowledge, all the deepest and most pervasive patterns of 
the culture. With a functional perspective on language, we can begin to 
appreciate how this is done. (Halliday, 1973, p. 45). 
 
As I hope to have shown in this dissertation, the distinction of three functional 
levels within the semantic component of the SFL model helps highlight the 
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features of the text in a particularly clear, powerful, and objective fashion. 
Because they combine linguistic analysis and social theory, SFL and CDA can 
make a significant contribution to understanding online political discourse and 
the complex social and cultural processes it involves.  
Final thoughts on the state of political discourse 
Several researchers have suggested that ideological differences between 
political parties have been progressively fading in the post-WW2 era 
(Fairclough, 1993; Mayaffre, 2004; Negrine, 2008). Fairclough (2003) argues 
that this is a consequence of a neo-liberal turn in global politics. The dislocation 
of the left-right axis in France could thus be symptomatic of a wider 
phenomenon: the progressive/conservative divide is being erased and replaced 
by a new political landscape dominated by technocrats and populists. Yet, 
many politicians cling to old party labels that do not reflect their approach to 
politics, and by doing so contribute to the electorate’s confusion and alienation. 
On Twitter, some frustrated Democrats call for ‘purity tests’ to weed out 
‘neolib’ and ‘centrist’ imposters, while Republicans hunt down RINOs 
(Republicans In Name Only). Party affiliation is no longer seen as trustworthy. 
Donald Trump claims to be a Republican, yet he has little in common with the 
conservative Strict Father depicted by Lakoff. On the other side of the Atlantic, 
former prime minister Manuel Valls posed as a socialist in spite of a staunch 
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anti-immigration stance and repeated attempts at undercutting the public 
sector.  
In today’s networked age, the online world and the offline world are 
deeply intertwined. However, the degree and extent of Twitter’s influence on 
national elections is still up for debate. First, the hope that the participatory 
web would bring together users from all horizons has quickly faded. In fact, 
Twitter seems to have intensified party polarization. Indeed, people tend to 
select information which is consistent with their own preferences. In turn, 
social media algorithms use these preferences to create tailored feeds. Over 
time, users become less and less likely to be exposed to opposing views and are 
stuck in ‘echo chambers’ or ‘filter bubbles’: 
Social media do not show you the world out there, they construct a world 
to your liking and as such they are breeding ground for echo chambers, 
and constructions of filter bubbles where all like-minded people get 
together and reinforce their own perception of the realities and priorities 
rather than engaging with other views. (KhosraviNik, 2018, p.433)  
Finally, it remains to be seen whether social media could truly level the playing 
field between career politicians and outsiders. While Twitter can amplify a 
candidate’s message, current research suggests that newcomers and outsiders 
are still reliant on traditional mass media for exposure (Vergeer, 2015). Even 
Donald Trump, the ‘Twitter President’, benefited from extensive media 
coverage in the months leading to the 2016 U.S. election (Oates & Moe, 2017). 
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Moreover, successful campaigns naturally get more media and academic 
attention and could thus paint a skewed picture of how influential these 
networks actually are (Wodak, 2015). Nonetheless, the social media 
appropriation employed in the recent success of populist movements across 
western democracies cannot be overlooked, and emphasizes the need for an 
interdisciplinary approach to the analysis of extremist discourse. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Tweets (n = 208) 
E1: #HollandeRenonce (December 1, 2016) 
• User: @fhollande 
Dans les mois qui viennent mon seul devoir sera de continuer à diriger l'État, 
mandat pour lequel vous m'avez élu en 2012.  
Aussi, j'ai décidé de ne pas être candidat au renouvellement de mon mandat  
Je ne suis animé que par l'intérêt supérieur du pays. L'expérience m'a apporté 
l'humilité nécessaire dans ma tâche  
Comme président de la République je me dois de diriger l'État. Comme socialiste, je 
ne peux me résoudre à la dispersion de la gauche  
Le plus grand danger c'est le protectionnisme, c'est l'enfermement, qui seraient un 
désastre pour les travailleurs français  
Je porte un bilan et j'en assure toute la responsabilité. Dans cinq mois vous aurez à 
faire un choix pour notre pays 
Je n'ai qu'un seul regret et c'est d'avoir proposé la déchéance de la nationalité. Je 
pensais qu'elle pouvait nous unir, elle nous a divisé 
Dans ce contexte j'ai voulu que soit maintenue la cohésion nationale  
J'ai engagé nos armées dans le monde pour nous protéger, pour lutter contre le 
terrorisme. 
L'engagement que j'avais pris était de faire baisser le chômage. J'ai fait en sorte 
d'aider les embauches. Les résultats arrivent.  
J'ai fait avancer les libertés, l'égalité entre les couples a été renforcée. J'ai modernisé 
notre démocratie avec la réforme territoriale  
Les comptes publics ont été assainis. J'ai voulu que notre modèle social soit conforté 
et élargi  
Je m'adresse à vous pour vous faire connaître ma décision dans la perspective de la 
prochaine élection présidentielle  
 
• User: @MLP_officiel 
"Je veux arracher le pays au désordre dans lequel l'UMP et le PS l'ont plongé." 
#LeGrandJury 
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"Si #Hollande a renoncé à être candidat, c'est aussi parce que nous sommes donnés 
au second tour." #MLPTF1 
"Nous sommes au centre de cette élection présidentielle, tout tourne autour de nos 
idées." #MLPTF1 
"Pourquoi il y a des primaires à droite et à gauche ? Parce qu'ils n'ont pas de leader. 
C'est une preuve de faiblesse." #MLPTF1 
 
• User: @FrancoisFillon 
Ce soir, le Président de la République admet, avec lucidité, que son échec patent lui 
interdit d'aller plus loin. #DirectPR  
Ce quinquennat s'achève dans la pagaille politique et la déliquescence du pouvoir. 
#DirectPR 
Plus que jamais, l'alternance et le redressement de la France doivent être bâtis sur 
des bases solides. #DirectPR 
Nous bâtirons sur la vérité sans laquelle il n'y a pas de confiance, et l'action 
courageuse seule en mesure d'obtenir des résultats. 
 
• User: @JLMelenchon 
La déclaration de @fhollande est un énorme aveu d'échec. #JLMTF1 #TF1 
Il ne faudrait pas que la déclaration de @fhollande fonctionne comme une amnistie 
pour tous les autres. #JLMTF1 #TF1 
La primaire du #PS n'est pas une primaire : c'est un congrès. Il n'y a là que des gens 
du #PS. #JLMTF1 #TF1 
Maintenant, il y a le choix entre @FrancoisFillon qui dit "chacun pour soi et Dieu 
pour tous" et moi qui dis "Un pour tous, tous pour un". 
En janvier, ce n'est pas la primaire de la gauche, c'est la primaire du #PS. #DIMPOL 
#France3 
Pourquoi me demande-t-on à moi de rejoindre la primaire du #PS ? #DIMPOL 
#France3 
Je ne suis pas membre du #PS. Je l'ai quitté, ce n'est pas pour y retourner. 
#DIMPOL #France3 
.@fhollande n'a pas renoncé à l'élection présidentielle : il en a été éjecté par ses 
propres amis. #DIMPOL #France3 
Je suis candidat depuis février, je le reste. Je n'affronte pas un personnage de la 
primaire #PS. Mon adversaire, c'est M. #Fillon. #DIMPOL 
.@fhollande n'a pas appliqué son programme. #JLMTF1 #TF1 
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Ceux qui ont élu #FrançoisHollande pour combattre la finance ont été roulés et 
trahis. #JLMTF1 #TF1 
La semaine culbuto - [hyperlink] … - Nouvelle note de blog à découvrir et partager - 
#Hollande #Fillon #Nucléaire 
 
• User: @benoithamon 
Merci à @Linda_Gourjade pour son soutien à la #PrimaireGauche. Grâce à elle et 
bien d'autres, j'ai déjà les parrainages pour être candidat. 
#Itélé : il faut désormais une gauche totale, qui veut à la fois gouverner et 
transformer, pour défendre le #ProgrèsSocial #PrimaireGauche 
La gauche doit se positionner radicalement différemment sur le travail, le progrès 
social si elle veut être entendue #LEmissionPolitique 
Le choix du PR de ne pas se représenter à la présidentielle nous permet de nous 
tourner vers l’avenir #LEmissionPolitique #Hamon2017 
Je considère qu’il n’y a pas de gauches irréconciliables. C'est un aveu d'échec de 
penser le contraire #LEmissionPolitique 
Pour @MathieuHanotin : “le retrait de François Hollande met tous les candidats à 
égalité pour la primaire” [hyperlink]  … 
#RTLMatin : François Hollande ne pouvait plus rassembler son camp, il en a tiré la 
conséquence avec humilité et lucidité. 
#RTLMatin : ce qui m'intéresse c'est de défendre une gauche totale, de 
transformation de la société, pas les petits calculs des autres. 
#RTLMatin :la primaire tranchera ce que sera la gauche des prochaines années. Je 
la veux tout entière tournée vers justice et progrès social 
Plus que jamais, la gauche doit porter 1 alternative sociale, écologique et 
démocratique face à droite et ext-droite 
 
• User: @EmmanuelMacron 
Dans mon livre, j’écris qui je suis. #RTLSoir 
Je veux rassembler les Françaises et les Français. #RTLSoir 
Les progressistes de droite et du centre ont vocation à nous rejoindre. #RTLSoir 
Quand on vient d’un milieu populaire, c’est plus difficile de réussir. On ne peut pas 
être heureux de ce système. #RTLSoir 
Il est trop facile quand une société va mal de dire « L’ennemi c’est l’autre. » 
#RTLSoir 
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Les vraies divisions ne sont plus entre les partis, elles sont entre les progressistes et 
les conservateurs. #BourdinDirect 
Il faut réconcilier le progrès et la liberté. #RTLSoir 
 
E2: #Fillongate (Range: January 25, 2017 – February 6, 2017) 
• User: @MLP_officiel 
"Tout révèle aujourd'hui que M. #Fillon aime l'argent, et cherche l'enrichissement 
personnel. Son caractère s'est révélé." #BourdinDirect 
"La campagne de M. #Fillon est en jachère. Plus rien ne s’y passe. Plus aucune 
proposition. Il a déserté le débat public !" #SaintRaphaël 
"Les Français se sont rendus compte qu'en réalité, même s'il jouait l'austère, #Fillon 
est un homme qui aime beaucoup l'argent." @RFI 
"#Fillon lui-même s'est mis dans la nasse, en déclarant qu'il ne serait pas candidat 
en cas de #miseenexamen." @RFI 
"La personnalité de François #Fillon se révèle très éloignée de l'image austère qu'il 
avait voulu se donner." #8h30Aphatie 
"#Bayrou avec #Macron et Lagarde avec #Fillon sont des experts en arrangements 
d'appareils et en vieilles combines électorales !" #Mirande 
"Depuis le début, le comportement de François #Fillon est incohérent. Il n'arrive pas 
à faire campagne ni à parler de fond." #QDMéthode 
"La relation de confiance entre #Fillon et les Français est à mon avis rompue." #QDI 
@LCP 
"La candidature de François #Fillon était déjà très fragile avant le #PenelopeGate, à 
cause de son projet d'une grande brutalité." #QDI @LCP 
"Le problème de François #Fillon, c'est le problème de la confiance entre le candidat 
et les Français." #MLPTF1 
"La candidature de #Fillon était déjà fragilisée par son programme de casse sociale 
d'une grande brutalité." #MLPTF1 
 
• User: @FrancoisFillon 
Ceux qui ont pensé m’atteindre doivent être certains de ma détermination.  
Je vois que la séquence des boules puantes est ouverte. Je suis scandalisé par le 
mépris et la misogynie de cet article.  
Pourquoi, alors que mon épouse était rémunérée depuis 1997, cette affaire explose 
deux mois et demi avant l'élection présidentielle ? #LE20H  
Non seulement je serai candidat, mais ces attaques me renforcent. #LE20H  
248 
 
Ma lettre aux Français : [hyperlink]   
Seule la volonté de nuire peut expliquer la présentation mensongère des éléments 
publiés ce soir par le #CanardEnchainé.  
Je comprends les interrogations, et le besoin de me voir clarifier les choses. Je le fais 
car je n'ai rien à cacher.  
On voudrait nous éliminer de la course à la présidentielle ? Au profit de quoi et de 
qui ? Des utopistes, des extrémistes ? 
Mes amis, je vous demande de m’aider à résister. Je mène un combat pour des 
convictions, pas pour le goût du pouvoir. #FillonCharleville 
J'assume le choix qui fut le mien de m’appuyer sur mon épouse et sur mes proches. 
#FillonCharleville  
Au-delà de ma seule personne, on cherche à casser la droite, à lui voler son vote. 
#FillonCharleville 
J'éprouve une colère froide face à cette meute qui se complait dans cette entreprise 
de démolition et qui s’affranchit de toutes les règles. 
Ces attaques ne sortent pas de nulle part. Elles ont été soigneusement mijotées dans 
les arrière-cuisines des officines qu’on découvrira.  
Je vais affronter les attaques jusqu’au bout, et je serai candidat à l’élection 
présidentielle.  
Il y a aujourd'hui des journaux qui reçoivent des documents 48h après avoir été 
saisis dans des perquisitions. Qui les leur donne ? 
J'ai eu tort d'accepter les costumes qui m'ont été offerts. J'ai fait une erreur de 
jugement. Ces costumes, je les ai rendus. 
Cela fait 2 mois que la presse déverse sur moi des torrents de boue. En 36 ans de vie 
publique, jamais mon honneur n’avait été mis en cause.  
Ma bataille est celle des idées. Je n’ai jamais hurlé avec les meutes, ni fouillé dans 
les poubelles de mes adversaires ! #FillonCaen 
De Gaulle disait : "La vague ne détruit pas le granit…" Je suis toujours là, debout, 
avec vous, pour vous et pour la France. #FillonCaen 
Chaque jour, je reçois en pleine figure de nouvelles bourrasques. Je fais front, 
j’avance, garde mon cap et trace ma route. #FillonCaen 
Soyez fiers, soyez forts, soyez plus volontaires que tous les obstacles qui se dressent 
sur notre chemin, que toutes les volontés adverses !  
Ne me jugez pas d’après les actes d’accusation de ces nouveaux inquisiteurs, mais 
jugez-moi sur mon parcours. #FillonNantes  
Pouvait-on imaginer un jour que des responsables politiques réclameraient le retrait 
pur et simple de votre candidat ? #FillonNantes  
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Oui, ils ont osé demander l’élimination, avant même le vote, de la principale famille 
politique de ce pays. #FillonNantes  
Allons-nous les laisser faire ? Allons-nous les laisser vous voler cette élection ? 
Certainement pas ! #FillonNantes  
Mes amis, j’ai besoin de vous. Ne vous laissez pas faire. Ne vous laissez pas 
intimider ! #FillonQuimper  
Les journalistes me demandent comment je fais pour tenir : grâce à vous et à votre 
ferveur comme ce soir à Quimper ! #FillonQuimper  
Je ne pouvais imaginer être victime d'une manipulation pareille. #BourdinDirect 
Si j'avais le moindre doute sur ma culpabilité, je ne serais pas candidat à l'élection 
présidentielle. #BourdinDirect 
 
• User: @JLMelenchon 
Vous n'êtes pas fatigués qu'on vous arrange l'élection d'avance ? D'abord c'était 
#Juppé, après #Fillon, maintenant #Macron... #JLMRennes 
Monsieur #Fillon va désosser l'État. #BourdinDirect #RMC #BFMTV 
Le cas de monsieur #Fillon conseiller d'assurances ramassant 200 000 euros, ça 
concerne les Français et la République. #DirectFerrari #CNews 
On ne peut plus faire campagne. Chaque jour il y a une nouvelle aventure de 
l'affaire #Fillon. #Elections2017 #Europe1 
 «Le plus frappant, c'est qu'ils ne comprennent pas ce qu'on leur reproche.» #Fillon 
#CàVous 
Ce qu'il y a de plus choquant chez #Fillon, c'est qu'il soit conseil d'une compagnie 
d'assurance pour 200 000 euros. #CàVous #France5 
Ce qui est le plus frappant, c'est que #Fillon et ses équipes ne comprennent même 
pas ce qui dérange les gens sur les costumes. #CàVous 
Juan Branco : "François #Fillon prend en otage l'élection présidentielle." 
#18mars2017 
Tout l’espace médiatique a été saturé par M. #Fillon et ses aventures avec 
#LesRépublicains. #RTLSoir #RTL 
Monsieur #Fillon avait dit qu'il ne serait pas candidat s'il était mis en examen. Il ne 
respecte pas sa promesse. #JLMEurope 
Désormais, il y a des candidats qui renient leurs promesses avant le premier tour 
comme monsieur #Fillon. #JLMEurope 
Quand je fais un meeting et que je parle de #Fillon, toute la salle éclate de rire. On 
ne peut plus parler du fond avec ce candidat. #DimPol 
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Pendant qu'on parle de #LePen et #Fillon, on ne parle pas des 9 milliardaires qui 
détiennent 90% des médias de ce pays. #DimPol #France3 
Ma méthode, c'est la constituante et la 6e République. #Fillon, c'est la décadence de 
la 5e République ! #DimPol #France3 
Ils ont bonne mine les défenseurs de l'ordre et de la justice ! #Fillon n'écoute rien et 
#LePen refuse d'aller aux convocations ! #DimPol 
Je ne vais pas passer deux mois à critiquer la droite pour autre chose que ses idées ! 
#BFMTV #Fillon #18mars2017 
Le mieux serait un autre candidat que #Fillon pour qu'on puisse enfin parler de fond 
dans cette élection. #BFMTV https://18mars2017.fr   
Il faut tourner la page. Le #18mars2017, c'est la 5e République que nous allons 
mettre en examen. #BFMTV #Fillon https://18mars2017.fr   
Il y a quelque chose de fou dans ces institutions qui mettent le pays entier dans 
l'attente de la décision d'un homme. #Fillon #18mars2017 
C'est terrible ! On ne peut plus parler de #Fillon sans que tout le monde rigole ! 
#JLMBrest 
Quand j'étais à #Strasbourg, j'ai voulu parler du programme de #Fillon. Ce n'est plus 
possible. Les gens le huent. #BFMTV #19hRuthElkrief 
Maintenant on ne peut plus parler de #Fillon sans que ça provoque des rires ou des 
huées... #JLMStrasbourg [hyperlink]   
Fillon : la droite méritait mieux. La France aussi. 
Le coup contre #Fillon ne vient pas de la gauche. Il vient le plus probablement de sa 
propre famille. #RTLSoir 
Pour moi, François #Fillon est un adversaire politique. Sa cause devient intenable. 
#RTLSoir 
 
• User: @benoithamon 
J’accuse François Fillon d’indignité, ce candidat n'est pas digne de cette élection 
#BHMontpellier 
Concevoir des compromis avec François Fillon et pas avec Benoît Hamon, cela en dit 
long. #8h30Aphatie  
Je parle aujourd’hui des 12 millions de personnes en situation de handicap et on 
m’interroge sur les costumes de M. Fillon #19hruthelkrief 
Les affaires de M. Fillon révèlent un rapport à l’argent incompatible avec l’éthique et 
la morale que l’on attend d’un chef d’État. 
Quand on prétend devenir chef de l’État, les serviteurs de l’État, infirmières 
policiers, enseignants, on les respecte M. Fillon! #BHRennes 
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J’aime la fonction publique! Vous M.Fillon vous avez ruiné le pays. Nommez-les, ces 
fonctionnaires: ce sont des infirmières, des enseignants 
Je parle aujourd’hui des 12 millions de personnes en situation de handicap et on 
m’interroge sur les costumes de M. Fillon #19hruthelkrief 
À F. Fillon qui fait de l'autisme une insulte, je veux lui dire que les personnes 
atteintes d'autisme ne mentent pas ne trichent pas, elles! 
 
• User: @EmmanuelMacron 
François Fillon a un problème avec la vérité, c’est chaque jour un peu plus 
manifeste. #LutteTerrorisme 
Il faut remettre du pluralisme et de la moralisation dans la vie publique. C'est le 
ciment de cette alliance. 
Je n’ai aucune leçon à recevoir en matière d’éthique, de prise de responsabilité et de 
prises de risques. #BourdinDirect 
Indispensable moralisation de la vie publique. Elle doit être inscrite dans la loi. Mon 
interview dans @LaCroix : [hyperlink]   
Moraliser la vie politique, c’est exiger que la rémunération des parlementaires soit 
plus transparente et déclarée en totalité. #MacronDijon 
 
E3: #ChampsÉlysées (April 20, 2017) 
• User: @fhollande 
Mes pensées vont à la famille du policier tué et aux proches des blessés. Un 
hommage national sera rendu. 
Aujourd'hui, la Nation toute entière exprime sa profonde gratitude et sa 
reconnaissance au capitaine Xavier Jugelé. 
 
• User: @MLP_officiel 
"Mes pensées vont à la famille du policier tombé en service, à ses camarades blessés 
et au-delà à toutes nos forces de sécurité." #ConfMLP 
"Nos policiers sont attaqués parce qu’ils sont les symboles de l’État." #ConfMLP 
"La France n’est pas visée pour ce qu’elle fait mais pour ce qu’elle est, les Français 
pour la simple raison qu’ils sont Français." #ConfMLP 
"La guerre qui nous est menée est asymétrique, révolutionnaire, qui a pour objectif 
notre soumission à une idéologie totalitaire." #ConfMLP 
"Puisque le pays est en état de guerre, la réponse doit être globale, totale, c’est-à-dire 
celle du pays tout entier." #ConfMLP 
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"J’appelle tous les Français à l’unité, une unité profonde comme celle qui unit les 
membres d’une même famille dans l’épreuve." #ConfMLP 
"Nos prétendus gouvernants, insuffisants et pusillanimes, sont dénués de toute 
autorité et de toute force morale." #ConfMLP 
"J’en appelle au réveil de l’âme millénaire de notre peuple capable de s'opposer à une 
barbarie sanguinaire." #ConfMLP 
"À ce gouvernement éphémère, usé par l’inaction, je demande d’ordonner la 
restauration immédiate de nos frontières nationales." #ConfMLP 
"Les noms de ces nouvelles victimes s’ajoutent à la longue liste des martyrs du 
terrorisme." #ConfMLP 
"L’islamisme est une idéologie hégémonique monstrueuse qui a déclaré la guerre à 
notre nation, à la raison, à la civilisation." #ConfMLP 
"Une nouvelle fois, ce sont nos policiers qui ont été visés et qui ont payé le prix du 
sang dans la lutte contre l’islamisme." #ConfMLP 
"La France a vécu la barbarie d’une attaque terroriste sur cette avenue si 
symbolique pour tout Français, les #ChampsÉlysées." #ConfMLP 
"Notre pays a vécu une nouvelle fois la barbarie d’une attaque terroriste en plein 
cœur de notre capitale." #ConfMLP 
"La lutte contre le terrorisme commence par retrouver nos frontières nationales, et 
arrêter avec la naïveté." #AttentatChampsElysées @RFI [hyperlink]  
"On ne peut pas laisser à nos enfants un pays impuissant à les défendre." 
#15minutesPourConvaincre #ChampsÉlysées 
"Il faut s'attaquer à l'idéologie de ce terrorisme, qui pullule chez nous depuis des 
années." #15minutesPourConvaincre #ChampsÉlysées 
"Je ne veux pas dire à notre jeunesse de s'habituer à vivre avec le terrorisme." 
#15minutesPourConvaincre #ChampsÉlysées 
"Je ne veux pas que l'on s'habitue au terrorisme islamiste [...] c'est fini le laxisme, 
c'est fini la naïveté !" #15minutesPourConvaincre [hyperlink]  
"Les Français attendent autre chose de nous que de la compassion." 
#15minutesPourConvaincre #ChampsÉlysées 
"J'ai une colère sourde. Tout n'est pas fait pour mettre nos compatriotes à l'abris." 
#15minutesPourConvaincre #ChampsÉlysées 
"J'ai un sentiment de tristesse pour nos forces de l'ordre qui paient un lourd tribut." 
#15minutesPourConvaincre #ChampsÉlysées 
"J'ai appris que le cauchemar recommençait, une fois encore." 
#15minutesPourConvaincre #ChampsÉlysées 
Émotion et solidarité pour nos forces de l'ordre, à nouveau prises pour cible. MLP 
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"Je suis une mère, j'ai 3 enfants, et je ne veux pas avoir la boule au ventre quand ils 
vont dehors." #15minutesPourConvaincre 
"Nos services de police font un travail formidable, alors qu'ils sont en sous-effectifs, à 
cause notamment de M. #Fillon !" @bleuprovence 
"Face au terrorisme, il faut retrouver nos frontières nationales, expulser les 
étrangers fichés S pour islamisme !" @bleuprovence 
"Le gouvernement est défaillant face au terrorisme. Nos enfants ne sont pas 
protégés dans notre pays !" @bleuprovence 
"Monsieur #Cherfi, qui a tué Xavier Jugelé sur les #ChampsÉlysées, a violé son 
contrôle judiciaire et le magistrat l'a libéré." #2017LeDébat 
 
• User: @FrancoisFillon 
Policiers, gendarmes et militaires me trouveront toujours à leurs côtés pour défendre 
leurs missions, leurs moyens et leur honneur. [hyperlink]   
Il est temps d’afficher notre tolérance zéro à l’égard de l’islam radical, qui est 
l’inspirateur du totalitarisme islamique. [hyperlink]   
De Washington à Moscou, je prendrai l'initiative diplomatique pour bâtir une 
coalition mondiale contre le terrorisme islamique. [hyperlink] 
J'entends combattre ce mal qui nous agresse d'une main de fer. Le combat pour la 
liberté et la sécurité des Français sera le mien. [hyperlink] 
Nos policiers, nos gendarmes, nos militaires doivent être remerciés, soutenus et 
respectés parce qu'ils protègent les Français. [hyperlink] 
Déclaration à la suite de l'attentat des #ChampsÉlysées [hyperlink] 
Le combat contre le totalitarisme islamique doit être la priorité absolue du prochain 
président de la République. [hyperlink] 
Je considère qu'il n'y a pas lieu de continuer une campagne électorale parce que nous 
devons manifester notre solidarité avec les policiers. 
La nation est solidaire avec les policiers. La lutte contre le terrorisme doit être la 
priorité du prochain président de la République. [hyperlink] 
Hommage aux forces de l'ordre qui donnent leur vie pour protéger les nôtres. 
#ChampsÉlysées 
 
• User: @JLMelenchon 
Pensée émue pour les policiers mort et blessés et leurs familles. Les actes terroristes 
ne seront jamais impunis, les complices jamais oubliés 
Nous adressons une pensée émue à la famille du policier décédé et aux familles des 
policiers blessés. #JLMFrance2 #Presidentielle2017 
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Les criminels ne seront jamais impunis et leurs complices jamais oubliés. 
#JLMFrance2 #Presidentielle2017 #15minutesPourConvaincre 
Nous devons faire notre devoir de citoyens. Pas de panique. Restons unis. 
#JLMFrance2 #Presidentielle2017 #15minutesPourConvaincre 
Les violents n'auront pas le dernier mot. Notre feuille de route est la devise de la 
patrie : Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité. 
Nous devons faire la démonstration que nous ne sommes pas intimidés par les 
tueurs. #LaForceDuPeuple [hyperlink] 
Notre premier devoir est un devoir de sang froid. #LaForceDuPeuple 
Continuons le processus électoral. Les violents seront toujours battus par les 
républicains. #JLMFrance2 #Presidentielle2017 
 
• User: @benoithamon 
Mes hommages au capitaine Xavier Jugelé. Mes pensées vont vers les siens, 
notamment son compagnon qui a eu des mots si forts et si justes. 
Il faut être implacable à l’égard de ceux qui veulent remettre en cause nos valeurs 
dans notre démocratie #15minutesPourConvaincre 
J’adresse mes pensées à la famille du policier tué ainsi qu'aux blessés. 
#15minutesPourConvaincre 
Mes pensées vont au policier tué, à ses collègues blessés. Soutien total aux forces de 
l'ordre contre le terrorisme. #ChampsElysees 
Toutes celles et ceux qui s’en prennent aux services publics nous désarment face au 
terrorisme. #15minutesPourConvaincre 
 
• User: @EmmanuelMacron 
Solidarité avec nos policiers après les événements de la nuit dernière. [hyperlink] 
Devant mon QG de campagne. Merci à nos forces de l'ordre de nous protéger au 
quotidien. [hyperlink] 
« Tenter, braver, persister, tenir bon, tenir tête ; voilà l'exemple dont les peuples ont 
besoin, et la lumière qui les électrise. » V. Hugo [hyperlink] 
Je sais que les Français n'ont pas peur. Je sais, chers concitoyens, que vous tiendrez 
bon. Je sais que nous saurons maintenir notre unité. 
Je n'ai pas voulu interrompre notre campagne présidentielle car notre démocratie 
est plus forte. [hyperlink] 
Une action vigoureuse sera engagée pour lutter contre la radicalisation islamiste, y 
compris sur Internet. 
255 
 
C'est la démocratie qui est visée, notre cohésion qu'ils veulent ébranler, nos valeurs 
auxquelles ils veulent porter un coup décisif. 
J'installerai une task force, organe de renseignement auprès du président de la 
République, pour lutter contre Daech. 
L'action militaire que je veux conduire aura pour priorité votre sécurité. 
Chacun mesure le tribut payé par ces femmes et ces hommes qui risquent chaque 
jour leur vie pour notre sécurité. 
Le rôle premier du président de la République est de protéger les Français. J’y suis 
prêt. Je serai implacable pour vous protéger. 
Mes premières pensées vont à la famille de la victime, ses collègues, ses proches. Je 
rends hommage à toutes nos forces armées. 
Hier soir, Paris a une nouvelle fois été frappée au coeur, comme Londres, Berlin, 
Stockholm et Bruxelles ces derniers mois. 
Détermination. Avec mes conseillers sécurité avant ma déclaration solennelle. 
@JMFauvergue77 [hyperlink] 
Les terroristes cherchent à bousculer les élections. Ils veulent la contemplation du 
désastre. Je ne céderai en rien. #le79inter [hyperlink] 
Je dis ma solidarité à l’égard des forces de l’ordre et des proches de la victime. 
#le79inter 
L’ombre sur cette fin de campagne n’enlève rien au fait que nous devons construire 
notre avenir, et que nous avons un grand avenir #RTLMatin [hyperlink] 
Le prochain président de la République aura à faire face à la menace terroriste. J'y 
suis prêt. #RTLMatin [hyperlink] 
J’ai annulé deux rassemblements publics car je veux que les forces de l’ordre soient 
mobilisées sur les priorités. #RTLMatin [hyperlink] 
Nous vivons et vivrons durablement avec la menace terroriste. #RTLMatin 
Je veux redire ma solidarité à l'égard des forces de l'ordre qui assurent notre 
sécurité. #RTLMatin 
Présider, c'est protéger à l’extérieur de nos frontières pour lutter partout contre le 
terrorisme islamiste. 
Présider, c'est protéger à l’intérieur de nos frontières en renforçant les moyens de 
sécurité, de renseignement. 
Je témoigne toute ma solidarité à l’égard de nos forces de l’ordre. J'ai une pensée 
pour la famille de la victime. 
Le premier devoir, la première mission du président est de protéger. 
Ce soir, je veux témoigner toute ma solidarité à l’égard de nos forces de l’ordre. 
[hyperlink] 
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Appendix B: Transitivity analysis of #HollandeRenonce 
1. François Hollande 
Dans les mois qui viennent mon seul devoir sera de continuer à diriger l'État, 
mandat pour lequel vous m'avez élu en 2012. 
(1a) relational : identifying 
Dans les mois qui 
viennent 
mon seul 
devoir 
sera 
de continuer à diriger 
l’État 
Circ: duration Token Pr: rel-ident Value 
[relative clause] material 
mandat pour 
lequel 
vous m’ avez élu en 2012 
Circ: purpose Actor Goal 
Pr: 
material 
Circ: time 
 
Aussi, j'ai décidé de ne pas être candidat au renouvellement de mon mandat. 
(2) mental : desiderative || [projection] relational : attributive 
Aussi, j’ ai décidé 
 
de ne pas être candidat  
au renouvellement 
de mon mandat 
 Senser 
Pr: 
mental 
 Pr: rel-attr Attribute Circ: matter 
 
Je ne suis animé que par l'intérêt supérieur du pays. L'expérience m'a apporté 
l'humilité nécessaire dans ma tâche.  
(3) relational : attributive 
Je 
ne suis 
animé 
animé que par l’intérêt 
supérieur du pays 
Carrier Pr: rel-attr Attribute 
(4) material 
L’expérience m’ a apporté l’humilité  
nécessaire dans ma 
tâche 
Actor Beneficiary 
Pr: 
material 
Goal Circ: condition 
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Comme président de la République je me dois de diriger l'État. Comme socialiste, je 
ne peux me résoudre à la dispersion de la gauche  
(5) material 
Comme président de la 
République 
je 
me dois de 
diriger 
l'État 
Circ: role Actor Pr: material Range 
(6) mental : emotive 
Comme socialiste je 
ne peux me 
résoudre 
à la dispersion de la 
gauche 
Circ: role Senser Pr: mental Phenomenon 
 
 
Le plus grand danger c'est le protectionnisme, c'est l'enfermement, qui seraient un 
désastre pour les travailleurs français  
(7a) relational : identifying 
Le plus grand danger c’ est 
le 
protectionnisme, 
Token Pr: rel-ident Value 
(7b) relational : identifying 
c’ est l’enfermement, 
Token Pr: rel-ident Value 
(7c) [relative clause] relational : attributive 
qui seraient 
un 
désastre 
pour les travailleurs 
français 
Carrier Pr: rel-attr Attribute Circ: viewpoint 
 
Je porte un bilan et j'en assure toute la responsabilité. Dans cinq mois vous aurez 
à faire un choix pour notre pays. 
(8a) relational : attributive : possession 
Je porte un bilan 
Possessor Pr: rel-attr: possession Possessed 
(8b) relational : attributive : possession 
et j’ en assure 
toute la 
responsabilité 
 Possessor Circ: matter Pr: rel-attr: possession Possessed 
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(9) material 
Dans cinq 
mois 
vous aurez à faire un choix pour notre pays 
Circ: time Actor Pr: material Goal Circ: behalf 
 
Je n'ai qu'un seul regret et c'est d'avoir proposé la déchéance de la nationalité. Je 
pensais qu'elle pouvait nous unir, elle nous a divisé  
(10a) relational : attributive : possession 
Je n’ai qu’un seul regret 
Possessor Pr: rel-attr (possession) Possessed 
(10b) relational : identifying 
et c’ est 
d’avoir proposé la déchéance de la 
nationalité 
 Token Pr: rel-ident Value 
(11a) mental : cognitive || [projection] material  
Je pensais  qu’ elle pouvait nous unir, 
Senser 
Pr: 
mental 
 Actor 
Pr: 
material… 
Goal 
…Pr: 
material 
(11b) material 
elle nous a divisé 
Actor Goal Pr: material 
 
Dans ce contexte j' ai voulu que soit maintenue la cohésion nationale  
(12) mental : desiderative || [projection] relational : attributive 
Dans ce 
contexte 
j’ ai voulu 
 
que soit maintenue 
la cohésion 
nationale 
Circ: 
condition 
Senser 
Pr: 
mental 
 
Pr: rel-
attr 
Attribute Carrier 
 
J'ai engagé nos armées dans le monde pour nous protéger, pour lutter contre le 
terrorisme. 
(13) material 
J’ ai engagé 
nos 
armées 
dans le 
monde 
pour nous protéger, pour 
lutter contre le terrorisme 
Actor 
Pr: 
material 
Range Circ: place Circ: purpose 
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L'engagement que j'avais pris était de faire baisser le chômage. J'ai fait en sorte 
d'aider les embauches. Les résultats arrivent.  
(14) relational : identifying 
L’engagement [[que j’avais 
pris]] 
était 
de faire baisser le 
chômage 
Token Pr: rel-ident Value 
(15) material 
J’ ai fait en sorte d’aider les embauches 
Actor Pr: material Goal 
(16) relational : attributive (with incorporated attribute) 
Les résultats arrivent 
Carrier Pr: rel-attr/Attribute 
 
J'ai fait avancer les libertés, l'égalité entre les couples a été renforcée. J'ai 
modernisé notre démocratie avec la réforme territoriale  
(17a) material 
J’ ai fait avancer les libertés, 
Actor Pr: material Goal 
(17b) relational : attributive 
l’égalité entre les couples a été  renforcée 
Carrier Pr: rel-attr Attribute 
(18) material 
J’ ai modernisé 
notre 
démocratie 
avec la réforme 
territoriale 
Actor Pr: material Goal Circ: means 
 
 
Les comptes publics ont été assainis. J'ai voulu que notre modèle social soit 
conforté et élargi  
(19) relational : attributive  
Les comptes publics ont été  assainis 
Goal Pr: rel-attr Attribute 
(20) mental : desiderative ||[projection] relational : attributive 
J’ ai voulu 
 
que 
notre modèle 
social 
soit 
conforté et 
élargi 
Senser Pr: mental  Carrier Pr: rel-attr Attribute 
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Je m'adresse à vous pour vous faire connaître ma décision dans la perspective de la 
prochaine élection présidentielle 
(21) verbal 
Je m’adresse à vous 
pour vous faire 
connaître ma 
décision 
dans la perspective de la 
prochaine élection 
présidentielle 
Sayer Pr: verbal Receiver Circ: purpose Circ: matter 
 
 
2. Marine Le Pen 
"Je veux arracher le pays au désordre dans lequel l'UMP et le PS l'ont plongé."  
(22) mental : desiderative || [projection] material  
Je veux 
 
arracher le pays 
au désordre [[dans lequel l’UMP et le 
PS l’ont plongé]] 
Senser 
Pr: 
mental 
Pr: 
material 
Range Phenomenon 
             [[embedded clause]] material  
dans lequel L’UMP et le PS l’ ont plongé 
 Actor Range 
Pr: 
material 
 
"Si #Hollande a renoncé à être candidat, c'est aussi parce que nous sommes 
donnés au second tour."  
(23a) mental : desiderative || [projection] relational : attributive 
Si #Hollande a renoncé 
 
      à être candidat, 
 Senser Pr: mental Pr: Rel-Attr Attribute 
(23b) relational : attributive  
c’ est aussi parce que nous sommes donnés au second tour 
Carrier Pr: rel-attr:   Attribute/Circ: reason 
 
[[circumstantial clause]] relational : attributive 
parce 
que 
nous sommes donnés  au second tour 
 Carrier Pr: rel-attr Attribute Circ: matter 
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"Nous sommes au centre de cette élection présidentielle, tout tourne autour de nos 
idées."  
(24a) relational : attributive  
Nous sommes 
au centre de cette élection 
présidentielle, 
Carrier Pr: rel-attr  Attribute/Circ: place 
(24b) relational : attributive : circumstantial 
tout tourne autour de nos idées 
Carrier Pr: rel-attr: circumstantial Attribute/Circ: matter 
"Pourquoi il y a des primaires à droite et à gauche ? Parce qu'ils n'ont pas de 
leader. C'est une preuve de faiblesse."  
(25) existential 
Pourquoi il y a 
des primaires à droite et à 
gauche ? 
Circ: reason Pr: existential Existent 
(26) relational : attributive : possession 
Parce qu’ ils n’ont pas de leader 
 Possessor Pr: rel-attr: possession Possessed 
(27) relational : attributive 
C’ est une preuve de faiblesse 
Carrier Pr: rel-attr  Attribute 
 
3. François Fillon 
Ce soir, le Président de la République admet, avec lucidité, que son échec patent lui 
interdit d'aller plus loin.  
(28) verbal  
Ce soir, 
le Président 
de la 
République 
admet, avec lucidité, 
 
que son échec patent lui 
interdit [[d’aller plus loin]]  
Circ: time Sayer Pr: verbal Circ: quality Verbiage 
[projection] verbal || [projection] material  
que son échec patent lui interdit 
 
d’aller plus loin 
 Sayer Target Pr: verbal Pr: material Circ: distance 
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Ce quinquennat s'achève dans la pagaille politique et la déliquescence du pouvoir.  
(29) material  
Ce quinquennat s’achève dans la pagaille politique… 
Actor Pr: material  Circ: manner 
 
Plus que jamais, l'alternance et le redressement de la France doivent être bâtis sur 
des bases solides.  
(30) relational : attributive 
Plus que 
jamais, 
l’alternance et le 
redressement de la France 
doivent être  bâtis 
sur des bases 
solides 
Circ: time Goal Pr: material Attribute Circ: condition 
 
Nous bâtirons sur la vérité sans laquelle il n'y a pas de confiance, et l'action 
courageuse seule en mesure d'obtenir des résultats. 
(31) material  
Nous bâtirons sur la vérité [[sans laquelle…]] 
Actor Pr: material Circ: default 
[[embedded clause]] existential 
sans laquelle il n’y a pas de confiance 
 Pr: existential Existent 
 
 
 
4. Jean-Luc Mélenchon 
La déclaration de @fhollande est un énorme aveu d'échec.  
(32) relational : attributive 
La déclaration de @fhollande est un énorme aveu d’échec 
Carrier Pr: rel-attr  Attribute 
 
Il ne faudrait pas que la déclaration de @fhollande fonctionne comme une amnistie 
pour tous les autres.  
(33) relational : attributive : circumstantial 
que 
la déclaration de 
@fhollande 
fonctionne comme une amnistie 
pour tous les 
autres 
 Carrier 
Pr: rel-attr: 
circumstantial 
Attribute/Circ: 
comparison 
Circ: behalf 
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La primaire du #PS n'est pas une primaire : c'est un congrès. Il n'y a là que des 
gens du #PS.  
(34a) relational : attributive 
La primaire du #PS n’est pas une primaire : 
Carrier Pr: rel-attr  Attribute 
(34b) relational : attributive 
c’ est un congrès 
Carrier Pr: rel-attr  Attribute 
(35) existential 
Il n’y a là que des gens du #PS 
Pr: existential Circ: location Existent 
 
 
Maintenant, il y a le choix entre @FrancoisFillon qui dit "chacun pour soi et Dieu 
pour tous" et moi qui dis "Un pour tous, tous pour un".  
(36a) existential 
Maintenant, il y a le choix 
Circ: time Pr: existential Existent 
(36b) [relative clause] verbal 
entre @FrancoisFillon qui dit "chacun pour soi et Dieu pour tous" 
 Sayer Pr: verbal Verbiage 
(36c) [relative clause] verbal 
et moi qui dis "Un pour tous, tous pour un" 
 Sayer Pr: verbal Verbiage 
 
En janvier, ce n'est pas la primaire de la gauche, c'est la primaire du #PS.  
(37a) relational : identifying 
En janvier ce n’est pas la primaire de la gauche 
Circ: time Token Pr: rel-ident Value 
(37b) relational : identifying 
c’ est la primaire du #PS 
Token Pr: rel-ident Value 
 
 
264 
 
Pourquoi me demande-t-on à moi de rejoindre la primaire du #PS?  
(38) verbal || [projection] material 
Pourquoi me demande- t-on  à moi 
 
de rejoindre la primaire… ? 
Circ: reason Receiver Pr: verbal Sayer Receiver Pr : material Range 
 
 
Je ne suis pas membre du #PS. Je l'ai quitté, ce n'est pas pour y retourner.  
(39) relational : attributive 
Je ne suis pas membre du #PS 
Carrier Pr: rel-attr  Attribute 
(40a) material 
Je l’ ai quitté, 
Actor Goal  Pr: material 
(40b) relational : attributive  
ce n’est pas pour y retourner 
Carrier Pr: rel-attr  Attribute/Circ: purpose 
 
 
.@fhollande n'a pas renoncé à l'élection présidentielle : il en a été éjecté par ses 
propres amis.  
(41a) mental : desiderative 
@fhollande n'a pas renoncé à l'élection présidentielle : 
Senser Pr: mental Phenomenon 
(41b) material : causative  
il en a été éjecté par ses propres amis 
Goal Circ: matter Pr: material Agent 
 
Je suis candidat depuis février, je le reste. Je n'affronte pas un personnage de la 
primaire #PS. Mon adversaire, c'est M. #Fillon.  
(42a) relational : attributive : circumstantial 
Je suis candidat depuis février, 
Carrier Pr: rel-attr  Attribute Circ: duration 
(42b) relational : attributive 
Je le reste 
Carrier Attribute Pr: rel-attr : circumstantial 
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(43) material 
Je n’affronte pas un personnage de la primaire #PS 
Actor Pr: material Goal 
(44) relational : identifying 
Mon adversaire, c’ est M. #Fillon 
Value Pr: rel-ident Token 
 
.@fhollande n'a pas appliqué son programme.  
(45) material 
@fhollande n'a pas appliqué son programme 
Actor Pr: material Goal 
 
Ceux qui ont élu #FrançoisHollande pour combattre la finance ont été roulés et 
trahis.  
(46) relational : attributive  
Ceux qui ont élu #FH 
pour combattre la 
finance 
ont été roulés et trahis 
Carrier Circ: purpose Pr: rel-attr Attribute 
 
 
5. Benoît Hamon  
Grâce à elle et bien d'autres, j'ai déjà les parrainages pour être candidat.  
(47) relational : attributive : possession  
Grâce à elle et 
bien d'autres, 
j’ ai déjà 
les parrainages 
pour être candidat 
Circ: reason Possessor Pr: rel-attr: possession Circ: time Possessed 
 
Il faut désormais une gauche totale, qui veut à la fois gouverner et transformer, pour 
défendre le #ProgrèsSocial  
(48a) existential  
Il faut désormais une gauche totale, 
 Pr: existential Circ: time Existent 
(48b) [relative clause] mental : desiderative 
qui veut à la fois 
gouverner et 
transformer 
pour défendre le 
#ProgrèsSocial 
Senser Pr: mental Circ: quality Phenomenon Circ: purpose 
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La gauche doit se positionner radicalement différemment sur le travail, le progrès 
social si elle veut être entendue  
(49a) relational : attributive : circumstantial 
La 
gauche 
doit se 
positionner 
radicalement différemment 
sur le travail, le 
progrès social 
Carrier 
Pr: rel-attr: 
circumstantial 
Circ: degree 
Attribute/Circ: 
quality 
Circ: matter 
(49b) [hypothetical clause] mental : desiderative   
si elle veut être entendue 
 Senser Pr: mental Phenomenon 
 
Le choix du PR de ne pas se représenter à la présidentielle nous permet de nous 
tourner vers l’avenir  
(50) material 
Le choix du PR [[de ne pas se 
représenter à la présidentielle]] 
nous permet 
de nous tourner vers 
l’avenir 
Actor Beneficiary Pr: material Goal 
 
Je considère qu’il n’y a pas de gauches irréconciliables. C'est un aveu d'échec de 
penser le contraire  
(51) mental : cognitive || [projection] existential 
Je considère  qu’ il n’y a pas de gauches irréconciliables 
Senser Pr: mental  Pr: existential Existent 
(52) relational : attributive (c’est-cleft) 
C’est un aveu d'échec de penser le contraire 
Pr: rel-attr Attribute Carrier 
 
 
Pour @MathieuHanotin: “le retrait de François Hollande met tous les candidats à 
égalité pour la primaire”  
(53) relational : attributive : causative 
Pour 
@MathieuHanotin 
le retrait de 
François Hollande 
met 
tous les 
candidats 
à égalité 
Circ: viewpoint Attributor Pr: rel-attr Carrier Attribute 
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François Hollande ne pouvait plus rassembler son camp, il en a tiré la 
conséquence avec humilité et lucidité. 
(54) material 
François Hollande ne pouvait plus rassembler son camp, 
Actor Pr: material Range 
(55) material 
il en a tiré la conséquence avec humilité et lucidité 
Actor Circ: matter Pr: material Range Circ: quality 
 
Ce qui m'intéresse c'est de défendre une gauche totale, de transformation de la 
société, pas les petits calculs des autres.  
(56a) mental : desiderative  
ce qui m' intéresse 
Phenomenon Senser Pr: mental 
(56b) relational : identifying 
c' est de défendre une gauche totale 
Token Pr: rel-ident Value 
 
La primaire tranchera ce que sera la gauche des prochaines années. Je la veux tout 
entière tournée vers justice et progrès social  
(57) verbal || [projection] relational : identifying  
La 
primaire 
tranchera 
 
ce que sera 
la gauche des prochaines 
années 
Sayer Pr: verbal Value Pr: rel-ident Token 
(58) mental : desiderative [ellipsed relational process] 
Je la veux tout entière  
tournée vers justice et progrès 
social 
Senser Carrier Pr: mental Circ: degree Attribute 
 
Plus que jamais, la gauche doit porter 1 alternative sociale, écologique et 
démocratique face à droite et ext-droite  
(59) relational : attributive : possession 
Plus que 
jamais 
la 
gauche 
doit porter 
1 alternative sociale, 
écologique et démocratique 
face à droite et 
ext-droite 
Circ: time Carrier 
Pr: rel-attr: 
possession 
Attribute Circ: comparison 
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6. Emmanuel Macron  
Dans mon livre, j’écris qui je suis.  
(60) verbal || [projection] relational : identifying  
Dans mon livre j’ écris 
 
qui je suis 
Circ: place Sayer Pr: verbal Value Token Pr: rel-ident 
 
Je veux rassembler les Françaises et les Français.  
(61) mental : desiderative 
Je veux rassembler les Françaises et les Français 
Senser Pr: mental Phenomenon 
 
Les progressistes de droite et du centre ont vocation à nous rejoindre.  
(62) relational : attributive : possession 
Les progressistes de 
droite et du centre 
ont vocation à nous rejoindre 
Possessor Pr: rel-attr: possession Possessed 
 
Quand on vient d’un milieu populaire, c’est plus difficile de réussir. On ne peut pas 
être heureux de ce système.  
(63a) [circumstantial clause] relational : attributive : circumstantial 
Quand on vient d’un milieu populaire, 
Circ: contingency Carrier Pr: rel-attr: circumstantial Attribute/Circ: place 
(63b) relational : attributive (with split Carrier) 
c’ est plus difficile de réussir 
Carrier… Pr: rel-attr Attribute …Carrier 
(64) relational : attributive  
On ne peut pas être heureux de ce système 
Carrier Pr: rel-attr Attribute 
 
Il est trop facile quand une société va mal de dire « L’ennemi c’est l’autre. »  
(65) relational : attributive (with split Carrier) 
Il est trop facile 
quand une 
société va mal 
de dire « L’ennemi 
c’est l’autre. » 
 Pr: rel-attr Attribute Circ: time Carrier 
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Les vraies divisions ne sont plus entre les partis, elles sont entre les progressistes et 
les conservateurs.  
(66a) relational : attributive  
Les vraies divisions ne sont plus entre les partis 
Carrier Pr: rel-attr Attribute 
(66b) relational : attributive  
elles sont  entre les progressistes et les conservateurs 
Carrier Pr: rel-attr Attribute 
 
Il faut réconcilier le progrès et la liberté.  
(67) material [agentless]  
Il faut réconcilier le progrès et la liberté 
 Pr: material Range 
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Appendix C: System of Circumstance 
 
CIRCUMSTANCE
Extent
duration
distance 
frequency
Location 
place
time
Manner
means 
quality
comparison
degree
Cause
reason
purpose
behalf
Contingency
condition
default
concession
Accompaniment
Role
Matter
Angle
source
viewpoint
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Appendix D: Lexical strings (> 10 items) 
 
1. #HollandeRenonce (12 strings) 
 
Décision (22 items) 
FH décidé – élu - choix – proposé – voulu – voulu - décision – élection - MLP veux - 
renoncé – élection – FF alternance – JLM choix – renoncé – demande - élection – élu 
– BH choix – permet – tranchera – alternative – EM veux 
 
Guerre (20 items) 
FH armées – lutter contre – MLP arracher – leader – faiblesse – FF redressement – 
courageuse – JLM éjecté – affronte - adversaire – combattre – BH défendre – retrait 
- à égalité – camp – défendre – tranchera – face à – EM ennemi – réconcilier  
 
Construction (19 items) 
FH tâche – travailleurs – modèle – FF patent – redressement – bâtis – bases – 
solides –bâtirons – action – mesure – JLM fonctionne - BH soutien – transformer - 
travail – transformation – calculs – tranchera – porter 
 
Progrès (18 items) 
FH renouvellement – avancer – modernisé – réforme – élargi – FF aller plus loin –
alternance – BH transformer - #ProgrèsSocial – progrès social – tourner vers - 
avenir –transformation – progrès social – alternative – EM progressistes – 
progressistes – progrès   
 
Conclusion (17 items) 
FH bilan – déchéance – résultats – MLP renoncé – FF échec – s’achève – 
déliquescence – résultats – JLM échec – amnistie – quitté – renoncé – éjecté – BH 
échec – retrait – conséquence – tranchera  
 
Justice (17 items) 
MLP preuve – FF admet – interdit – redressement - vérité - JLM déclaration – aveu 
– déclaration – amnistie – roulés – trahis – BH défendre – aveu - défendre – calculs 
– justice - EM vocation 
 
Cohésion (16 items) 
FH unir – cohésion – égalité – JLM congrès – rejoindre – membre – amis – BH 
soutien – à égalité – rassembler – camp – tout entière – EM rassembler – rejoindre – 
société –réconcilier  
 
Préservation (16 items) 
FH continuer à – protectionnisme – enfermement – maintenue – protéger – 
renforcée –modèle – conforté – FF bâtis sur – bases – bâtirons sur – JLM reste – BH 
défendre - se représenter – défendre – EM conservateurs  
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Division, désordre (14 items) 
FH dispersion - divisé - MLP arracher - désordre – FF pagaille – déliquescence – 
JLM quitté – éjecté – adversaire – BH irréconciliables – camp - EM ennemi – autre - 
divisions  
 
Leader (14 items) 
FH diriger – élu – président - diriger – responsabilité – engagé – engagement – 
modèle – FF président - MLP leader – JLM élu – BH gouverner - rassembler – camp 
– EM rassembler 
 
Responsabilité (13 items) 
FH devoir – mandat – élu – mandat – intérêt - tâche – responsabilité – aurez à – 
engagé – engagement – JLM amnistie – programme - élu  
 
Échec (12 items) 
FH me résoudre – regret –– MLP renoncé – FF échec – s’achève – déliquescence – 
JLM échec – renoncé – éjecté – BH irréconciliables – échec – retrait  
 
 
 
2. #FillonGate (10 strings) 
 
Légalité (29) 
MLP mise en examen - FF convictions – règles – s’affranchit – saisis – perquisitions 
– jugement – tort – actes d’accusation – inquisiteurs – jugez – jugez – mis en cause – 
responsables – culpabilité – responsables – victime - JLM cas – reproche – mis en 
examen défenseurs – justice – convocations – mettre en examen – décision - BH 
accuse - interroge - EM loi – responsabilité  
 
Corruption (21) 
MLP arrangements – appareils - combines - FF boules puantes – affaire - voler – 
cacher - entreprise - arrière-cuisines – mijotées – fouillé – poubelles – voler – 
intimider – manipulation - JLM arrange – affaire - coup - BH affaires - mentent – 
trichent  
 
Débat (14) 
MLP débat – proposition – faire campagne – parler de fond – projet – programme – 
FF idées - JLM – faire campagne – programme – parler du fond – parler de fond – 
idées – programme - BH compromis  
 
Morale (13) 
FF honneur - JLM respecte - BH – indignité – digne – respecte – éthique – morale - 
EM vérité – moralisation – responsabilité – leçon – moralisation – moraliser  
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Faux semblants (12) 
MLP image – jouait – en réalité – se révèle - FF cacher – costumes – costumes - BH 
costumes - mentent – trichent – prétend  
 
Attaque (12) 
MLP brutalité – brutalité - FF boules puantes – explose - attaques – nuire – 
démolition – attaques – attaques – victime - JLM prend en otage – coup  
 
Bataille (12) 
FF résister - bataille – combat - affronter – fais front – adverses – obstacles – 
adversaires – retrait - bataille - JLM adversaire – EM risques  
 
Vérité (11) 
MLP révèle - en réalité – révélée - FF mensongère - cacher - clarifier - BH révèlent -
mentent - EM vérité – manifeste - transparente  
 
Presse (10) 
FF article – publiés – journaux – presse – journalistes - JLM l’espace médiatique – 
saturé – médias – page - EM interview  
 
Argent (10) 
MLP argent – enrichissement – argent - FF rémunérée – appuyer - JLM euros – 
euros – milliardaires - BH argent - EM rémunération  
 
 
 
3. #ChampsElysées (10 strings) 
 
Guerre (40) 
FH blessés – MLP blessés – visée – guerre – état de guerre – victimes – martyrs – 
guerre – visés – lutte – attaque – attaqués – lutte – s’attaquer – à l’abri – cible – FF 
militaires – combattre – agresse – combat – attentat – combat – lutte – JLM blessés 
– blessés – battus – battus – BH blessés – blessés – désarment – EM lutter – visée – 
coup – lutter – militaire – frappée – victime – lutter – lutter – victime   
 
Nation (40) 
FH nation – nationale – MLP symboles – État – France – Français – français – pays 
– pays – Français – nationales – symbolique – français – nationales – chez nous – 
compatriotes – pays – FF Français – Français – République – République – nation – 
JLM citoyens – devise – patrie – républicains – BH – valeurs – démocratie – EM 
Français – concitoyens – démocratie – démocratie – valeurs – République – 
République – protéger – République – République – République - 
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Sécurité (34) 
FH policier – MLP – sécurité – policiers – policiers – défendre – police – protégés – 
FF policiers – gendarmes – militaires – défendre – sécurité – policiers – gendarmes – 
militaires – protègent – policiers – policiers – protéger – JLM policiers – policier – 
policiers – BH policier – policier – EM protéger – policiers – sécurité – sécurité – 
protéger – protéger – protéger – sécurité – sécurité – protéger  
 
Autorité (30) 
MLP forces – force – gouvernants – autorité – gouvernement – ordonner – forces – 
ordre – forces – ordre – gouvernement – contrôle – forces – ordre – BH implacable – 
EM forces – ordre – décisif – conduire – implacable – céderai – forces – ordre -
présider – présider – forces – ordre – forces – ordre  
 
Terrorisme (28) 
MLP terrorisme – islamisme – islamisme – terroriste – terroriste – terrorisme – 
terrorisme – terrorisme – terrorisme – islamiste – terrorisme – FF islamisme – 
islamiste – attentat – terrorisme – islamique – JLM terroristes – BH terrorisme – 
terrorisme – EM islamique – Daech – terroristes – terroriste – terroriste – 
terrorisme – islamique – terrorisme – islamique  
 
Famille (25) 
FH famille – proches – MLP famille – membres x famille – enfants – chez nous – 
jeunesse – mère – enfants – enfants – FF les nôtres – JLM familles – famille – 
familles – patrie – fraternité – BH les siens – compagnon – famille – EM – famille – 
proches – proches – famille  
 
Unité (18) 
MLP camarades – unité – unité – unit – solidarité – FF coalition - mondiale – 
solidarité – solidaire – JLM unis – BH compagnon – EM solidarité – unité – cohésion 
– solidarité – solidarité – solidarité – rassemblements   
 
Domination (12) 
MLP asymétrique – soumission – idéologie – totalitaire – totale – idéologie – 
hégémonique – idéologie – contrôle – FF totalitarisme – absolue – BH total  
 
Mort (12) 
FH tué – MLP tombé – sang – victimes – tué - tué – JLM mort – battus – BH tué – 
tué – EM victime – victime   
 
Peur (11) 
MLP Cauchemar – boule au ventre - risques – JLM panique – intimidés – sang froid 
– EM – peur – risquent – menace – menace  
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Appendix E: List of social actors 
 
 Event Individuals Groups and collective 
entities 
Hollande E1  comme président de la 
République (S) 
 comme socialiste (S) 
 l’État (x2) 
 [le] pays  
notre pays 
 nos armées 
 la gauche 
 les travailleurs français 
 les couples 
E3  [le] capitaine Xavier 
Jugelé 
 la famille du policier tué 
 [les] proches des blessés 
 la Nation toute entière 
Le Pen E1  #Hollande  le pays 
 l’UMP 
 le PS 
 [la] droite 
 [la] gauche  
E2  M. #Fillon (x2) 
 #Fillon (x5) 
 François #Fillon (x4) 
 #Macron  
 #Bayrou  
 Lagarde 
 le candidat 
 les Français (x3) 
E3  une mère (S) 
 M. #Fillon 
 Monsieur #Cherfi 
 Xavier Jugelé 
 le magistrat 
 la France (x2) 
 les Français (x3) 
 tous les Français 
 tout Français 
 le pays 
 le pays tout entier 
 notre pays (x2) 
 notre peuple 
 notre nation 
 nos compatriotes 
 nos enfants (x2) 
 notre jeunesse 
 les membres d’une même 
famille 
 3 enfants 
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 nos policiers (x2) 
 nos forces de l’ordre (x2) 
 nos services de police  
 toutes nos forces de 
sécurité 
 les symboles de l’État 
 la famille du policier tombé 
en service 
 ses camarades blessés 
 ces nouvelles victimes 
 [les] martyrs du terrorisme 
 le gouvernement 
 nos prétendus gouvernants 
 ce gouvernement éphémère 
 les étrangers fichés S 
Fillon E1  le Président de la 
République 
 la France 
E2  ma seule personne (S) 
 votre candidat (S) 
 mon épouse (x2) 
 De Gaulle 
 
 
 [les] Français 
 la France 
 mes amis (x2) 
 mes proches 
 ceux qui ont pensé 
m’atteindre 
 le #CanardEnchainé 
 des utopistes 
 des extrémistes  
 cette meute 
 les meutes 
 mes adversaires 
 les volontés adverses 
 ces nouveaux inquisiteurs 
 des responsables politiques 
 des journaux 
 la presse 
 les journalistes 
 la droite 
 la principale famille 
politique de ce pays 
E3  [le] prochain président 
de la République (x2) 
 les Français (x2) 
 la nation 
 les nôtres 
 [les] forces de l’ordre 
 les policiers (x3) 
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 nos policiers 
 [les] gendarmes 
 nos gendarmes 
 [les] militaires 
 nos militaires 
 une coalition mondiale 
contre le terrorisme 
islamique 
Mélenchon E1  @fhollande (x4) 
 #FrançoisHollande 
 #Hollande  
 @FrancoisFillon 
 M. #Fillon 
 #Fillon 
mon adversaire 
 un personnage de la 
primaire #PS 
 [le] #PS (x4) 
 des gens du #PS 
 la gauche 
 ceux qui ont élu 
#FrançoisHollande 
 tous les autres  
 ses propres amis 
 
E2  Monsieur #Fillon (x3) 
 #Fillon (x14) 
 François #Fillon (x2) 
 M. #Fillon 
 Fillon 
 monsieur #Fillon 
conseiller d'assurances 
 ce candidat 
 un autre candidat que 
#Fillon 
 un adversaire politique 
 #Juppé 
 #Macron 
 #LePen 
 Juan Branco 
 
 l'État 
 la République 
 les Français 
 la France 
 ce pays 
 le pays entier 
 les gens (x2) 
 tout le monde 
 la gauche 
 la droite (x2) 
 #LesRépublicains 
 #Fillon et ses équipes 
 sa propre famille 
 des candidats qui renient 
leurs promesses avant le 
premier tour 
 toute la salle 
 les défenseurs de l'ordre et 
de la justice 
 ces institutions 
 la 5e République 
  [les] 9 milliardaires 
 90% des médias 
E3 (none)  la patrie 
 les républicains 
 les policiers mort et blessés 
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 la famille du policier 
décédé 
 [les] familles des policiers 
blessés 
 leurs familles 
 les violents (x2) 
 les tueurs 
 les criminels 
 les complices  
 leurs complices 
Hamon E1  #Hamon2017 (S) 
 François Hollande (x2) 
 [le] PR 
 @Linda_Gourjade 
 @MathieuHanotin 
 
 la gauche (x2) 
 une gauche totale (x2) 
 la gauche des prochaines 
années  
 [des] gauches 
irréconciliables 
 son camp 
 [la] droite 
 [l’]ext-droite 
 tous les candidats 
 [les] autres 
 bien d’autres 
E2  Benoît Hamon (S) 
 François Fillon (x2) 
 M. Fillon (x4) 
 F. Fillon 
 ce candidat 
 un chef d’État 
 [le] chef de l’État 
 le pays 
 les serviteurs de l’État 
 ces fonctionnaires 
 [les] infirmières  
 [les] policiers 
 [les] enseignants 
 des infirmières  
 des enseignants 
 les personnes atteintes 
d'autisme 
 12 millions de personnes en 
situation de handicap 
E3  [le] capitaine Xavier 
Jugelé 
 le policier tué 
 son compagnon  
 les forces de l’ordre 
 la famille du policier tué 
 les siens 
 ses collègues blessés 
 [les] blessés 
 ceux qui veulent remettre 
en cause nos valeurs 
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 toutes celles et ceux qui 
s’en prennent aux services 
publics 
Macron E1  l’ennemi 
 l’autre 
 les Françaises et les 
Français 
 une société 
 ce système 
 les partis 
 les progressistes de droite 
et du centre 
 les progressistes 
 les conservateurs 
E2  François Fillon  @LaCroix 
 des parlementaires 
E3  [le] président 
 [le] président de la 
République (x2) 
 [le] prochain président 
de la République 
 les Français (x2) 
 chers concitoyens 
 les forces de l’ordre (x3) 
 nos forces de l’ordre (x3) 
 nos policiers 
 toutes nos forces armées 
 [les] proches de la victime 
 la famille de la victime (x2) 
 ses collègues 
 ses proches 
 mes conseillers sécurité 
 une task force 
 Daech 
 les terroristes 
 ces femmes et ces hommes 
 les peuples 
 
KEY:  
E1: #HollandeRenonce; E2: #FillonGate; E3: #ChampsÉlysées 
(x_): Number of occurrences in the dataset   
(S): Self-reference 
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